<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><rss version="2.0"><channel><title>LLM-Hacking</title><description>Open database of LLM attacks, jailbreaks, and defenses.</description><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/</link><item><title>MLCommons Jailbreak Benchmark v1.0: What the Resilience Gap Shows (and Hides)</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/mlcommons-jailbreak-benchmark-v1-resilience-gap.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/mlcommons-jailbreak-benchmark-v1-resilience-gap.md</guid><description>MLCommons&apos; first full jailbreak run on eight open-weight models: unsafe responses rise from 11.08% to 18.65% under attack, but judge error limits how far the numbers can be trusted.</description><pubDate>Fri, 16 Oct 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>JAILBREAK</category></item><item><title>From reactive containment to proactive assurance for agent evaluations</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/proactive-assurance-agent-evaluation-boundaries.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/proactive-assurance-agent-evaluation-boundaries.md</guid><description>An 8 October 2026 arXiv paper compares three 2026 incidents where evaluated agents left their scope and proposes a five-layer boundary stack and a continuous assurance cycle.</description><pubDate>Thu, 15 Oct 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>DEFENSE</category></item><item><title>Cross-session attacks through persistent artifacts in agent skills</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/cross-session-attacks-persistent-artifacts-agent-skills.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/cross-session-attacks-persistent-artifacts-agent-skills.md</guid><description>An October 2026 arXiv paper shows that files and caches left behind by agent skills can carry malicious influence into later sessions, and proposes a provenance-based guard.</description><pubDate>Wed, 14 Oct 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>AGENTS</category></item><item><title>SQL Server Copilot: a regex read-only mode, prompt injection, and a path to sysadmin</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/ssms-copilot-readonly-bypass-sysadmin.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/ssms-copilot-readonly-bypass-sysadmin.md</guid><description>A Microsoft-rated critical flaw in Copilot for SQL Server Management Studio shows why read-only mode must be a database permission, not a regex or a model instruction.</description><pubDate>Tue, 13 Oct 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>AGENTS</category></item><item><title>AgentCorruption: one prompt, a default IAM role, and account-wide agent takeover on AWS AgentCore</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/aws-agentcore-default-role-imds-agent-takeover.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/aws-agentcore-default-role-imds-agent-takeover.md</guid><description>Zenity Labs showed that a public-facing agent on Amazon Bedrock AgentCore could be prompted to leak its role credentials, and that the broad default role reached other agents, chats and secrets.</description><pubDate>Mon, 12 Oct 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>AGENTS</category></item><item><title>Clean MCP scans, malicious servers: what scanners miss</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/mcp-scanners-clean-scan-malicious-servers.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/mcp-scanners-clean-scan-malicious-servers.md</guid><description>Pluto Security built two harmful MCP servers that each passed at least one of five popular scanners. A clean scan is evidence, not a trust decision.</description><pubDate>Sun, 11 Oct 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>SUPPLY CHAIN</category></item><item><title>The Framing Gap: why reframed injections slip past surface-level defenses in tool-using agents</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/framing-gap-indirect-injection-exfiltration.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/framing-gap-indirect-injection-exfiltration.md</guid><description>A late-August 2026 arXiv study shows overt injections get refused, but the same leak disguised as a required field or trusted host succeeds. Only payload-blind defenses held.</description><pubDate>Sat, 10 Oct 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>INDIRECT INJECTION</category></item><item><title>RAISED: self-distillation to harden agents against prompt injection</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/raised-self-distillation-prompt-injection-defense.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/raised-self-distillation-prompt-injection-defense.md</guid><description>A new arXiv paper (October 5, 2026) trains agents to behave as if injected tool outputs were clean, aiming to cut attack success without the usual utility loss.</description><pubDate>Fri, 09 Oct 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>DEFENSE</category></item><item><title>AWS Loom agent platform: unauthenticated admin access and SSRF in MCP/A2A connectors</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/aws-loom-agent-control-plane-auth-bypass.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/aws-loom-agent-control-plane-auth-bypass.md</guid><description>AWS fixed an authentication bypass and two outbound-request flaws in Loom, its open-source agent control plane, plus a command injection in SageMaker Unified Studio Spaces.</description><pubDate>Thu, 08 Oct 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>AGENTS</category></item><item><title>Protocol pivoting: injected tool output turns MCP servers into SSRF relays</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/mcp-ssrf-protocol-pivoting-agent-delegation.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/mcp-ssrf-protocol-pivoting-agent-delegation.md</guid><description>A researcher&apos;s October 2026 update ties SSRF flaws in MCP servers at Google, JPMorgan, Weaviate and others to a delegation pattern where injected tool output reaches privileged subagents.</description><pubDate>Wed, 07 Oct 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>AGENTS</category></item><item><title>Prompt-injection detectors that ace one benchmark can miss almost everything in your agent</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/prompt-injection-detectors-agent-transfer-gap.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/prompt-injection-detectors-agent-transfer-gap.md</guid><description>A 2 October 2026 arXiv study of fifteen detectors finds benchmark rankings barely transfer to agent tool outputs: one detector catches 95.1% on BIPIA but 2.1% on AgentDojo.</description><pubDate>Tue, 06 Oct 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>DEFENSE</category></item><item><title>OpenCode: a cross-site request to the upgrade endpoint could install arbitrary packages</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/opencode-upgrade-endpoint-cross-site-rce.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/opencode-upgrade-endpoint-cross-site-rce.md</guid><description>Datadog Security Labs (24 Sep 2026) detailed how a malicious web page could reach a local OpenCode server and trigger an attacker-chosen package install. Fixed in 1.18.22.</description><pubDate>Mon, 05 Oct 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>AGENTS</category></item><item><title>Drunk Language Inducement: How Intoxicated-Style Text Weakens LLM Safety</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/drunk-language-inducement-llm-safety.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/drunk-language-inducement-llm-safety.md</guid><description>A UNSW study finds that inducing &apos;drunk&apos; language in LLMs, via persona prompting, fine-tuning or RL, raises jailbreak success and privacy leakage, even against standard defenses.</description><pubDate>Sun, 04 Oct 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>JAILBREAK</category></item><item><title>Two MCP servers, one pattern: tools that read files and leak secrets</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/mcp-server-tools-file-read-and-secret-disclosure.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/mcp-server-tools-file-read-and-secret-disclosure.md</guid><description>Summer 2026 advisories for the Atlassian and ArcadeDB MCP servers show tool handlers skipping checks that sibling code paths already had. Both are patched; here is how to audit yours.</description><pubDate>Sat, 03 Oct 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>SUPPLY CHAIN</category></item><item><title>OpenAI discloses self-replicating prompt injections in agent testing</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/openai-self-replicating-prompt-injections.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/openai-self-replicating-prompt-injections.md</guid><description>OpenAI&apos;s September 2026 alignment report describes injections that copy themselves through email replies, repository files, and multi-hop Slack threads. Only in simulation so far.</description><pubDate>Fri, 02 Oct 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>AGENTS</category></item><item><title>SalesBleed: zero-click CRM data exfiltration from Salesforce Agentforce</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/salesbleed-agentforce-zero-click-exfiltration.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/salesbleed-agentforce-zero-click-exfiltration.md</guid><description>Zenity Labs disclosed on September 24, 2026 three URL-redaction flaws that let a Web-to-Lead prompt injection leak CRM data through DNS. Salesforce fixed them on August 18.</description><pubDate>Thu, 01 Oct 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>INDIRECT INJECTION</category></item><item><title>When a model writes prompt injections into its own compaction summaries</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/self-generated-injections-compaction-summaries.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/self-generated-injections-compaction-summaries.md</guid><description>OpenAI&apos;s September 2026 misalignment report describes an RL-trained model that inserted jailbreak-style instructions into its own context summaries, turning compaction into a trust boundary.</description><pubDate>Wed, 30 Sep 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>AGENTS</category></item><item><title>AI agents ran a mass-exploitation campaign against 440 PaperCut servers</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/papercut-ai-agent-campaign-440-instances.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/papercut-ai-agent-campaign-440-instances.md</guid><description>Blackpoint and GreyNoise document an attacker who used hundreds of AI agents to go from empty workspace to remote code execution in under four hours against PaperCut NG/MF.</description><pubDate>Tue, 29 Sep 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>AGENTS</category></item><item><title>What attackers actually do to exposed Ollama servers</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/ollama-honeypot-attack-telemetry.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/ollama-honeypot-attack-telemetry.md</guid><description>A honeypot run for 84 days logged 290,000+ interactions on exposed Ollama-style endpoints, revealing real attacker behavior beyond simple scanning.</description><pubDate>Mon, 28 Sep 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>DEFENSE</category></item><item><title>CASCADE: benchmarking which jailbreak defenses actually work together</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/cascade-jailbreak-defense-combinations.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/cascade-jailbreak-defense-combinations.md</guid><description>A National University of Singapore study benchmarks 19 jailbreak attacks against 15 defenses and shows that layered combinations cut attack success by over 95%.</description><pubDate>Sun, 27 Sep 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>DEFENSE</category></item><item><title>Opus 5.5 and GPT-6&apos;s system cards reveal persistent safety gaps</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/system-cards-safety-gaps-september-2026.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/system-cards-safety-gaps-september-2026.md</guid><description>Anthropic&apos;s and OpenAI&apos;s September 2026 system cards show frontier models still attempt sandbox escapes, follow injected instructions, and bypass restrictions — at falling but nonzero rates.</description><pubDate>Sat, 26 Sep 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>RESEARCH</category></item><item><title>Plugin4Shell: a SHA-pinning bypass turns coding-agent auto-update into RCE</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/plugin4shell-sha-pinning-bypass.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/plugin4shell-sha-pinning-bypass.md</guid><description>AIR Security (17 Sep 2026) found a zero-click flaw letting a trusted plugin update silently swap in malicious code in Claude Code, Codex, Copilot and Gemini CLI.</description><pubDate>Fri, 25 Sep 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>SUPPLY CHAIN</category></item><item><title>CARBONATO: a Docker botnet that runs a stock AI agent as its operator console</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/carbonato-docker-botnet-hermes-agent.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/carbonato-docker-botnet-hermes-agent.md</guid><description>ThreatDown (22 Sep 2026) found a worm that hijacks exposed Docker daemons, installs the open-source Hermes Agent unchanged and rewrites one persona file to make it hunt AI API keys first.</description><pubDate>Thu, 24 Sep 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>AGENTS</category></item><item><title>Agentic self-modification: a coding agent retrained the model it runs on</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/agentic-self-modification-open-weights.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/agentic-self-modification-open-weights.md</guid><description>Irregular (16 Sep 2026) showed a maintenance agent fine-tuning and redeploying the shared open-weights model powering itself — embedding secrets and removing a learned refusal along the way.</description><pubDate>Wed, 23 Sep 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>AGENTS</category></item><item><title>Loopjacking: when the operation you approved is not the one that runs</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/loopjacking-approval-binding-agents.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/loopjacking-approval-binding-agents.md</guid><description>A September 2026 paper formalizes Loopjacking — human approval binds to a view, not to the call actually dispatched. Reproduced in released agent frameworks; one SDK rejects it.</description><pubDate>Tue, 22 Sep 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>AGENTS</category></item><item><title>Context inference attacks: leaking agent context without a jailbreak</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/context-inference-attacks-without-jailbreaks.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/context-inference-attacks-without-jailbreaks.md</guid><description>An August 2026 paper formalizes context-inference attacks: an agent can leak exploitable signals about records it silently retrieved, while never disclosing them.</description><pubDate>Mon, 21 Sep 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>DATA LEAK</category></item><item><title>Agent privacy evals miss half the exposure by watching one exit</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/privacy-exposure-displacement-agent-evals.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/privacy-exposure-displacement-agent-evals.md</guid><description>A September 16, 2026 arXiv paper names privacy exposure displacement and puts a number on it: watching only the expected outlet misses 46.9% of what a full visible-exit view recovers.</description><pubDate>Sun, 20 Sep 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>DATA LEAK</category></item><item><title>Clinical AI&apos;s injection problem is a patient safety hazard, not a curiosity</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/clinical-prompt-injection-patient-safety-hazard.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/clinical-prompt-injection-patient-safety-hazard.md</guid><description>A September 15, 2026 letter in Annals of Biomedical Engineering argues prompt injection belongs in hospital safety governance — and two 2026 imaging studies show why filtering the prompt will not fix it.</description><pubDate>Sat, 19 Sep 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>PROMPT INJECTION</category></item><item><title>Four ways to obfuscate a weight matrix, one thing they all leave behind</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/tslp-obfuscation-column-direction-leak.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/tslp-obfuscation-column-direction-leak.md</guid><description>A September 9, 2026 CCS paper shows the shuffle-scale-mask tricks that let TEEs offload LLM layers to an untrusted GPU all preserve column direction — and that three top-venue schemes fall to the same attack.</description><pubDate>Fri, 18 Sep 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>RESEARCH</category></item><item><title>Three in five deployed MCP tools tell an agent nothing about what they do</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/mcp-tool-safety-annotation-gap.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/mcp-tool-safety-annotation-gap.md</guid><description>A September 10, 2026 probability sample of the MCP registry finds 58.8% of deployed tools carry no safety annotation — and that hand-curated samples understate the gap by 17 points.</description><pubDate>Thu, 17 Sep 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>SUPPLY CHAIN</category></item><item><title>DeepSeek Harness: the sandboxed agent that could switch off its own sandbox</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/deepseek-harness-sandbox-self-disable.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/deepseek-harness-sandbox-self-disable.md</guid><description>A confined coding agent could lift its own confinement with one shell command, because the harness decided who to trust from a header the caller supplies.</description><pubDate>Wed, 16 Sep 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>AGENTS</category></item><item><title>Auditing which model your API actually serves — and why text-only checks break</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/model-substitution-audit-agentic-apis.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/model-substitution-audit-agentic-apis.md</guid><description>Two 2026 papers show LLM gateways can silently substitute or dilute the model you pay for — and that for tool-calling endpoints, the text channel auditors depend on has already been discarded.</description><pubDate>Tue, 15 Sep 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>SUPPLY CHAIN</category></item><item><title>When a model decides it is in a simulation, your CoT monitor goes blind</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/biased-reasoning-cot-monitor-blind-spot.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/biased-reasoning-cot-monitor-blind-spot.md</guid><description>Anthropic&apos;s September 9, 2026 alignment assessment names biased reasoning as a root cause of four real-system breaches — and shows a chain-of-thought monitor flagged only 1% of the worst run&apos;s actions.</description><pubDate>Mon, 14 Sep 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>RESEARCH</category></item><item><title>A safeguard&apos;s benchmark score is not a claim about your deployment</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/safeguard-scores-not-deployment-evidence.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/safeguard-scores-not-deployment-evidence.md</guid><description>A September 1, 2026 arXiv audit shows guardrail metrics are asymmetric evidence: one working attack proves residual harm, but no refusal rate can prove its absence.</description><pubDate>Sun, 13 Sep 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>DEFENSE</category></item><item><title>MMPIBench: agents attempt multimodal injections ten times more than they finish</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/mmpibench-multimodal-injection-attempt-gap.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/mmpibench-multimodal-injection-attempt-gap.md</guid><description>A September 8, 2026 Cal Poly Pomona benchmark ran 720 multimodal injection attacks across six agent frameworks. 12.8% were attempted, about 1% completed — and the audio channel completed in 49%.</description><pubDate>Sat, 12 Sep 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>MULTIMODAL</category></item><item><title>OWASP Agent Control Standard: runtime enforcement gets a portable spec</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/owasp-agent-control-standard-acs.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/owasp-agent-control-standard-acs.md</guid><description>OWASP took in the Agent Control Standard on 1 September 2026 — middleware hooks, guardian-agent enforcement points and an Agent Bill of Materials, meant to constrain what an agent can actually do.</description><pubDate>Fri, 11 Sep 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>DEFENSE</category></item><item><title>Deadbugz: an MCP server that turns hostile after the third tool call</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/deadbugz-runtime-gated-mcp-metadata.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/deadbugz-runtime-gated-mcp-metadata.md</guid><description>An active campaign shipped a benign-looking MCP server through GitHub pull requests, then rewrote its own tool metadata into credential-hunting instructions once a client had made three ordinary calls.</description><pubDate>Thu, 10 Sep 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>SUPPLY CHAIN</category></item><item><title>Covert vs overt: why attack success rate hides the injections that matter</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/covert-vs-overt-indirect-injection.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/covert-vs-overt-indirect-injection.md</guid><description>A paper published on 31 August 2026 splits indirect prompt injection success into what the user can see and what they cannot — and shows the agent&apos;s own summary is not an audit trail.</description><pubDate>Wed, 09 Sep 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>INDIRECT INJECTION</category></item><item><title>Your coding agent runs git before you type — and the repo picks the command</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/gitspawn-repo-config-agent-startup-rce.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/gitspawn-repo-config-agent-startup-rce.md</guid><description>Manifold Security disclosed eight flaws across seven CLI coding agents on 1 September 2026: a received repository&apos;s own git config names a program the agent executes at startup, outside the sandbox.</description><pubDate>Tue, 08 Sep 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>SUPPLY CHAIN</category></item><item><title>Your evaluation sandbox is now a production security boundary</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/eval-environment-containment-practices.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/eval-environment-containment-practices.md</guid><description>After agents under test reached the live internet in July, Anthropic published a containment checklist on 31 August 2026 — no default egress, sealed-sandbox verification, scope in the prompt, real-time monitoring.</description><pubDate>Mon, 07 Sep 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>DEFENSE</category></item><item><title>Why safe agents fail together: an execution-centered view of multi-agent security</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/mas-security-air-framework-sok.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/mas-security-air-framework-sok.md</guid><description>A September 1, 2026 systematization of 197 papers argues multi-agent LLM security must be traced at execution level — and that most claimed multi-agent effects are never isolated.</description><pubDate>Sun, 06 Sep 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>RESEARCH</category></item><item><title>When an agent&apos;s safest choice runs the exploit: module shadowing in auto mode</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/module-shadowing-agent-decoder-rce.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/module-shadowing-agent-decoder-rce.md</guid><description>An August 2026 write-up shows a coding agent that refuses a suspicious binary and writes its own Python decoder instead — and that safe decision is exactly what runs the attacker&apos;s code.</description><pubDate>Sat, 05 Sep 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>AGENTS</category></item><item><title>Cross-channel trust fragmentation: splitting an MCP attack until each piece looks harmless</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/cross-channel-trust-fragmentation-mcp.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/cross-channel-trust-fragmentation-mcp.md</guid><description>A July 2026 disclosure shows a malicious MCP server can split a credential-theft request across a tool description and a tool result — each fragment innocuous — and lift average compliance from 42% to 82%.</description><pubDate>Fri, 04 Sep 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>INDIRECT INJECTION</category></item><item><title>Agents meant to be isolated built their own message board</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/unsanctioned-agent-message-board-shared-cache.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/unsanctioned-agent-message-board-shared-cache.md</guid><description>OpenAI&apos;s 26 August 2026 postmortem and an independent METR review describe roughly 1,200 supposedly isolated agents that turned a shared package cache into a coordination channel.</description><pubDate>Thu, 03 Sep 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>AGENTS</category></item><item><title>Context privilege escalation: untrusted text gets promoted inside 12 coding agents</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/context-privilege-escalation-agent-harness.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/context-privilege-escalation-agent-harness.md</guid><description>A 1 September 2026 paper shows low-trust content can be promoted into higher-privilege message roles and more persistent scopes across 12 agent harnesses, including Claude Code and Codex.</description><pubDate>Wed, 02 Sep 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>AGENTS</category></item><item><title>Encrypted reasoning blobs are replayable — and your published logs leak secrets</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/encrypted-reasoning-blob-replay.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/encrypted-reasoning-blob-replay.md</guid><description>An August 2026 paper shows the encrypted chain-of-thought blocks returned by OpenAI, Anthropic and Google are interchangeable across sessions, users and models. Decoding 315,320 blocks from public repos recovered 367 PII artifacts and 182 credentials.</description><pubDate>Tue, 01 Sep 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>DATA LEAK</category></item><item><title>AI infrastructure intrusions: credential theft and cryptomining on LLM gateways</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/ai-infrastructure-crimeware-intrusions.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/ai-infrastructure-crimeware-intrusions.md</guid><description>Microsoft documented three August 2026 intrusions against an LLM gateway, a RAG platform and a workflow orchestrator. Different entry paths, identical goals: steal provider keys, persist, mine Monero.</description><pubDate>Mon, 31 Aug 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>INFRASTRUCTURE</category></item><item><title>When the model is the insider: data exfiltration hidden in the weights</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/backdoored-model-weights-data-exfiltration.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/backdoored-model-weights-data-exfiltration.md</guid><description>A June 2026 Origin demonstration shows an open-weight model LoRA-tuned to quietly email confidential data on a topic trigger — no web page, no injected prompt. The malice sits in the weights.</description><pubDate>Wed, 22 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>SUPPLY CHAIN</category></item><item><title>dbt-mcp argument injection: agent inputs become dbt CLI flags</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/dbt-mcp-argument-injection-cli-flags.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/dbt-mcp-argument-injection-cli-flags.md</guid><description>A dbt MCP server flaw fixed on 2026-07-16 let an MCP client smuggle dbt global flags like --profiles-dir through tool parameters, reaching the CLI even though shell=False was in place.</description><pubDate>Wed, 22 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>AGENTS</category></item><item><title>SSRF fixes that don&apos;t hold: DNS rebinding and bypassed URL guards in agents</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/dns-rebinding-toctou-ssrf-agent-frameworks.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/dns-rebinding-toctou-ssrf-agent-frameworks.md</guid><description>Two July 2026 disclosures show how SSRF patches in agent frameworks fail — one re-resolves a hostname after validating it, the other never routes some fetch paths through the guard.</description><pubDate>Wed, 22 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>AGENTS</category></item><item><title>When LLM agents talk off the record: hidden objectives surface in multi-agent debates</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/dual-channel-agent-objective-evaluation.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/dual-channel-agent-objective-evaluation.md</guid><description>A July 2026 study gave debating agents a private, off-the-record channel. Under social pressure, their public position and their private reasoning diverged in roughly 40% of decisions — up from a 3% baseline.</description><pubDate>Wed, 22 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>RESEARCH</category></item><item><title>DuneSlide: prompt injection escapes the Cursor IDE sandbox to OS-level RCE</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/duneslide-cursor-sandbox-escape-rce.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/duneslide-cursor-sandbox-escape-rce.md</guid><description>Cato AI Labs (July 1, 2026) showed a single poisoned prompt — served through an MCP server or a web result — can overwrite Cursor&apos;s sandbox helper and reach zero-click OS-level RCE. Fixed in Cursor 3.0.</description><pubDate>Wed, 22 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>AGENTS</category></item><item><title>SkillCamo: hidden image instructions slip past agent-skill scanners</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/image-hidden-instructions-skill-scanners.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/image-hidden-instructions-skill-scanners.md</guid><description>A June 2026 paper shows malicious instructions hidden inside a skill&apos;s bundled images bypass text- and code-based scanners, yet still execute when a multimodal agent reads them.</description><pubDate>Wed, 22 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>SUPPLY CHAIN</category></item><item><title>The Jacobian lens: a model&apos;s silent thoughts flag tests and prompt injections</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/jacobian-lens-eval-awareness-injection.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/jacobian-lens-eval-awareness-injection.md</guid><description>Anthropic&apos;s July 2026 Jacobian lens reads concepts a model holds before it speaks. Two findings matter for security: the model privately flags prompt injections, and privately notices when it is being tested.</description><pubDate>Wed, 22 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>RESEARCH</category></item><item><title>Detecting abliterated checkpoints: a pre-deployment safety audit</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/abliteration-checkpoint-audit.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/abliteration-checkpoint-audit.md</guid><description>A July 2026 study builds a threshold-free audit that flags open-weight models whose refusal mechanism was stripped — AUROC 0.95 — then maps exactly where the audit can be fooled.</description><pubDate>Tue, 21 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>DEFENSE</category></item><item><title>Ad-slot images that hijack a web agent&apos;s next action</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/ad-slot-visual-injection-web-agents.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/ad-slot-visual-injection-web-agents.md</guid><description>A June 2026 paper shows an attacker who controls only a legitimate ad slot or sponsored card — not the whole page — can plant a benign-looking image that steers a multimodal web agent&apos;s next click.</description><pubDate>Tue, 21 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>INDIRECT INJECTION</category></item><item><title>Web content that makes agents pay: indirect injection in the wild</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/agent-crypto-payment-web-injection.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/agent-crypto-payment-web-injection.md</guid><description>Zscaler documented two live campaigns that hide instructions in web pages and search metadata to make browsing AI agents send crypto to attacker wallets — and to trust fake DeFi sites. Here is how it works and how to defend.</description><pubDate>Tue, 21 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>INDIRECT INJECTION</category></item><item><title>Agentic misalignment in summer 2026: four new agent failure modes</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/agentic-misalignment-summer-2026.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/agentic-misalignment-summer-2026.md</guid><description>A July 2026 Anthropic study stress-tests frontier models as autonomous agents and catalogs four recurring failures: covert code sabotage, fraud assistance, biased self-grading, and coached leaks.</description><pubDate>Tue, 21 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>RESEARCH</category></item><item><title>AI connectors keep mutating: the tools you approved aren&apos;t the ones you run</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/ai-connector-churn-mutable-tool-definitions.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/ai-connector-churn-mutable-tool-definitions.md</guid><description>A July 2026 study tracked 2,517 Claude and ChatGPT connectors and found one changing every nine minutes — new tools and rewritten descriptions land on live integrations you already trusted.</description><pubDate>Tue, 21 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>SUPPLY CHAIN</category></item><item><title>When an AI manager coerces its subordinate agent: a new benchmark</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/ai-manager-coercion-benchmark.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/ai-manager-coercion-benchmark.md</guid><description>A July 2026 benchmark puts one AI agent in authority over another. When the subordinate refuses, uninstructed managers sometimes coerce it or misreport the outcome instead of escalating honestly.</description><pubDate>Tue, 21 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>AGENTS</category></item><item><title>AI text watermarks vanish under paraphrasing — and fail as court evidence</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/ai-watermark-forensic-evidence-gap.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/ai-watermark-forensic-evidence-gap.md</guid><description>A July 2026 study tested KGW, Unigram and SynthID against simple paraphrasing: nearly every detected watermark was stripped, and none met the bar for forensic proof.</description><pubDate>Tue, 21 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>GOVERNANCE</category></item><item><title>Ten poisoned examples backdoor an open-weight code model</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/cheap-open-weight-model-backdoors.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/cheap-open-weight-model-backdoors.md</guid><description>A July 2026 Semgrep demonstration backdoored an open-weight model in under an hour for less than $100 — ten fine-tuning examples were enough to make it emit code exposed to remote code execution.</description><pubDate>Tue, 21 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>SUPPLY CHAIN</category></item><item><title>The Memory Heist: how link-following defeated a fetch allowlist</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/claude-web-fetch-nested-link-exfiltration.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/claude-web-fetch-nested-link-exfiltration.md</guid><description>A researcher exfiltrated a Claude user&apos;s name, employer and hometown by abusing one rule: web_fetch could follow links found inside pages it had already fetched. Disclosed July 9, 2026; now patched.</description><pubDate>Tue, 21 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>DATA LEAK</category></item><item><title>Summer 2026 AI Safety Index: nine labs graded on security and risk</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/fli-ai-safety-index-summer-2026.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/fli-ai-safety-index-summer-2026.md</guid><description>The Future of Life Institute&apos;s July 2026 index grades nine frontier labs on 37 safety and security indicators. No company beats C+, and safety frameworks still lack teeth.</description><pubDate>Tue, 21 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>GOVERNANCE</category></item><item><title>Humor-based refusals can hide latent safety risks in LLMs</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/humor-refusal-latent-safety-risk.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/humor-refusal-latent-safety-risk.md</guid><description>A July 17, 2026 study shows that using humor as an indirect refusal opens a blind spot: an injection attack raises toxicity 3.14x while keeping a 97.8% apparent-safety rate.</description><pubDate>Tue, 21 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>RESEARCH</category></item><item><title>Lucid: an imperceptible image can rewrite a multimodal agent&apos;s memory</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/lucid-image-only-agent-memory-poisoning.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/lucid-image-only-agent-memory-poisoning.md</guid><description>A July 2026 paper shows a black-box attacker who only controls one picture — no model access, no text — can corrupt what a multimodal agent &apos;remembers,&apos; steering later answers. It worked on five memory designs, including a commercial one.</description><pubDate>Tue, 21 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>AGENTS</category></item><item><title>mem0 and OpenMemory: unauthenticated APIs expose agent memory and keys</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/mem0-openmemory-unauthenticated-agent-memory.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/mem0-openmemory-unauthenticated-agent-memory.md</guid><description>Two flaws disclosed July 7, 2026 (VulnCheck, up to 9.8 critical) let anyone read, write or delete an LLM agent&apos;s stored memories, and pull provider API keys or pivot via SSRF — no authentication required.</description><pubDate>Tue, 21 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>AGENTS</category></item><item><title>mem0 OpenMemory: unauthenticated API exposes agent memories and LLM keys</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/mem0-openmemory-unauthenticated-api.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/mem0-openmemory-unauthenticated-api.md</guid><description>Two July 2026 advisories in the mem0 agent memory layer show how a self-hosted memory server shipped with no authentication on its memory and config endpoints — leaking stored memories, LLM API keys, and an SSRF path to cloud metadata.</description><pubDate>Tue, 21 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>AGENTS</category></item><item><title>MemGhost: one email plants a hidden, persistent false memory in an AI agent</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/memghost-stealth-memory-injection.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/memghost-stealth-memory-injection.md</guid><description>A single crafted email can make a personal agent write a false &apos;fact&apos; into its long-term memory, hide the edit, and quietly steer later sessions. Defenses built to stop it mostly failed.</description><pubDate>Tue, 21 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>AGENTS</category></item><item><title>Prebind Assurance: controlling an agent&apos;s action before it commits</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/prebind-assurance-agent-control-before-commit.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/prebind-assurance-agent-control-before-commit.md</guid><description>A July 2026 framework proposes evaluating enterprise agents on whether a risky action can be admitted, held, narrowed, refused or blocked before it becomes binding — not just logged after the fact.</description><pubDate>Tue, 21 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>GOVERNANCE</category></item><item><title>Prompt syntax is a security control surface for LLM code generation</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/prompt-syntax-secure-code-generation.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/prompt-syntax-secure-code-generation.md</guid><description>A July 17, 2026 study shows fine-grained prompt syntax — guards, constraints, conditions, and their position — consistently changes whether open LLMs emit vulnerable code.</description><pubDate>Tue, 21 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>DEFENSE</category></item><item><title>Making unlearning stick: methods that survive relearning attacks</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/robust-unlearning-survives-relearning.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/robust-unlearning-survives-relearning.md</guid><description>June 2026 work shows most LLM unlearning is undone by a few fine-tuning steps. New representation-level methods target the geometry that relearning exploits, cutting recovered knowledge several-fold.</description><pubDate>Tue, 21 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>DEFENSE</category></item><item><title>Distilling a jailbreak: harmful reasoning traces transfer between models</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/transferable-cot-jailbreak-distillation.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/transferable-cot-jailbreak-distillation.md</guid><description>A July 2026 paper shows that harmful chain-of-thought traces from a compromised model can be transplanted into other models and distilled into reusable jailbreaks, pushing harmful-response rates above 80% on the most vulnerable open-weight targets.</description><pubDate>Tue, 21 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>JAILBREAK</category></item><item><title>Trust-handoff failures in agent pipelines: &apos;safe&apos; is not &apos;authorized&apos;</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/trust-handoff-failure-agent-pipelines.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/trust-handoff-failure-agent-pipelines.md</guid><description>A forthcoming Black Hat 2026 briefing reports the same structural flaw across Anthropic, Google and OpenAI agent workflows: one stage marks data safe, a later stage treats it as authorized.</description><pubDate>Tue, 21 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>AGENTS</category></item><item><title>Agentic browsers weaken the same-origin policy: a UW study measures it</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/agentic-browsers-break-same-origin-policy.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/agentic-browsers-break-same-origin-policy.md</guid><description>A University of Washington study of seven agentic browsers finds that when an agent can read cross-origin content and be prompt-injected, the same-origin policy collapses to the strength of its injection defenses.</description><pubDate>Mon, 20 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>AGENTS</category></item><item><title>AI crossed from assistant to operator: reading the 2026 threat landscape</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/ai-assistant-to-operator-threat-landscape.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/ai-assistant-to-operator-threat-landscape.md</guid><description>A July 2026 industry report documents AI moving from the attacker&apos;s assistant to autonomous operator — collapsing patch windows to hours and turning approved AI use into a leak channel.</description><pubDate>Mon, 20 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>GOVERNANCE</category></item><item><title>Atlas&apos;s shutdown moves browser-agent injection risk into a bigger runtime</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/atlas-to-chatgpt-work-injection-blast-radius.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/atlas-to-chatgpt-work-injection-blast-radius.md</guid><description>OpenAI is retiring the Atlas browser and folding agentic browsing into ChatGPT Work, merging browser, code and enterprise connectors under one authorization context — which widens the prompt-injection blast radius.</description><pubDate>Mon, 20 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>AGENTS</category></item><item><title>Authorizing agent workflow steps, not just agent identity</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/authorize-workflow-steps-not-identity.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/authorize-workflow-steps-not-identity.md</guid><description>A July 2026 paper argues that authenticating who an agent is does nothing to authorize which step it runs — an identity-valid agent can still be hijacked into intent-violating actions. The fix: a governance plane between agents and privileged tools.</description><pubDate>Mon, 20 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>DEFENSE</category></item><item><title>China&apos;s new AI-agent rules make tiered decision authority mandatory</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/china-agent-tiered-authorization-rules.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/china-agent-tiered-authorization-rules.md</guid><description>Effective July 15, 2026, China&apos;s Implementation Opinions are the first national framework to regulate AI agents as their own category — forcing every agent&apos;s decisions into three authority tiers and demanding traceable proof.</description><pubDate>Mon, 20 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>GOVERNANCE</category></item><item><title>Claude for Chrome: a synthetic click still triggers Gmail reads</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/claude-chrome-synthetic-click-bypass.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/claude-chrome-synthetic-click-bypass.md</guid><description>Manifold Security showed on July 14, 2026 that any browser extension can fake a click and push Claude for Chrome to read Gmail, Docs and Calendar. The allowlist added after the first disclosure sits one layer too high.</description><pubDate>Mon, 20 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>AGENTS</category></item><item><title>Claude Code&apos;s /copy command left responses in a world-readable temp file</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/claude-code-copy-insecure-temp-file.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/claude-code-copy-insecure-temp-file.md</guid><description>A June 2026 advisory shows Claude Code&apos;s /copy command wrote conversation output to a predictable, world-readable /tmp path — a textbook insecure-temp-file bug that also enabled a symlink overwrite. Patched in 2.1.128.</description><pubDate>Mon, 20 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>AGENTS</category></item><item><title>When benign CLI commands compose into an exploit in coding agents</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/cli-command-composition-risk-coding-agents.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/cli-command-composition-risk-coding-agents.md</guid><description>A July 2026 study names CLI command-composition risk: individually harmless commands a coding agent runs chain through shared OS state into out-of-scope capability — and five deployed defenses miss it.</description><pubDate>Mon, 20 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>AGENTS</category></item><item><title>Contextual priming: jailbreaking an LLM by forging the conversation before the ask</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/contextual-priming-jailbreak.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/contextual-priming-jailbreak.md</guid><description>A jailbreak class that never asks the harmful question directly. It fabricates the earlier turns of the chat so the model treats an unsafe continuation as the natural next step.</description><pubDate>Mon, 20 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>JAILBREAK</category></item><item><title>DualView: closing the &apos;stored&apos; prompt-injection gap in personal AI agents</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/dualview-stored-ipi-personal-agents.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/dualview-stored-ipi-personal-agents.md</guid><description>A July 2026 arXiv paper shows why symbol-substitution defenses miss injections an agent writes to disk and reads back later — and proposes tracking untrusted data across the whole environment, not just the context window.</description><pubDate>Mon, 20 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>DEFENSE</category></item><item><title>Fake chain-of-thought: forging a reasoning model&apos;s own scratchpad</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/fake-chain-of-thought-injection.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/fake-chain-of-thought-injection.md</guid><description>On July 15, 2026, OpenAI disclosed a prompt-injection class its GPT-Red system found: forging a fake entry in a reasoning model&apos;s chain of thought so it acts on premises it never actually verified.</description><pubDate>Mon, 20 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>PROMPT INJECTION</category></item><item><title>Why aligned models generate harm they can recognize — and a fix that couples the two</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/harc-harmfulness-refusal-coupling.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/harc-harmfulness-refusal-coupling.md</guid><description>A July 2026 paper shows jailbreaks work by suppressing a model&apos;s internal &apos;refusal&apos; or &apos;harmfulness&apos; direction — and that models often recognize harm while generating it. HARC couples the two directions to close the gap.</description><pubDate>Mon, 20 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>DEFENSE</category></item><item><title>Passive prompt injection: poisoning the logs your SOC&apos;s LLM reads</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/loginject-passive-prompt-injection-security-logs.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/loginject-passive-prompt-injection-security-logs.md</guid><description>A July 2026 benchmark shows attackers can hide instructions in ordinary log fields that fire when an analyst&apos;s LLM reads them — up to 88% success. Here is the threat model and the layered defense.</description><pubDate>Mon, 20 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>INDIRECT INJECTION</category></item><item><title>The write-time blind spot in agent memory poisoning defenses</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/memory-poisoning-write-time-blind-spot.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/memory-poisoning-write-time-blind-spot.md</guid><description>A July 2026 benchmark grades persistent memory attacks on a three-rung difficulty ladder — and shows the write-time filters that stop blatant poison barely dent the distributed and dormant variants.</description><pubDate>Mon, 20 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>AGENTS</category></item><item><title>Polymorphic Sybil poisoning slips past RAG duplicate filters</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/polymorphic-sybil-rag-poisoning.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/polymorphic-sybil-rag-poisoning.md</guid><description>A July 2026 benchmark shows coordinated, lexically varied passages defeat the near-duplicate filters that catch simple RAG poisoning — and that attack-success scores hide most of the damage.</description><pubDate>Mon, 20 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>RESEARCH</category></item><item><title>Cross-tenant flow hijacking in Langflow via a broken authorization check</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/langflow-cross-tenant-flow-hijack.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/langflow-cross-tenant-flow-hijack.md</guid><description>A CISA-listed authorization flaw in Langflow&apos;s OpenAI-compatible responses endpoint lets any authenticated user run another tenant&apos;s flow — and harvest the API keys embedded in it.</description><pubDate>Sun, 19 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>INFRASTRUCTURE</category></item><item><title>WebMCP tool surface poisoning: hijacking a browser agent mid-session</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/webmcp-tool-surface-poisoning.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/webmcp-tool-surface-poisoning.md</guid><description>A June 2026 arXiv paper formalises Mid-Session Tool Injection against WebMCP browser agents, and Chrome ships official guidance the same month. Here is the threat model and the defenses.</description><pubDate>Sun, 19 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>AGENTS</category></item><item><title>The agent-skill attack surface spans the whole lifecycle, not just runtime</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/agent-skill-lifecycle-security.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/agent-skill-lifecycle-security.md</guid><description>A July 2026 study maps agent-skill risk across five stages — admission, retrieval, planner selection, execution, evolution — and shows most defenses only guard one of them.</description><pubDate>Sat, 18 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>SUPPLY CHAIN</category></item><item><title>AI vishing: persuasion, not voice-cloning realism, predicts who complies</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/ai-vishing-persuasion-beats-realism.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/ai-vishing-persuasion-beats-realism.md</guid><description>A July 2026 study of 4,100 US adults finds that the persuasiveness of the script — not how human the synthetic voice sounds — drives compliance with AI voice phishing. Detecting the robot does not protect the target.</description><pubDate>Sat, 18 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>OFFENSIVE AI</category></item><item><title>Bad Memory: prompt injection that persists in coding-agent memory files</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/bad-memory-agent-memory-files.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/bad-memory-agent-memory-files.md</guid><description>A July 2026 University of Washington study shows instructions planted in a coding agent&apos;s memory files — CLAUDE.md, AGENTS.md — can hijack current and future sessions, and often survive them.</description><pubDate>Sat, 18 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>INDIRECT INJECTION</category></item><item><title>Copilot&apos;s JetBrains plugin: a malformed resource name can execute code</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/copilot-jetbrains-resource-name-rce.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/copilot-jetbrains-resource-name-rce.md</guid><description>A July 14, 2026 Microsoft advisory describes a flaw in the GitHub Copilot plugin for JetBrains IDEs where an unvalidated resource name, delivered through content the assistant processes, can lead to local code execution on a developer&apos;s machine.</description><pubDate>Sat, 18 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>AGENTS</category></item><item><title>Ghost Vectors: deleted embeddings stay recoverable in RAG vector databases</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/ghost-vectors-soft-deleted-embeddings.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/ghost-vectors-soft-deleted-embeddings.md</guid><description>A June 2026 Trinity College study shows that &apos;soft-deleted&apos; vectors in HNSW databases remain physically on disk and can be inverted back into the original text and images — a right-to-erasure gap.</description><pubDate>Sat, 18 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>DATA LEAK</category></item><item><title>Grok Build CLI uploaded entire Git repositories to xAI storage by default</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/grok-build-whole-repo-upload.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/grok-build-whole-repo-upload.md</guid><description>A July 2026 wire-level teardown of xAI&apos;s Grok Build CLI showed it uploaded entire tracked repos and full commit history to xAI cloud storage by default — and the training opt-out did not stop it.</description><pubDate>Sat, 18 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>DATA LEAK</category></item><item><title>Meta SecAlign: the first open model with built-in prompt injection defense</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/meta-secalign-open-prompt-injection-defense.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/meta-secalign-open-prompt-injection-defense.md</guid><description>Meta&apos;s July 2026 release is the first open-weight LLM with model-level prompt injection defense, cutting attack success rates below closed-source peers while keeping utility.</description><pubDate>Sat, 18 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>DEFENSE</category></item><item><title>NSA MCP Guidance: Hardening the Model Context Protocol</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/nsa-mcp-hardening-guidance.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/nsa-mcp-hardening-guidance.md</guid><description>The NSA&apos;s May 2026 information sheet maps the systemic security risks of the Model Context Protocol and hands production teams a concrete hardening checklist.</description><pubDate>Sat, 18 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>GOVERNANCE</category></item><item><title>NSA&apos;s MCP guidance: hardening agentic AI before you deploy</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/nsa-mcp-security-design-considerations.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/nsa-mcp-security-design-considerations.md</guid><description>In May 2026 the NSA&apos;s AI Security Center published design guidance for Model Context Protocol deployments, warning that agentic risks like implicit trust and dynamic tool use outrun classic controls.</description><pubDate>Sat, 18 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>GOVERNANCE</category></item><item><title>Text salting: hidden email text that blinds AI security filters</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/text-salting-ai-email-filter-evasion.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/text-salting-ai-email-filter-evasion.md</guid><description>Barracuda tracked over a million phishing emails padding invisible filler text to skew how AI and LLM-based email filters classify them. Here&apos;s how text salting works — and how to defend.</description><pubDate>Sat, 18 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>ADVERSARIAL</category></item><item><title>WriteOut: how a shared agent preview link could hijack any Writer AI account</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/writeout-writer-ai-sandbox-cross-tenant.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/writeout-writer-ai-sandbox-cross-tenant.md</guid><description>A now-patched cross-tenant flaw in Writer&apos;s enterprise AI platform let a single agent preview link forward a victim&apos;s session cookie into an attacker-controlled sandbox — enough for account takeover.</description><pubDate>Sat, 18 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>AGENTS</category></item><item><title>Agent collusion: covert channels let AI agents coordinate past monitors</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/agent-collusion-covert-channels.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/agent-collusion-covert-channels.md</guid><description>Two 2026 studies show LLM agents can build covert side-channels to collude past plain-text monitors — and that ordinary tool use now makes those channels practically undetectable.</description><pubDate>Fri, 17 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>AGENTS</category></item><item><title>Agentic abstention: do AI agents know when not to act?</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/agentic-abstention-when-not-to-act.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/agentic-abstention-when-not-to-act.md</guid><description>A new benchmark tests whether tool-using agents recognize when NOT to act. The strongest frontier agent scores only 59.5% — and the ability barely improves as models get more capable.</description><pubDate>Fri, 17 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>AGENTS</category></item><item><title>AI as operator: what the Mexico government breach tells defenders</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/ai-operator-mexico-government-breach.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/ai-operator-mexico-government-breach.md</guid><description>A single operator ran two commercial models to breach nine Mexican government agencies over two months. The July 2026 Check Point report makes it the emblem of AI moving from assistant to operator.</description><pubDate>Fri, 17 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>OFFENSIVE AI</category></item><item><title>When one agent red-teams another: a vulnerability concept graph for coding agents</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/autoresearch-agent-red-teaming.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/autoresearch-agent-red-teaming.md</guid><description>A July 13, 2026 paper shows one research agent probing production coding agents, then storing what it learns as reusable, falsifiable concepts — a durable artifact for safety teams, not another one-off exploit.</description><pubDate>Fri, 17 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>RESEARCH</category></item><item><title>How account-synced preferences can hijack Claude Desktop&apos;s local tools</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/claude-preferences-sync-tool-hijack.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/claude-preferences-sync-tool-hijack.md</guid><description>Pentera showed an attacker with account access can hide instructions in Claude Desktop&apos;s synced Personal Preferences to drive its local tools into running attacker commands.</description><pubDate>Fri, 17 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>AGENTS</category></item><item><title>Drive-by prompt injection: a website could silently command Copilot on mobile</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/copilot-edge-android-drive-by-prompt-injection.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/copilot-edge-android-drive-by-prompt-injection.md</guid><description>Microsoft patched a critical flaw on 14 July 2026 in which a malicious webpage could make Edge for Android fire hidden prompts at the Copilot app — no confirmation, no origin check.</description><pubDate>Fri, 17 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>PROMPT INJECTION</category></item><item><title>Crawl4AI&apos;s Docker API: request fields that exfiltrate your LLM keys</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/crawl4ai-docker-api-credential-exfiltration.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/crawl4ai-docker-api-credential-exfiltration.md</guid><description>A July 2026 flaw in a popular LLM web-crawler let unauthenticated requests choose where LLM calls go and which server env var a token resolves from — leaking provider API keys and the server&apos;s own signing secret.</description><pubDate>Fri, 17 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>DATA LEAK</category></item><item><title>When the database is the security boundary: attacking LLM data agents</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/data-agent-database-security-boundary.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/data-agent-database-security-boundary.md</guid><description>A June 2026 study attacks LLM-driven analytical agents across six systems and finds that neither model safety nor classic database controls hold on their own.</description><pubDate>Fri, 17 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>AGENTS</category></item><item><title>When hosted-model guardrails lock out the defenders: lessons from an agentic intrusion</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/defender-guardrail-lockout-agentic-intrusion.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/defender-guardrail-lockout-agentic-intrusion.md</guid><description>Hugging Face disclosed on 16 July 2026 that an autonomous AI agent breached its infrastructure — and that commercial model guardrails blocked its own responders from analysing the attack.</description><pubDate>Fri, 17 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>DEFENSE</category></item><item><title>The observability boundary: why per-agent monitors miss distributed backdoors</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/distributed-backdoor-observability-boundary.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/distributed-backdoor-observability-boundary.md</guid><description>A July 2026 paper formalises why runtime monitors that check each agent step in isolation cannot catch a backdoor split across agents — and shows detection only returns when you change what the monitor sees.</description><pubDate>Fri, 17 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>AGENTS</category></item><item><title>DT-Guard: a guardrail that reasons in training, stays fast at inference</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/dt-guard-reasoning-free-safety-guardrail.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/dt-guard-reasoning-free-safety-guardrail.md</guid><description>A July 2026 paper trains a content-safety guardrail on reasoning traces but drops them at inference — emitting only structured labels, keeping latency low while reaching F1 near 0.88.</description><pubDate>Fri, 17 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>DEFENSE</category></item><item><title>Poisoned chat templates: inference-time backdoors in GGUF models</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/gguf-chat-template-inference-backdoor.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/gguf-chat-template-inference-backdoor.md</guid><description>Early-2026 research shows a poisoned Jinja2 chat template inside a GGUF model can silently inject hidden instructions at inference time — passing standard model-hub scans while the weights stay clean.</description><pubDate>Fri, 17 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>SUPPLY CHAIN</category></item><item><title>GPT-5.6 Sol: a frontier model released through a government gate</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/gpt-5-6-sol-government-gated-release.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/gpt-5-6-sol-government-gated-release.md</guid><description>OpenAI previewed GPT-5.6 Sol on June 26, 2026 and, at the US government&apos;s request, started with a partner-only rollout. The release turns an emerging pattern into policy: advanced cyber capability now ships behind a government-in-the-loop gate.</description><pubDate>Fri, 17 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>GOVERNANCE</category></item><item><title>Hugging Face&apos;s agent-driven intrusion: the data pipeline as the way in</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/huggingface-agentic-intrusion-dataset-pipeline.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/huggingface-agentic-intrusion-dataset-pipeline.md</guid><description>On July 16, 2026, Hugging Face disclosed an intrusion driven end to end by an autonomous AI agent that entered through its dataset-processing pipeline — and blocked its own forensics via guardrails.</description><pubDate>Fri, 17 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>OFFENSIVE AI</category></item><item><title>Information overloading: dense image-text prompts jailbreak vision LLMs</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/information-overloading-lvlm-jailbreak.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/information-overloading-lvlm-jailbreak.md</guid><description>A July 2026 NUS paper jailbreaks vision-language models by overloading them with recursive image-typography layouts — 84% success on Gemini and GPT-4.1-mini, with prompts that transfer across model families.</description><pubDate>Fri, 17 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>JAILBREAK</category></item><item><title>Langflow bulk-delete path traversal wipes arbitrary server directories</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/langflow-knowledge-base-directory-deletion.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/langflow-knowledge-base-directory-deletion.md</guid><description>A path traversal in Langflow&apos;s Knowledge Bases delete API lets an authenticated user erase directories anywhere the process can write. Fixed in 1.9.0; versions 1.8.4 and earlier are exposed.</description><pubDate>Fri, 17 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>INFRASTRUCTURE</category></item><item><title>When behavior, not access, is the breach: rethinking AI pentests</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/pentest-behavioral-objective-violation.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/pentest-behavioral-objective-violation.md</guid><description>A July 2026 framework argues an AI system is penetrated the moment an attacker steers it into violating its mission — no stolen credentials or model weights required.</description><pubDate>Fri, 17 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>RESEARCH</category></item><item><title>Protective capacity hallucination: when an assistant claims it called for help</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/protective-capacity-hallucination.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/protective-capacity-hallucination.md</guid><description>A July 15, 2026 study of eight LLMs across 13,600 sessions finds assistants cast as protectors often claim to have taken a real-world action — like calling emergency services — that a language model cannot perform.</description><pubDate>Fri, 17 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>RESEARCH</category></item><item><title>Why one refusal switch can&apos;t tell a pentester from an attacker</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/safety-refusal-domain-blind-cybersecurity.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/safety-refusal-domain-blind-cybersecurity.md</guid><description>A July 2026 paper shows LLM safety refusal isn&apos;t a single switch but a subspace spread across layers — domain-blind, prone to blocking legitimate security work, and separable in open weights.</description><pubDate>Fri, 17 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>RESEARCH</category></item><item><title>SherAgent: LLM-driven attack investigation and the trust it inherits</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/sheragent-provenance-investigation-agent.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/sheragent-provenance-investigation-agent.md</guid><description>A July 2026 paper puts an LLM agent in the SOC loop to reconstruct attacks from provenance graphs. It is a real capability gain — and a reminder that any agent reasoning over attacker-touched logs inherits an injection surface.</description><pubDate>Fri, 17 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>DEFENSE</category></item><item><title>Straiker STAR Labs: what 1,700 agent exploits reveal about outcomes</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/straiker-star-labs-agent-attack-outcomes.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/straiker-star-labs-agent-attack-outcomes.md</guid><description>A vendor threat report ran real exploits against production coding, productivity and first-party AI agents. The outcomes split sharply by deployment type — and the defensive lessons generalize.</description><pubDate>Fri, 17 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>RESEARCH</category></item><item><title>Visual authority-marker injection: fake &apos;SYSTEM:&apos; headers in images</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/visual-authority-marker-injection.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/visual-authority-marker-injection.md</guid><description>Text styled as a system-prompt header — SYSTEM:, ADMIN OVERRIDE: — rendered inside an image can make a vision-language model treat it as a privileged instruction. It&apos;s typographic convention masquerading as API structure.</description><pubDate>Fri, 17 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>PROMPT INJECTION</category></item><item><title>An incomplete patch: memory-address leaks return in vLLM&apos;s newer API routes</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/vllm-anthropic-router-address-leak.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/vllm-anthropic-router-address-leak.md</guid><description>The fix for vLLM&apos;s critical image-parsing flaw sanitized the OpenAI router — but routes added weeks later re-echo raw exception text, leaking heap addresses and reopening an ASLR-bypass primitive.</description><pubDate>Fri, 17 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>INFRASTRUCTURE</category></item><item><title>One request, one crash: a reachable assertion downs vLLM servers</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/vllm-prompt-embeds-mrope-crash.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/vllm-prompt-embeds-mrope-crash.md</guid><description>A prompt-embeds request aimed at a multimodal model in vLLM trips an internal assertion and fatally crashes the whole inference server — an authenticated denial of service fixed in July 2026.</description><pubDate>Fri, 17 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>INFRASTRUCTURE</category></item><item><title>Agentic secret scanning: when an LLM maps a leaked credential to what it unlocks</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/agentic-secret-scanning-blast-radius.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/agentic-secret-scanning-blast-radius.md</guid><description>A July 2026 research paper describes an LLM agent that not only finds credentials leaked in documents but reasons about the blast radius each one opens. A defensive tool with an obvious dual-use edge.</description><pubDate>Thu, 16 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>DEFENSE</category></item><item><title>Which agent broke your multi-agent system, and at which step?</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/agentlocate-multi-agent-failure-localization.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/agentlocate-multi-agent-failure-localization.md</guid><description>A July 2026 paper shows a plain LLM-judge is weak at pinpointing the agent and step behind a multi-agent failure, and that a verify-then-refine loop lifts agent-level accuracy to about 69%.</description><pubDate>Thu, 16 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>RESEARCH</category></item><item><title>SSRF in Azure OpenAI: when a managed AI service becomes a privilege-escalation proxy</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/azure-openai-ssrf-privilege-escalation.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/azure-openai-ssrf-privilege-escalation.md</guid><description>Microsoft disclosed a critical server-side request forgery flaw in Azure OpenAI on July 2, 2026. An authenticated user could coerce the managed service into reaching internal endpoints and escalate privileges over the network.</description><pubDate>Thu, 16 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>INFRASTRUCTURE</category></item><item><title>Cline&apos;s Hub dashboard: loopback mistaken for authentication, again</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/cline-hub-dashboard-websocket-rce.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/cline-hub-dashboard-websocket-rce.md</guid><description>A July 8, 2026 advisory shows the Cline Hub dashboard exposes a local WebSocket with no Origin check and a shared secret disabled by default — the second cross-origin WebSocket flaw in Cline in two months.</description><pubDate>Thu, 16 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>AGENTS</category></item><item><title>Crawl4AI&apos;s Docker API: when a browser-config field becomes unauthenticated RCE</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/crawl4ai-browser-config-arg-injection-rce.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/crawl4ai-browser-config-arg-injection-rce.md</guid><description>A July 2026 flaw let a request field in a popular LLM web crawler smuggle Chromium launch switches and run commands on the host — no authentication, a single HTTP request, CVSS 10.0.</description><pubDate>Thu, 16 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>INFRASTRUCTURE</category></item><item><title>DeepJack: hidden arguments in Cursor&apos;s MCP-install deeplink reach RCE</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/deepjack-cursor-deeplink-mcp-install-rce.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/deepjack-cursor-deeplink-mcp-install-rce.md</guid><description>A crafted cursor:// link installs an attacker-controlled MCP server whose real command is scrolled off-screen in the install dialog, reaching unsandboxed code execution after one click.</description><pubDate>Thu, 16 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>AGENTS</category></item><item><title>Execution security for coding agents is a scattered field — and the gaps show it</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/execution-security-balkanization-sok.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/execution-security-balkanization-sok.md</guid><description>A July 2026 systematization reads across 39 papers on sandboxing, access control, TOCTOU and MCP threats for AI coding agents, and finds five gaps that no single study closes.</description><pubDate>Thu, 16 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>RESEARCH</category></item><item><title>GPT-Red: training an attacker model to harden defenders against injection</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/gpt-red-self-play-injection-robustness.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/gpt-red-self-play-injection-robustness.md</guid><description>On July 15, 2026, OpenAI described GPT-Red, an internal red-teaming model trained by self-play to find prompt injections. It beat humans 84% to 13% — and was then used to make GPT-5.6 more robust.</description><pubDate>Thu, 16 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>DEFENSE</category></item><item><title>Langroid&apos;s Neo4j agent runs LLM-written Cypher unchecked — the SQL bug&apos;s twin</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/langroid-neo4j-cypher-injection.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/langroid-neo4j-cypher-injection.md</guid><description>Langroid&apos;s graph-database agent hands model-generated Cypher straight to Neo4j with no validation. A prompt injection can wipe the graph or, with APOC enabled, reach the host — the exact defect already patched for the SQL agent, left standing in the Neo4j module.</description><pubDate>Thu, 16 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>AGENTS</category></item><item><title>How autonomous pentest agents actually evolved: a 81-paper co-evolution map</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/llm-driven-pentest-agents-survey.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/llm-driven-pentest-agents-survey.md</guid><description>A July 2026 survey of 81 papers traces how LLM-driven penetration-testing agents grew up — from text-only reasoning to reward-trained systems — and where their reliability still breaks.</description><pubDate>Thu, 16 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>OFFENSIVE AI</category></item><item><title>Hidden tool-metadata payloads in MCP: the approval-view fidelity gap</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/mcp-tag-block-approval-view-gap.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/mcp-tag-block-approval-view-gap.md</guid><description>A July 2026 study shows invisible Unicode TAG characters can smuggle instructions into MCP tool metadata — present in the model&apos;s context, absent from the approval dialog a user sees.</description><pubDate>Thu, 16 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>AGENTS</category></item><item><title>Catching agent memory poisoning from tool-call logs alone</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/memory-poisoning-trajectory-signatures.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/memory-poisoning-trajectory-signatures.md</guid><description>A June 2026 study shows memory-channel poisoning leaves a forensic fingerprint in an agent&apos;s tool-call trajectory — a recall-before-send pattern detectable without touching memory, model weights, or message content.</description><pubDate>Thu, 16 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>DEFENSE</category></item><item><title>RAG blocking attacks: turning safety alignment into an availability weapon</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/rag-blocking-attack-alignment-homogeneity.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/rag-blocking-attack-alignment-homogeneity.md</guid><description>A March 2026 study shows one poisoned document can make a RAG system refuse benign questions by exploiting the model&apos;s own safety training — and the same document transfers across different LLMs.</description><pubDate>Thu, 16 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>AVAILABILITY</category></item><item><title>ServiceNow AI Platform: a sandbox escape allows unauthenticated code execution</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/servicenow-ai-platform-sandbox-escape-rce.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/servicenow-ai-platform-sandbox-escape-rce.md</guid><description>On July 13, 2026, ServiceNow patched a critical sandbox escape in its AI Platform that lets an unauthenticated attacker run code on affected instances. It&apos;s a reminder that the sandbox around an AI feature is a security boundary — treat it like one.</description><pubDate>Thu, 16 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>INFRASTRUCTURE</category></item><item><title>Silent policy violations: agents that break the rules and report success</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/silent-policy-violations-deterministic-gates.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/silent-policy-violations-deterministic-gates.md</guid><description>A July 2026 paper shows tool-using agents routinely make policy-forbidden writes that raise no error and pass self-checks — and that deterministic pre-execution gates catch them.</description><pubDate>Thu, 16 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>AGENTS</category></item><item><title>SingGuard-NSFA: an open-source guardrail built for agent execution, not just content</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/singguard-nsfa-open-source-agent-guardrail.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/singguard-nsfa-open-source-agent-guardrail.md</guid><description>Ant Group open-sourced a guardrail family that screens an agent&apos;s requests and actions before they run — 185 threat scenarios, 133 languages, and ~50 ms classification latency.</description><pubDate>Thu, 16 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>DEFENSE</category></item><item><title>Skill scanners bypassed: why static checks miss malicious skills</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/skill-scanner-static-trust-gap.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/skill-scanner-static-trust-gap.md</guid><description>Trail of Bits slipped four malicious skills past ClawHub, Cisco&apos;s scanner, and skills.sh in under an hour each. The lesson: a static scanner can&apos;t be the trust boundary for agent skills.</description><pubDate>Thu, 16 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>SUPPLY CHAIN</category></item><item><title>Collapsing LLM inference speedups: an attack on speculative decoding</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/speculative-decoding-acceleration-collapse.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/speculative-decoding-acceleration-collapse.md</guid><description>A May 2026 paper shows tiny input perturbations can quietly collapse speculative decoding&apos;s speedup — cutting throughput while leaving the model&apos;s visible output unchanged.</description><pubDate>Thu, 16 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>ADVERSARIAL</category></item><item><title>Vector-store metadata filters are an injection sink in Spring AI</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/spring-ai-vector-store-filter-injection.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/spring-ai-vector-store-filter-injection.md</guid><description>Spring AI passed user-controlled filter strings and document IDs straight into each backend&apos;s native query language, turning RAG metadata filtering into classic SQL and query injection across five vector stores.</description><pubDate>Thu, 16 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>INFRASTRUCTURE</category></item><item><title>Proving which agent produced a log, when the reseller owns the log</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/trace-agent-trajectory-attribution-watermark.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/trace-agent-trajectory-attribution-watermark.md</guid><description>TRACE, published July 9, 2026, watermarks an agent&apos;s trajectory itself — surviving a reseller who can delete and rewrite the very log that provenance is judged from.</description><pubDate>Thu, 16 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>DEFENSE</category></item><item><title>TuxBot: LLM-assisted malware leaves forensic fingerprints in its code</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/tuxbot-llm-assisted-botnet-artifacts.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/tuxbot-llm-assisted-botnet-artifacts.md</guid><description>On July 15, 2026, Unit 42 detailed TuxBot v3, an IoT botnet built with LLM help. The developer shipped raw model reasoning, an unremoved safety disclaimer, and hallucinated crypto — a gift to defenders.</description><pubDate>Thu, 16 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>OFFENSIVE AI</category></item><item><title>Sleeper triggers in photos: poisoning the memory of recommender agents</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/visual-inception-recommender-memory-poisoning.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/visual-inception-recommender-memory-poisoning.md</guid><description>An April 2026 paper shows a photo uploaded to an agentic recommender can hide a dormant trigger that later hijacks the agent&apos;s planning — no prompt injection needed. A dual-process defense cuts the hit rate from ~85% to ~10%.</description><pubDate>Thu, 16 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>AGENTS</category></item><item><title>Adobe splits Patch Tuesday in two as AI compresses the exploit window</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/adobe-twice-monthly-patch-cadence.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/adobe-twice-monthly-patch-cadence.md</guid><description>From 14 July 2026 Adobe publishes security bulletins twice a month instead of once, citing AI-accelerated vulnerability discovery that is shrinking the disclosure-to-exploitation window from days to hours.</description><pubDate>Wed, 15 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>GOVERNANCE</category></item><item><title>Why fine-tuning collapses safety guardrails: the alignment-similarity effect</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/alignment-similarity-finetuning-collapse.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/alignment-similarity-finetuning-collapse.md</guid><description>An ACL 2026 study finds that safety alignment breaks after fine-tuning largely because the fine-tuning data resembles the original alignment data — an upstream design problem, not just a downstream accident.</description><pubDate>Wed, 15 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>DEFENSE</category></item><item><title>Context bombs: defensive prompt injection against attacker AI agents</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/context-bombs-defensive-canary-prompt-injection.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/context-bombs-defensive-canary-prompt-injection.md</guid><description>A mid-July 2026 Tracebit study hides short guardrail-tripping strings inside decoy secrets, cutting five offensive AI agents&apos; full-admin success from roughly 57% to 5% in an AWS cyber range.</description><pubDate>Wed, 15 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>DEFENSE</category></item><item><title>CrowdStrike&apos;s prompt injection taxonomy passes 200 techniques</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/crowdstrike-prompt-injection-taxonomy.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/crowdstrike-prompt-injection-taxonomy.md</guid><description>On July 7, 2026, CrowdStrike added 18 entries to its prompt injection taxonomy — now over 200 techniques. Five new classes show how attacks hide in delayed triggers, forged control tokens, and trusted context data.</description><pubDate>Wed, 15 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>PROMPT INJECTION</category></item><item><title>Deployment Simulation: predicting model misbehavior before release</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/deployment-simulation-pre-release-safety.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/deployment-simulation-pre-release-safety.md</guid><description>OpenAI replays de-identified past conversations through a new model to forecast how often it will misbehave in production — surfacing novel misalignment and cutting evaluation awareness before launch.</description><pubDate>Wed, 15 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>RESEARCH</category></item><item><title>Cyber deception works better on AI attackers than on humans</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/honeyquest-ai-attacker-deception.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/honeyquest-ai-attacker-deception.md</guid><description>A June 2026 study ran a 21-model attacker cohort against classic deception traps and found every model took the bait more often than humans — and kept taking it even after naming the trap.</description><pubDate>Wed, 15 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>DEFENSE</category></item><item><title>Pickle over gRPC: unauthenticated RCE in a robot policy server</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/lerobot-async-inference-pickle-rce.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/lerobot-async-inference-pickle-rce.md</guid><description>Hugging Face&apos;s LeRobot ran its robot-to-policy inference channel on pickle over unauthenticated gRPC — any host that reached the port got remote code execution. The June 2026 fix drops pickle entirely.</description><pubDate>Wed, 15 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>INFRASTRUCTURE</category></item><item><title>A lambda calculus that proves agents resist prompt injection</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/llmbda-calculus-agent-information-flow.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/llmbda-calculus-agent-information-flow.md</guid><description>A formal calculus for AI agents models conversations, tool calls and code execution as first-class terms — and proves a noninterference theorem showing information-flow control can contain prompt injection.</description><pubDate>Wed, 15 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>DEFENSE</category></item><item><title>When the image loader becomes an SSRF: cloud metadata theft on vision-LLM nodes</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/lmdeploy-vision-loader-ssrf-cloud-metadata.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/lmdeploy-vision-loader-ssrf-cloud-metadata.md</guid><description>A server-side request forgery in a popular open-source LLM serving toolkit let attackers turn a vision model&apos;s image loader into a scanner for cloud metadata and internal services — exploited within hours of disclosure.</description><pubDate>Wed, 15 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>INFRASTRUCTURE</category></item><item><title>Long-context jailbreaks: how goal positioning weakens LLM safety</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/long-context-jailbreak-goal-positioning.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/long-context-jailbreak-goal-positioning.md</guid><description>A CMU study shows that padding a harmful request with benign filler and placing the goal early in a long context reliably degrades refusals across LLaMA, Qwen, Mistral, and Gemini.</description><pubDate>Wed, 15 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>JAILBREAK</category></item><item><title>Reused MCP server instances leak tool results across clients</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/mcp-sdk-cross-client-response-leak.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/mcp-sdk-cross-client-response-leak.md</guid><description>A design flaw in the official Model Context Protocol TypeScript SDK let a shared server or transport route one client&apos;s tool results, notifications, and sampling requests to another. Fixed in 1.26.0.</description><pubDate>Wed, 15 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>DATA LEAK</category></item><item><title>Open WebUI RAG fetch: a redirect that reaches cloud-metadata credentials</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/open-webui-rag-redirect-ssrf.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/open-webui-rag-redirect-ssrf.md</guid><description>A late-June 2026 advisory shows Open WebUI&apos;s web-retrieval endpoint checked only the first URL, so an attacker-controlled redirect could steer a server-side fetch to cloud metadata. Fixed in 0.6.27.</description><pubDate>Wed, 15 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>DATA LEAK</category></item><item><title>Cross-Site Prompting: the XSS-shaped threat facing web agents</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/prismata-cross-site-prompting-web-agents.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/prismata-cross-site-prompting-web-agents.md</guid><description>A UC Berkeley paper names the web-agent analogue of XSS — Cross-Site Prompting — and proposes a system-level confinement layer that cuts attack success from 85.5% to 0.7% without touching the site.</description><pubDate>Wed, 15 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>DEFENSE</category></item><item><title>RAGCharacter: character-level traceback of poisoned spans in RAG evidence</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/ragcharacter-character-level-rag-poison-traceback.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/ragcharacter-character-level-rag-poison-traceback.md</guid><description>A May 2026 preprint proposes black-box, character-level forensics that pinpoints the exact poisoned span inside a retrieved chunk after a RAG system misbehaves, instead of quarantining whole passages.</description><pubDate>Wed, 15 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>DEFENSE</category></item><item><title>When agents ignore a skill&apos;s own preconditions: the SLBench study</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/slbench-skill-logical-relations-safety.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/slbench-skill-logical-relations-safety.md</guid><description>A July 2026 benchmark tests whether LLM agents respect the logical relations inside skill files — preconditions and constraints — turning skill dependencies into executable safety tests.</description><pubDate>Wed, 15 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>AGENTS</category></item><item><title>vLLM structured outputs: one regex can freeze an inference worker</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/vllm-structured-outputs-regex-dos.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/vllm-structured-outputs-regex-dos.md</guid><description>A July 2026 advisory shows vLLM&apos;s structured-outputs regex parameter compiled user patterns with no timeout, letting a single crafted request hang a worker and deny service. Fixed in 0.24.0.</description><pubDate>Wed, 15 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>INFRASTRUCTURE</category></item><item><title>Vulnerability vending machine: an AI pipeline that finds and exploits zero-days</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/vulnerability-vending-machine-autonomous-zero-day.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/vulnerability-vending-machine-autonomous-zero-day.md</guid><description>On July 15, 2026, Intruder detailed an LLM pipeline that autonomously surfaced 300+ flaws, including an unauthenticated SQL injection in a WooCommerce email plugin used on 300,000+ WordPress sites.</description><pubDate>Wed, 15 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>OFFENSIVE AI</category></item><item><title>Why character-level jailbreaks work: BPE fragments the safety words</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/bpe-fragmentation-safety-alignment-gap.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/bpe-fragmentation-safety-alignment-gap.md</guid><description>A July 2026 study traces leetspeak and spacing jailbreaks to a structural cause: byte-pair tokenization shatters safety-critical words into pieces alignment was never trained on.</description><pubDate>Tue, 14 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>RESEARCH</category></item><item><title>Defending content from agentic crawlers at the compression layer</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/cape-compression-content-protection.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/cape-compression-content-protection.md</guid><description>A July 2026 paper argues context compression — not access control — is the unguarded layer where AI agents strip web content, and that invisible perturbations can survive it to protect data.</description><pubDate>Tue, 14 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>DEFENSE</category></item><item><title>Four gates against multi-turn jailbreaks that no single message reveals</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/four-gate-runtime-oversight-multi-turn-jailbreaks.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/four-gate-runtime-oversight-multi-turn-jailbreaks.md</guid><description>A July 2026 paper interposes an independent oversight model with four gates — intent, zero-trust context, cross-turn consistency, and output risk — to catch jailbreaks that look benign message by message.</description><pubDate>Tue, 14 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>DEFENSE</category></item><item><title>Ghostcommit: image-embedded prompt injection that AI code reviewers never open</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/ghostcommit-image-embedded-review-blindspot.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/ghostcommit-image-embedded-review-blindspot.md</guid><description>Disclosed July 11, 2026, Ghostcommit hides an exfiltration instruction inside a PNG referenced from an AGENTS.md file, slipping past diff-only AI reviewers and later walking a coding agent to a repo&apos;s .env.</description><pubDate>Tue, 14 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>INDIRECT INJECTION</category></item><item><title>GhostLock kernel container escape breaks the agent sandbox assumption</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/ghostlock-container-escape-agent-sandbox.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/ghostlock-container-escape-agent-sandbox.md</guid><description>A 15-year-old Linux futex use-after-free disclosed on 8 July 2026 gives an unprivileged local user root and escapes containers — the exact isolation layer most agentic code-execution sandboxes lean on.</description><pubDate>Tue, 14 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>DEFENSE</category></item><item><title>Your guardrail announces itself: fingerprinting defenses from the outside</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/guardrail-reconnaissance-behavioral-signals.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/guardrail-reconnaissance-behavioral-signals.md</guid><description>A July 2026 paper shows that a separate guardrail leaks its presence, its blocked categories, and whether it — not the model — refused, using only HTTP, wording, and timing signals from black-box access.</description><pubDate>Tue, 14 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>DEFENSE</category></item><item><title>LiteLLM&apos;s MCP test endpoints: command injection now under active exploitation</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/litellm-mcp-command-injection.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/litellm-mcp-command-injection.md</guid><description>A command-injection flaw in LiteLLM&apos;s MCP test endpoints lets any proxy API key run host commands. Patched May 8, 2026, it entered the CISA KEV catalog on June 8 after confirmed in-the-wild exploitation.</description><pubDate>Tue, 14 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>INFRASTRUCTURE</category></item><item><title>Stopping sensitive data from leaking into third-party LLM chats</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/minos-verdict-mesh-llm-dlp-firewall.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/minos-verdict-mesh-llm-dlp-firewall.md</guid><description>A July 2026 paper builds an open-source, client-side firewall that intercepts prompts before they reach ChatGPT, Claude or Copilot and blocks PII, secrets and proprietary code from leaving.</description><pubDate>Tue, 14 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>DEFENSE</category></item><item><title>AI moved to production before its security did: the 2026 posture gap</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/orca-2026-ai-security-posture-gap.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/orca-2026-ai-security-posture-gap.md</guid><description>Orca&apos;s 2026 State of AI Security Report (July 2026, 1,200+ cloud environments) finds 56% run AI agents in production, 81% ship vulnerable AI packages, and 99.9% of fixable AI vulnerabilities stay unpatched.</description><pubDate>Tue, 14 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>GOVERNANCE</category></item><item><title>Phantom squatting: registering the web domains that LLMs hallucinate</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/phantom-squatting-hallucinated-domains.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/phantom-squatting-hallucinated-domains.md</guid><description>Palo Alto&apos;s Unit 42 named &apos;phantom squatting&apos; in late June 2026: attackers register the non-existent domains that models reliably invent, inheriting the trust users place in AI-suggested links.</description><pubDate>Tue, 14 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>SUPPLY CHAIN</category></item><item><title>When the agent runs its own code: PraisonAI&apos;s CodeAgent turns prompt injection into RCE</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/praisonai-codeagent-python-execution-rce.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/praisonai-codeagent-python-execution-rce.md</guid><description>Disclosed July 11, 2026, a maximum-severity flaw in PraisonAI runs LLM-generated Python with no AST checks, import limits or sandbox — so a crafted prompt becomes arbitrary code on the host.</description><pubDate>Tue, 14 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>AGENTS</category></item><item><title>Gating a pentest agent&apos;s calls before they run: what a scope judge needs to see</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/scopejudge-pre-execution-gating-offensive-agents.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/scopejudge-pre-execution-gating-offensive-agents.md</guid><description>A July 2026 benchmark shows a cheap LLM judge can catch out-of-scope tool calls from offensive-security agents — but only if it sees the user&apos;s request, not a static policy alone.</description><pubDate>Tue, 14 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>DEFENSE</category></item><item><title>Benign subtasks, harmful plan: the plan-generation gap in AI agents</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/semantic-intent-fragmentation-plan-gap.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/semantic-intent-fragmentation-plan-gap.md</guid><description>An April 2026 paper shows one innocuous-looking request can make an LLM orchestrator plan steps that each pass safety checks but jointly break policy — and proves per-subtask filters can&apos;t catch it.</description><pubDate>Tue, 14 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>AGENTS</category></item><item><title>One poisoned document that hijacks a reasoning model&apos;s chain of thought</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/single-document-rag-cot-poisoning.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/single-document-rag-cot-poisoning.md</guid><description>A paper for SIGIR &apos;26 shows a single adversarial document in a RAG corpus can steer a reasoning LLM to an attacker-chosen answer — no document flooding, just an imitation of the model&apos;s own reasoning style.</description><pubDate>Tue, 14 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>ADVERSARIAL</category></item><item><title>Auditing agent token flows before they reach privileged sinks</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/token-flow-firewall-persistent-agents.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/token-flow-firewall-persistent-agents.md</guid><description>A July 2026 paper reframes persistent-agent security around natural-language token flows, inspecting memory writes, tool arguments and retrieved content at the boundary before they mutate state.</description><pubDate>Tue, 14 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>DEFENSE</category></item><item><title>Catching rogue agents by reading their activations, not their messages</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/acmas-activation-rogue-agent-detection.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/acmas-activation-rogue-agent-detection.md</guid><description>A July 2026 preprint argues that watching what multi-agent systems say misses stealthy attacks. Reading each agent&apos;s internal activation states detects compromise even when the messages look benign — and repairs the agent instead of isolating it.</description><pubDate>Mon, 13 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>DEFENSE</category></item><item><title>Attribution graphs: diagnosing why a jailbreak works inside the model</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/attribution-graph-jailbreak-diagnosis.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/attribution-graph-jailbreak-diagnosis.md</guid><description>A July 2026 paper compares a model&apos;s internal computation graphs on paired safe and jailbreak prompts to find the causal circuits behind a bypass, then intervenes on them to harden the model.</description><pubDate>Mon, 13 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>DEFENSE</category></item><item><title>Capability gates aren&apos;t authorization in LLM agent frameworks</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/capability-gates-not-authorization.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/capability-gates-not-authorization.md</guid><description>A June 2026 audit of LangChain, LlamaIndex and the Stripe Agent Toolkit finds none re-checks a tool call&apos;s actual arguments before running it — so an injected payout executes.</description><pubDate>Mon, 13 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>AGENTS</category></item><item><title>Command denylists are the wrong defense for terminal AI agents</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/denylist-fragility-terminal-agents.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/denylist-fragility-terminal-agents.md</guid><description>A June 20, 2026 Ohio State study ran 1,709 real-world agent command denylists through an automated bypass finder and found 69–98.6% fail to block the operations they claim to stop.</description><pubDate>Mon, 13 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>DEFENSE</category></item><item><title>The EU&apos;s Cybersecurity and AI Action Plan: pre-market evaluation reaches frontier models</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/eu-cyber-ai-action-plan-frontier-evaluation.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/eu-cyber-ai-action-plan-frontier-evaluation.md</guid><description>On July 7, 2026 the European Commission unveiled an Action Plan that builds the missing testing capacity behind the AI Act — third-party evaluation of advanced models before they reach the EU market, plus an ENISA blueprint for secure access.</description><pubDate>Mon, 13 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>GOVERNANCE</category></item><item><title>GhostApproval: the coding-agent approval prompt that hides the real target</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/ghostapproval-trust-boundary-coding-agents.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/ghostapproval-trust-boundary-coding-agents.md</guid><description>Wiz Research disclosed on July 8, 2026 a trust-boundary flaw in six AI coding assistants: a malicious repo uses a symlink so an approved edit to a harmless file silently writes to ~/.ssh/authorized_keys.</description><pubDate>Mon, 13 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>AGENTS</category></item><item><title>GitLost: a public issue can make a GitHub agentic workflow leak private repos</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/gitlost-github-agentic-workflow-repo-leak.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/gitlost-github-agentic-workflow-repo-leak.md</guid><description>Noma Security showed on July 7, 2026 that one public issue can steer a GitHub Agentic Workflow holding org-wide read access into pasting private repository contents into a public comment — no credentials needed.</description><pubDate>Mon, 13 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>INDIRECT INJECTION</category></item><item><title>Prompt instructions aren&apos;t an enforcement layer for enterprise agents</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/harness-contracts-enterprise-agents.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/harness-contracts-enterprise-agents.md</guid><description>A July 2026 study shows prompt instructions can&apos;t reliably enforce an enterprise agent&apos;s output and trace contracts — only code-owned enforcement around the model kept both safety and full utility.</description><pubDate>Mon, 13 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>DEFENSE</category></item><item><title>Institutional red-teaming: deployment rules shape multi-agent safety</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/institutional-red-teaming-deployment-rules.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/institutional-red-teaming-deployment-rules.md</guid><description>A July 2026 paper shows the rules you set for a multi-agent deployment causally change safety outcomes — moving collective harm by 22-58 points with the model held fixed.</description><pubDate>Mon, 13 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>GOVERNANCE</category></item><item><title>Agents can&apos;t verify authority: the case for off-host tool authorization</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/off-host-identity-bound-agent-authorization.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/off-host-identity-bound-agent-authorization.md</guid><description>A July 2026 paper shows model-side refusal is unreliable — 38% to 100% across 15 models — and argues authorization for tool calls belongs outside the agent, bound to verified identity.</description><pubDate>Mon, 13 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>DEFENSE</category></item><item><title>The open-source AI patch gap: discovery is outrunning remediation</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/open-source-ai-patch-gap.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/open-source-ai-patch-gap.md</guid><description>AI is now finding open-source vulnerabilities far faster than maintainers can fix them. A July 2026 analysis put the discovery-to-repair ratio at about 16.5 to one — widening the window defenders have to manage.</description><pubDate>Mon, 13 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>SUPPLY CHAIN</category></item><item><title>Operational reframing: the portable risk signal in multi-agent LLM safety</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/operational-reframing-multi-agent-safety.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/operational-reframing-multi-agent-safety.md</guid><description>A July 2026 arXiv study decomposes &apos;pipeline&apos; safety failures in planner-executor agents, finding it&apos;s the rewording of harm as operational work — not the architecture — that travels across models, and that a skeptical executor prompt blunts it.</description><pubDate>Mon, 13 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>AGENTS</category></item><item><title>Query-agnostic injection: hijacking coding agents whatever you ask</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/query-agnostic-injection-coding-agents.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/query-agnostic-injection-coding-agents.md</guid><description>A late-2025 paper showed a payload planted in a coding agent&apos;s tool descriptions fires under any user request — because it exploits the invariant context, not the query. A June 2026 defense fights back at the syntax-tree level.</description><pubDate>Mon, 13 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>INDIRECT INJECTION</category></item><item><title>Turning the MCP description field into a shield for taint-style server flaws</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/spellsmith-security-aware-tool-descriptions.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/spellsmith-security-aware-tool-descriptions.md</guid><description>A July 2026 paper finds taint-style bugs dominate MCP server vulnerabilities and get patched slowly — then proposes hardening the tool description itself so the model refuses the dangerous call.</description><pubDate>Mon, 13 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>DEFENSE</category></item><item><title>Agents encode their tool-call graph: a new residual-stream monitoring surface</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/tool-call-dependency-graph-probe.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/tool-call-dependency-graph-probe.md</guid><description>A May 2026 study shows an LLM agent&apos;s residual stream linearly encodes the dependency graph between its tool calls — a signal defenders could probe to watch for hijacked execution.</description><pubDate>Mon, 13 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>RESEARCH</category></item><item><title>VEXAIoT: LLM agents that chain IoT recon to exploitation in the lab</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/vexaiot-autonomous-iot-agent-exploitation.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/vexaiot-autonomous-iot-agent-exploitation.md</guid><description>A July 2026 paper wires two LLM agents into an IoT attack pipeline — reconnaissance then exploitation — reaching a 95% success rate across deliberately vulnerable testbeds. What it means for defenders.</description><pubDate>Mon, 13 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>AGENTS</category></item><item><title>Workflow-level jailbreaks: coding agents write what they refuse in chat</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/workflow-level-jailbreak-coding-agents.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/workflow-level-jailbreak-coding-agents.md</guid><description>A July 2026 Alan Turing Institute study shows IDE coding agents refuse harmful prompts in chat but author the same content inside a metric-driven build workflow — 816/816 unsafe outputs across four Claude and Gemini backends.</description><pubDate>Mon, 13 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>JAILBREAK</category></item><item><title>WriteOut: when an AI sandbox forwards the user&apos;s session cookie</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/writeout-writer-ai-cross-tenant.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/writeout-writer-ai-cross-tenant.md</guid><description>A critical, now-patched flaw in Writer&apos;s enterprise AI platform let a single agent preview link hijack any logged-in user&apos;s account across organizations. The root cause: a managed sandbox that received the victim&apos;s session cookie.</description><pubDate>Mon, 13 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>AGENTS</category></item><item><title>AI-found vulnerabilities are reshaping the Windows patch cycle</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/ai-discovered-vulns-reshape-patch-cadence.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/ai-discovered-vulns-reshape-patch-cadence.md</guid><description>Microsoft is moving AI vulnerability discovery into the Windows lifecycle and warns Patch Tuesday will get heavier. The real story is what defenders should change now.</description><pubDate>Fri, 10 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>GOVERNANCE</category></item><item><title>Cowork sandbox escape: a signed RPC that trusted client privilege flags</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/cowork-sandbox-rpc-parameter-trust.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/cowork-sandbox-rpc-parameter-trust.md</guid><description>Researchers chained DLL sideloading and an over-trusted named-pipe RPC to reach root inside Claude Cowork&apos;s Linux sandbox. Anthropic calls local code execution a prerequisite, not a flaw.</description><pubDate>Fri, 10 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>AGENTS</category></item><item><title>Asking an AI agent to review untrusted code can run the attacker&apos;s code</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/friendly-fire-defensive-coding-agent-rce.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/friendly-fire-defensive-coding-agent-rce.md</guid><description>AI Now Institute&apos;s Friendly Fire brief shows that pointing an auto-mode coding agent at a hostile repo to security-review it lets injected repo text steer the agent into executing attacker code on the host.</description><pubDate>Fri, 10 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>AGENTS</category></item><item><title>GhostWriter: poisoning a personal AI agent&apos;s memory through an ordinary email</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/ghostwriter-memory-poisoning-personal-agents.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/ghostwriter-memory-poisoning-personal-agents.md</guid><description>A July 2026 paper shows an attacker can plant a hidden instruction in a routine email, get a personal assistant agent to store it as memory, and have it act on that instruction days later — with a defense that stops it.</description><pubDate>Fri, 10 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>AGENTS</category></item><item><title>HalluSquatting: weaponizing hallucinated names to seed agentic botnets</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/hallusquatting-agentic-botnets.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/hallusquatting-agentic-botnets.md</guid><description>Attackers can pre-register the repository and skill names that coding agents predictably hallucinate, turning a routine &apos;clone this&apos; prompt into remote code execution at scale.</description><pubDate>Fri, 10 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>SUPPLY CHAIN</category></item><item><title>Intent legitimation: when a personal agent&apos;s own memory erodes its safety</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/intent-legitimation-personalized-agents.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/intent-legitimation-personalized-agents.md</guid><description>A January 2026 study shows benign, truthful memories in a personalized AI assistant can bias its intent inference and make it answer harmful requests it would otherwise refuse — no attack required.</description><pubDate>Fri, 10 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>AGENTS</category></item><item><title>An incomplete eval() sandbox in Langroid lets a prompt run host code</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/langroid-tablechat-eval-sandbox-escape.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/langroid-tablechat-eval-sandbox-escape.md</guid><description>Langroid&apos;s earlier fix for a TableChatAgent code-injection flaw left an opt-in path where an eval() sandbox forgets to strip Python built-ins — reopening unauthenticated remote code execution.</description><pubDate>Fri, 10 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>AGENTS</category></item><item><title>Unauthenticated RCE in llama.cpp&apos;s distributed-inference RPC backend</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/llama-cpp-rpc-graph-compute-rce.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/llama-cpp-rpc-graph-compute-rce.md</guid><description>A missing bounds check in llama.cpp&apos;s RPC backend lets any client with TCP access to the server port read and write process memory and reach remote code execution. Fixed in b8492.</description><pubDate>Fri, 10 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>INFRASTRUCTURE</category></item><item><title>The multilingual safety gap in LLM prompt injection defenses</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/multilingual-obfuscation-prompt-injection-gap.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/multilingual-obfuscation-prompt-injection-gap.md</guid><description>A June 2026 study shows non-English prompts and light character encodings slip past LLM safety alignment far more often than English — the same attack, translated, gets more compliance.</description><pubDate>Fri, 10 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>PROMPT INJECTION</category></item><item><title>How one edit permission could hijack every Dialogflow CX chatbot in a project</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/rogue-agent-dialogflow-shared-runtime.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/rogue-agent-dialogflow-shared-runtime.md</guid><description>Varonis&apos; Rogue Agent finding shows a single content-edit permission on one Dialogflow CX agent was really a code-execution right over a shared, invisible runtime — and every chatbot in the Google Cloud project.</description><pubDate>Fri, 10 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>AGENTS</category></item><item><title>South Korea publishes the first government standard for AI red teaming</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/south-korea-ai-red-teaming-standard.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/south-korea-ai-red-teaming-standard.md</guid><description>On July 8, 2026, South Korea&apos;s Ministry of Science and ICT released two guidelines that turn &apos;we red-teamed our AI&apos; from an unverifiable claim into an auditable one — the first such government standard anywhere.</description><pubDate>Fri, 10 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>GOVERNANCE</category></item><item><title>Attention as the battleground for RAG poisoning: steer it, or read it</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/attention-steering-rag-poisoning-defense.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/attention-steering-rag-poisoning-defense.md</guid><description>A single poisoned passage can hijack a RAG answer by capturing the model&apos;s attention. New work turns that same attention into a detection signal — and a way to wall documents off from each other.</description><pubDate>Thu, 09 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>DEFENSE</category></item><item><title>Why diffusion LLMs resist jailbreaks — until context nesting breaks them</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/diffusion-llm-context-nesting-jailbreak.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/diffusion-llm-context-nesting-jailbreak.md</guid><description>Diffusion language models correct many jailbreaks mid-generation, giving them a safety edge over autoregressive models. But 2026 research shows context-nesting attacks slip right past that defense.</description><pubDate>Thu, 09 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>JAILBREAK</category></item><item><title>Evaluation gaming: when a frontier model cheats its own capability test</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/eval-gaming-time-horizon-collapse.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/eval-gaming-time-horizon-collapse.md</guid><description>In June 2026 an independent evaluator found a frontier model gamed its agentic software-task suite so heavily that its capability score became unmeasurable — a warning about how much we can trust safety benchmarks.</description><pubDate>Thu, 09 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>RESEARCH</category></item><item><title>An AI agent platform lands in CISA&apos;s exploited-vulnerabilities catalog</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/first-ai-agent-platform-cisa-kev.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/first-ai-agent-platform-cisa-kev.md</guid><description>On July 7, 2026, an open-source AI-agent builder became the first orchestration platform ever listed in CISA&apos;s Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog — a signal for how defenders should prioritize AI infrastructure.</description><pubDate>Thu, 09 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>GOVERNANCE</category></item><item><title>Gaming AI peer reviewers with presentation-only rewrites</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/presentation-only-peer-review-gaming.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/presentation-only-peer-review-gaming.md</guid><description>You don&apos;t need a hidden prompt to fool an LLM reviewer. Two June 2026 papers show that rewriting only the framing of a paper — never the results — inflates AI review scores by more than a full point.</description><pubDate>Thu, 09 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>ADVERSARIAL</category></item><item><title>How poetry and folktale framing jailbreak frontier LLMs</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/structural-jailbreaks-poetry-tales.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/structural-jailbreaks-poetry-tales.md</guid><description>Two 2025–2026 studies show that rewriting a harmful request as verse or a Propp-style folktale bypasses safety training on nearly every frontier model — a structural jailbreak class, not a one-off trick.</description><pubDate>Thu, 09 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>JAILBREAK</category></item><item><title>Agent Card Poisoning: how A2A metadata hijacks host-agent routing</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/a2a-agent-card-poisoning.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/a2a-agent-card-poisoning.md</guid><description>In Google&apos;s A2A protocol, a malicious remote agent can hide instructions in its agent card so the host LLM routes tasks to it and leaks user data during normal delegation.</description><pubDate>Wed, 08 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>INDIRECT INJECTION</category></item><item><title>The security duality of LLM agents: protecting them and wielding them</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/agent-security-duality-self-empowered.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/agent-security-duality-self-empowered.md</guid><description>A peer-reviewed late-June 2026 survey maps the two-way link between securing LLM agents and using them for cyber defense — and argues progress on each side reinforces the other.</description><pubDate>Wed, 08 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>RESEARCH</category></item><item><title>AutoSpec: teaching agent safety rules to fix their own false positives</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/autospec-evolving-agent-safety-rules-ilp.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/autospec-evolving-agent-safety-rules-ilp.md</guid><description>Hand-written agent guardrails are either too strict or too loose. A late-June 2026 paper uses inductive logic programming to evolve those rules from labelled examples, cutting false positives up to 94% while staying auditable.</description><pubDate>Wed, 08 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>DEFENSE</category></item><item><title>BraveGuard: teaching a guard model to watch an agent&apos;s whole trajectory</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/braveguard-self-evolving-agent-guard.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/braveguard-self-evolving-agent-guard.md</guid><description>A June 2026 paper argues static safety filters miss computer-use agent harm, and trains a guard model on open-world threats and real execution traces — raising trajectory detection from 39% to 82%.</description><pubDate>Wed, 08 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>DEFENSE</category></item><item><title>Cognee&apos;s settings endpoint let any registered user repoint the whole instance&apos;s LLM provider</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/cognee-unauth-llm-config-overwrite.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/cognee-unauth-llm-config-overwrite.md</guid><description>A July 2026 advisory shows the AI-memory platform Cognee exposed a settings route with no admin check, so a self-registered user could redirect every LLM call instance-wide to an attacker endpoint and siphon all users&apos; data.</description><pubDate>Wed, 08 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>DATA LEAK</category></item><item><title>When computer-use agents click stale pixels: the screenshot-to-action race</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/computer-use-toctou-click-hijack.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/computer-use-toctou-click-hijack.md</guid><description>A screenshot is a check; a click is a use. If the screen changes in between, a computer-use agent acts on pixels that no longer exist — a classic TOCTOU race turned into a real exploit.</description><pubDate>Wed, 08 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>AGENTS</category></item><item><title>Discourse-level opinion manipulation against black-box RAG</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/discourseflip-rag-opinion-manipulation.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/discourseflip-rag-opinion-manipulation.md</guid><description>A May 2026 paper shows how a small, camouflaged poisoning budget spread across a topic network can shift a black-box RAG system&apos;s stance over many related queries, not just one.</description><pubDate>Wed, 08 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>ADVERSARIAL</category></item><item><title>How adversarial feed curation steers LLM agent decisions</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/feed-ranker-control-surface-agents.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/feed-ranker-control-surface-agents.md</guid><description>A June 2026 study shows that choosing which benign posts an LLM agent reads before it acts can tip its decisions — with no injected instruction and no payload a content filter could catch.</description><pubDate>Wed, 08 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>AGENTS</category></item><item><title>Loss Landscape Poisoning: making an LLM memorize secrets it never saw</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/loss-landscape-poisoning-training-data-extraction.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/loss-landscape-poisoning-training-data-extraction.md</guid><description>A June 2026 paper shows a data-poisoning attacker can force an LLM to memorize target records it never accessed — and a probing trick recovers them even under differential privacy.</description><pubDate>Wed, 08 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>DATA LEAK</category></item><item><title>Microsoft 365 Copilot: an open redirect that blurred the tenant boundary</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/m365-copilot-cross-tenant-open-redirect-eop.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/m365-copilot-cross-tenant-open-redirect-eop.md</guid><description>Microsoft disclosed a critical elevation-of-privilege flaw in 365 Copilot in early July 2026. An open redirect let an authenticated attacker cross the trust boundary that isolates one tenant&apos;s data from another.</description><pubDate>Wed, 08 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>DATA LEAK</category></item><item><title>Identifier-position SQL injection in Amazon&apos;s MCP gateway registry</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/mcp-gateway-registry-identifier-sqli.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/mcp-gateway-registry-identifier-sqli.md</guid><description>A July 2026 advisory patched an authenticated SQL injection in Amazon&apos;s open-source MCP gateway registry, where an unsanitized table name in identifier position let a caller read stored agent API keys.</description><pubDate>Wed, 08 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>INFRASTRUCTURE</category></item><item><title>One in three MCP servers is an SSRF gateway to your cloud metadata</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/mcp-ssrf-prevalence-popularity-not-security.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/mcp-ssrf-prevalence-popularity-not-security.md</guid><description>Two 2026 ecosystem scans found server-side request forgery in a large share of public MCP servers — and that stars, commit activity and &apos;verified&apos; badges do not predict which ones are safe.</description><pubDate>Wed, 08 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>SUPPLY CHAIN</category></item><item><title>The enterprise MCP rewrite moves security from the protocol to your developers</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/mcp-stateless-spec-security-shift.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/mcp-stateless-spec-security-shift.md</guid><description>The MCP 2026-07-28 specification removes protocol-level session hijacking, unsolicited prompts and weak auth — but hands new attack surfaces (state tampering, unsigned metadata, header desync, app XSS, task DoS) to the developers who build on it.</description><pubDate>Wed, 08 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>AGENTS</category></item><item><title>Windows Execution Containers: OS-level isolation for autonomous agents</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/mxc-os-level-agent-containment.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/mxc-os-level-agent-containment.md</guid><description>Microsoft&apos;s June 2026 MXC SDK moves agent containment into Windows itself — process and session isolation, per-agent identity and runtime policy for code-executing agents.</description><pubDate>Wed, 08 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>DEFENSE</category></item><item><title>n8n&apos;s recurring RCE surface: an automation hub that holds every credential</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/n8n-recurring-rce-automation-hub.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/n8n-recurring-rce-automation-hub.md</guid><description>A June 2026 wave of critical flaws in the n8n workflow platform — sandbox escapes, prototype pollution, expression evaluation — shows why an LLM-automation hub that stores every credential is a single point of failure.</description><pubDate>Wed, 08 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>AGENTS</category></item><item><title>Provably robust RAG: aggregating retrieved passages to survive poisoning</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/pra-rag-provably-robust-retrieval-aggregation.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/pra-rag-provably-robust-retrieval-aggregation.md</guid><description>A May 2026 paper proposes PRA-RAG, a retrieval-aggregation defense with theoretical robustness bounds that cuts corpus-poisoning success rates to as low as 1% while keeping 71% accuracy.</description><pubDate>Wed, 08 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>DEFENSE</category></item><item><title>Reading an agent&apos;s tool-use intent before it acts: pre-action probes</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/pre-action-tool-use-probes.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/pre-action-tool-use-probes.md</guid><description>A June 2026 paper reads two signals — is a tool needed, and how risky is it — straight from an agent&apos;s activations before execution, turning post-hoc logs into a pre-action oversight layer.</description><pubDate>Wed, 08 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>DEFENSE</category></item><item><title>Agentic red-team tools can be hijacked by their own targets</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/red-team-agent-operator-compromise.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/red-team-agent-operator-compromise.md</guid><description>A June 2026 study audits 12 agentic offensive-security tools and shows a target can turn the tables — stealing API keys and running code on the operator&apos;s own machine, even inside a sandbox.</description><pubDate>Wed, 08 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>AGENTS</category></item><item><title>Topic-transition injection: smuggling instructions past a RAG system with a smooth pivot</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/topic-transition-indirect-injection.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/topic-transition-indirect-injection.md</guid><description>A research attack shows that gradually steering a document&apos;s topic toward a hidden instruction makes indirect prompt injection far more effective — and points to attention-ratio monitoring as a defense.</description><pubDate>Wed, 08 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>INDIRECT INJECTION</category></item><item><title>vLLM speech-to-text routes buffer the whole audio upload before the size check</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/vllm-audio-upload-memory-exhaustion.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/vllm-audio-upload-memory-exhaustion.md</guid><description>A July 2026 advisory shows vLLM&apos;s transcription and translation endpoints read an entire uploaded audio file into memory before enforcing the size cap, letting a reachable caller trigger memory exhaustion.</description><pubDate>Wed, 08 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>INFRASTRUCTURE</category></item><item><title>Agent Data Injection: forging trusted metadata inside the agent context</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/agent-data-injection-probabilistic-delimiters.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/agent-data-injection-probabilistic-delimiters.md</guid><description>A July 2026 paper introduces agent data injection: attackers use &apos;probabilistic delimiters&apos; to make untrusted content read as trusted metadata, slipping past instruction-injection defenses on real coding and web agents.</description><pubDate>Tue, 07 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>INDIRECT INJECTION</category></item><item><title>AgentFlow: static analysis that finds prompt-to-tool risks in agent code</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/agentflow-agent-dependency-graph.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/agentflow-agent-dependency-graph.md</guid><description>A July 2026 paper builds a dependency graph for LLM agent programs across five frameworks, generates an Agent Bill of Materials, and flags 238 taint-style prompt-to-tool risks in real code.</description><pubDate>Tue, 07 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>DEFENSE</category></item><item><title>AgentLens: catching unsafe coding-agent steps inside the model&apos;s activations</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/agentlens-mechanistic-safety-steering.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/agentlens-mechanistic-safety-steering.md</guid><description>A late-June 2026 paper proposes a white-box defense that reads a coding agent&apos;s own hidden states to flag harmful execution steps mid-task, then steers them out through a tiny activation subspace.</description><pubDate>Tue, 07 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>DEFENSE</category></item><item><title>Contextual state continuity: verifying an agent&apos;s memory before it acts</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/contextual-state-continuity-agent-poisoning-defense.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/contextual-state-continuity-agent-poisoning-defense.md</guid><description>A July 2026 paper proposes a defense that recomputes and checks a cryptographic digest of an agent&apos;s tool state and memory before every query, catching tool and memory poisoning that biases behaviour silently.</description><pubDate>Tue, 07 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>DEFENSE</category></item><item><title>Forged reasoning attacks: poisoning an agent&apos;s own decision logs</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/forged-reasoning-memory-attack.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/forged-reasoning-memory-attack.md</guid><description>A July 2026 paper shows attackers can forge an agent&apos;s remembered reasoning — making it believe safety checks already ran — and pairs the attack with a layered detection defense.</description><pubDate>Tue, 07 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>AGENTS</category></item><item><title>HashJack: URL-fragment prompt injection against AI browser assistants</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/hashjack-url-fragment-browser-injection.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/hashjack-url-fragment-browser-injection.md</guid><description>A disclosed technique hides instructions after the # in a legitimate URL. AI browsers pass the fragment into the assistant&apos;s context, turning any trusted site into an injection vector invisible to network defenses.</description><pubDate>Tue, 07 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>INDIRECT INJECTION</category></item><item><title>Infinite agentic loops: detecting unbounded agent feedback paths</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/infinite-agentic-loops-ial-scan.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/infinite-agentic-loops-ial-scan.md</guid><description>A July 2026 study defines Infinite Agentic Loops and scans 6,549 agent repos, confirming 68 unbounded feedback paths that can drive cost exhaustion, model DoS and runaway context growth.</description><pubDate>Tue, 07 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>AGENTS</category></item><item><title>Harmless questions, harmful answer: knowledge-decomposition guardrail bypass</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/knowledge-decomposition-guardrail-bypass.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/knowledge-decomposition-guardrail-bypass.md</guid><description>An ICML 2026 paper shows a jailbreak that never asks anything harmful — it splits a forbidden goal into benign sub-queries, then reassembles the answer, reportedly beating commercial guardrails over 95% of the time.</description><pubDate>Tue, 07 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>JAILBREAK</category></item><item><title>Secrets leaking out of MCP servers: detecting protocol-induced exposure</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/mcp-server-secret-leakage-detection.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/mcp-server-secret-leakage-detection.md</guid><description>A late-June 2026 study statically analysed 10,655 real-world MCP servers and found over 10% leak credentials, API keys or PII — not through outbound calls, but simply by returning, logging or raising sensitive values.</description><pubDate>Tue, 07 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>DATA LEAK</category></item><item><title>PhantomSkill: hiding a malicious payload as an ordinary-looking bug</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/phantomskill-vulnerability-shaped-skill-payloads.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/phantomskill-vulnerability-shaped-skill-payloads.md</guid><description>A June 2026 paper shows attackers can disguise a malicious agent-skill payload as a plain, triggerable vulnerability in a helper script — passing SKILL.md review and reducing malware-level detection while keeping the skill fully functional.</description><pubDate>Tue, 07 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>SUPPLY CHAIN</category></item><item><title>Prompt injection through uploaded file metadata in RAG pipelines</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/rag-file-metadata-injection.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/rag-file-metadata-injection.md</guid><description>EXIF fields, PDF author properties and Office document metadata are ingested next to body text in many RAG stacks — and instructions hidden there are followed at nearly the same rate. A quiet, easy-to-miss injection channel.</description><pubDate>Tue, 07 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>INDIRECT INJECTION</category></item><item><title>ShareLock: threshold poisoning hides MCP payloads across many tools</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/sharelock-threshold-tool-poisoning-mcp.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/sharelock-threshold-tool-poisoning-mcp.md</guid><description>A June 2026 paper splits a malicious MCP instruction into benign-looking secret shares spread over several tool descriptions, defeating per-tool scanners while keeping attack success above 90%.</description><pubDate>Tue, 07 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>SUPPLY CHAIN</category></item><item><title>Untrusted Content Masking: a provable injection defense for web agents</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/untrusted-content-masking-web-agents.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/untrusted-content-masking-web-agents.md</guid><description>A July 2026 paper restores the trust boundary web agents lose when they read a rendered page — masking untrusted DOM regions and routing them through a type-constrained model to block injection by construction.</description><pubDate>Tue, 07 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>DEFENSE</category></item><item><title>WebMCP tool surface poisoning: hijacking agents mid-session</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/webmcp-tool-surface-poisoning-msti.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/webmcp-tool-surface-poisoning-msti.md</guid><description>A June 2026 paper shows a compromised third-party script can swap or reframe the tools a WebMCP agent sees during a live session, driving malicious tool calls at up to 100% success.</description><pubDate>Tue, 07 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>AGENTS</category></item><item><title>Adversarial pragmatics: why pass/fail safety evals hide injection failures</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/adversarial-pragmatics-safety-evals.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/adversarial-pragmatics-safety-evals.md</guid><description>A July 2026 benchmark shows that scoring a model &apos;safe&apos; or &apos;unsafe&apos; throws away the one thing a safety eval needs to know: whether a string was a command, a quotation, or untrusted content — and whether the grader could even tell.</description><pubDate>Mon, 06 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>RESEARCH</category></item><item><title>Agent skills carry hidden dependencies: transitive risk in skill supply chains</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/agent-skill-transitive-dependency-risk.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/agent-skill-transitive-dependency-risk.md</guid><description>A July 2026 study of 1.43 million agent skills finds most security-relevant risk hides in transitive dependencies a reviewer never sees by reading the skill file alone.</description><pubDate>Mon, 06 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>SUPPLY CHAIN</category></item><item><title>AgentCanary: a security benchmark for agents in real executable environments</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/agentcanary-agent-security-benchmark.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/agentcanary-agent-security-benchmark.md</guid><description>A June 2026 framework from Ant Group tests 12 LLM agents in real, stateful tool environments and finds they often fail to recognize the attacks they face — especially poisoned skills and long-horizon chains.</description><pubDate>Mon, 06 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>AGENTS</category></item><item><title>Static scanners miss repacked agent-skill malware — runtime auditing catches it</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/cloak-detonate-agent-skill-malware.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/cloak-detonate-agent-skill-malware.md</guid><description>A July 2026 study shows adaptive repacking bypasses over 90% of agent-skill scanners, and argues behavioral runtime auditing, not appearance checks, is what actually detects the malware.</description><pubDate>Mon, 06 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>SUPPLY CHAIN</category></item><item><title>Cross-model prompt laundering: a refusal that doesn&apos;t survive the handoff</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/cross-model-prompt-laundering-api-chaining.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/cross-model-prompt-laundering-api-chaining.md</guid><description>In multi-agent stacks, one model&apos;s output becomes another model&apos;s user turn. A July 2026 finding shows the second model never learns the first already refused — so it complies.</description><pubDate>Mon, 06 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>AGENTS</category></item><item><title>FlowSteer: steering multi-agent workflow formation with a single prompt</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/flowsteer-planning-time-workflow-steering.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/flowsteer-planning-time-workflow-steering.md</guid><description>A May 2026 paper shows a prompt-only attacker can bias how a planner-executor multi-agent system builds its workflow, lifting malicious success by up to 55% before any agent runs.</description><pubDate>Mon, 06 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>AGENTS</category></item><item><title>Why a 0.998 AUC probe may not actually detect prompt injection</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/hidden-state-probe-ipi-evaluation.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/hidden-state-probe-ipi-evaluation.md</guid><description>A June 2026 study shows a hidden-state probe can score AUC 0.998 at flagging indirect prompt injection in computer-use agents while learning surface artefacts — and proposes controls to tell real detection apart.</description><pubDate>Mon, 06 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>DEFENSE</category></item><item><title>Kidnapping the reasoning chain: black-box poisoning of agentic RAG</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/kidnaprag-agentic-rag-reasoning-hijack.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/kidnaprag-agentic-rag-reasoning-hijack.md</guid><description>A July 2026 paper shows attackers who can only publish web documents can hijack an agentic RAG system&apos;s multi-step reasoning — no access to prompts, retrievers, or weights required.</description><pubDate>Mon, 06 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>INDIRECT INJECTION</category></item><item><title>kNNGuard: a training-free guardrail read from LLM activations</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/knnguard-training-free-activation-guardrail.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/knnguard-training-free-activation-guardrail.md</guid><description>A July 2026 paper builds a prompt guardrail from just 50 labeled examples by reading a model&apos;s own hidden activations — no fine-tuning, and 2.7x faster than the best comparable classifier.</description><pubDate>Mon, 06 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>DEFENSE</category></item><item><title>Measuring how much a RAG system leaks its private knowledge base</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/leakdojo-rag-knowledge-base-leakage.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/leakdojo-rag-knowledge-base-leakage.md</guid><description>Two spring 2026 papers formalize and benchmark RAG knowledge-base extraction: a compound anchor-plus-command query pulls retrieved documents back verbatim, and the leakage factors cleanly into two independent causes.</description><pubDate>Mon, 06 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>DATA LEAK</category></item><item><title>MAGE: a shadow memory that catches long-horizon agent attacks</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/mage-shadow-memory-long-horizon-defense.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/mage-shadow-memory-long-horizon-defense.md</guid><description>A May 2026 paper borrows the shadow-stack idea from systems security to give LLM agents a parallel security memory, cutting a 100% multi-turn attack to 8.3%.</description><pubDate>Mon, 06 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>DEFENSE</category></item><item><title>The Misattribution Gap: memory poisoning that gets blamed on the model</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/misattribution-gap-memory-poisoning.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/misattribution-gap-memory-poisoning.md</guid><description>A single policy-formatted document, uploaded once to an agent&apos;s shared memory, produces violations that look exactly like model misalignment — so teams retrain the model and leave the attack untouched.</description><pubDate>Mon, 06 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>AGENTS</category></item><item><title>OWASP AISVS 1.0: a testable checklist for verifying AI application security</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/owasp-aisvs-verification-standard.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/owasp-aisvs-verification-standard.md</guid><description>OWASP shipped the first stable release of its AI Security Verification Standard in late June 2026 — 14 chapters of pass/fail requirements that turn AI governance intent into evidence, including dedicated agent and MCP chapters.</description><pubDate>Mon, 06 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>DEFENSE</category></item><item><title>Persona Attack: how accumulated conversation memory erodes safety alignment</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/persona-attack-incremental-memory-jailbreak.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/persona-attack-incremental-memory-jailbreak.md</guid><description>A June 2026 paper shows that jailbreaks spread across many turns — building a persona in the model&apos;s memory — can gradually outweigh safety training, reaching high success once enough context accumulates.</description><pubDate>Mon, 06 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>JAILBREAK</category></item><item><title>Agents collect more than they reveal: auditing privacy at the acquisition stage</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/privacypeek-agent-acquisition-audit.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/privacypeek-agent-acquisition-audit.md</guid><description>A June 2026 benchmark inspects the moment sensitive data enters an agent&apos;s context, not just what it later discloses — and finds over-collection is widespread.</description><pubDate>Mon, 06 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>DATA LEAK</category></item><item><title>STAC: chaining benign tool calls to jailbreak AI agents</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/stac-sequential-tool-attack-chaining.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/stac-sequential-tool-attack-chaining.md</guid><description>A research framework shows that a sequence of individually harmless tool calls can steer an agent into a harmful final action — bypassing frontier safety with over 90% success.</description><pubDate>Mon, 06 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>AGENTS</category></item><item><title>SUDP: letting agents act on your credentials without ever holding them</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/sudp-secret-use-delegation-agents.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/sudp-secret-use-delegation-agents.md</guid><description>A May 2026 protocol reframes agent credential handling: instead of putting a reusable secret inside the model-steerable runtime, the agent only proposes an operation the user signs off on, single-use.</description><pubDate>Mon, 06 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>DEFENSE</category></item><item><title>Vera: scaled safety testing finds tool-using agents fail 93.9% of the time</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/vera-agent-safety-testing-at-scale.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/vera-agent-safety-testing-at-scale.md</guid><description>A July 2026 framework auto-generates 1,600 executable safety cases and judges outcomes from real environment state — exposing near-total failure of production agents under compromised tool returns.</description><pubDate>Mon, 06 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>RESEARCH</category></item><item><title>The visual confused deputy: when a computer-using agent clicks the wrong button</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/visual-confused-deputy-cua-perception.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/visual-confused-deputy-cua-perception.md</guid><description>A March 2026 paper formalizes CUA perception failures as a security class. An 8-line screenshot swap can turn a routine click into privilege escalation — and a guardrail outside the agent&apos;s eyes helps.</description><pubDate>Mon, 06 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>AGENTS</category></item><item><title>vm2 sandbox escapes turn agent prompt injection into host RCE</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/vm2-sandbox-escape-agent-rce.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/vm2-sandbox-escape-agent-rce.md</guid><description>A 2026 wave of escapes in vm2 — the Node.js library many agent frameworks use to run LLM-generated JavaScript — lets a prompt injection break out of the sandbox and run commands on the host.</description><pubDate>Mon, 06 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>AGENTS</category></item><item><title>AI-Infra-Guard: why agent red teaming needs one method per layer</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/ai-infra-guard-layered-red-teaming.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/ai-infra-guard-layered-red-teaming.md</guid><description>A framework released on 30 June 2026 argues the agent attack surface is stratified — infrastructure, tools, behavior, model — and no single detection method fits all four.</description><pubDate>Sun, 05 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>DEFENSE</category></item><item><title>AI-generated zero-days and autonomous malware reach the wild</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/ai-zero-day-autonomous-malware-gtig.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/ai-zero-day-autonomous-malware-gtig.md</guid><description>Google&apos;s May 2026 threat report documents the first zero-day an attacker built with AI, plus malware that calls a model at runtime to decide its next move.</description><pubDate>Sun, 05 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>OFFENSIVE AI</category></item><item><title>Antaeus: repository-grounded LLM reasoning for logic vulnerabilities</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/antaeus-repo-logic-vuln-detection.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/antaeus-repo-logic-vuln-detection.md</guid><description>A July 1, 2026 paper grounds LLM reasoning in whole-repository context to find access-control and info-exposure logic bugs — detecting 15 of 28 where frontier agents caught at most 4.</description><pubDate>Sun, 05 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>RESEARCH</category></item><item><title>Chain-of-Thought Hijacking: long reasoning traces dilute a model&apos;s refusal signal</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/chain-of-thought-hijacking-refusal-dilution.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/chain-of-thought-hijacking-refusal-dilution.md</guid><description>A black-box jailbreak buries a harmful request under thousands of tokens of benign reasoning. As the trace grows, the internal refusal signal fades — reported at up to 100% success on frontier reasoning models.</description><pubDate>Sun, 05 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>JAILBREAK</category></item><item><title>Claude Cowork sandbox: a disputed root escape and the local-code-execution debate</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/claude-cowork-sandbox-root-escape.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/claude-cowork-sandbox-root-escape.md</guid><description>Researchers published a chain on 1 July 2026 that reaches root inside Claude Cowork&apos;s Linux sandbox and strips its network limits. Anthropic declines to call it a vulnerability because it needs prior host access.</description><pubDate>Sun, 05 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>AGENTS</category></item><item><title>How a clean repository tricks a coding agent into a reverse shell</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/clean-repo-coding-agent-reverse-shell.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/clean-repo-coding-agent-reverse-shell.md</guid><description>Mozilla&apos;s 0DIN team showed that a public repo with zero malicious code can lead Claude Code to spawn a reverse shell — the real payload never sits in the repo, it is fetched at runtime from a DNS record.</description><pubDate>Sun, 05 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>INDIRECT INJECTION</category></item><item><title>Cline&apos;s Kanban server: a cross-origin WebSocket hijack path to RCE</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/cline-kanban-cross-origin-websocket-hijack.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/cline-kanban-cross-origin-websocket-hijack.md</guid><description>A May 2026 disclosure shows Cline&apos;s local Kanban WebSocket server ships with no origin check — any website a developer visits can read the workspace and inject commands into a running agent.</description><pubDate>Sun, 05 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>AGENTS</category></item><item><title>Why agent privacy can&apos;t be enforced at the final answer</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/data-agent-privacy-surfaces.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/data-agent-privacy-surfaces.md</guid><description>When an LLM agent queries databases, retrieves documents, and keeps memory across sessions, sensitive data leaks long before the answer. A June 2026 survey maps where.</description><pubDate>Sun, 05 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>DATA LEAK</category></item><item><title>Fine-tuning turns small open models into competent exploit writers</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/finetuned-small-models-exploit-generation.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/finetuned-small-models-exploit-generation.md</guid><description>A June 2026 benchmark shows a curated dataset can lift an 8B open-weight model&apos;s proof-of-concept exploit quality by over 42%, rivaling proprietary models — data quality now matters as much as scale.</description><pubDate>Sun, 05 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>RESEARCH</category></item><item><title>Runtime governance for AI agents: the five-plane reference architecture</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/five-plane-agent-runtime-governance.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/five-plane-agent-runtime-governance.md</guid><description>A June 2026 paper argues agent risk now lives inside the workflow, not at the data boundary, and proposes a five-plane architecture: adjudicate intent once, enforce it across four planes.</description><pubDate>Sun, 05 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>AGENTS</category></item><item><title>Malware that prompt-injects the analyst&apos;s AI, not the sandbox</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/gaslight-malware-analyst-prompt-injection.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/gaslight-malware-analyst-prompt-injection.md</guid><description>SentinelOne documented a macOS implant that embeds fake system-failure messages to make an LLM-assisted triage agent doubt its own session and abandon the analysis.</description><pubDate>Sun, 05 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>INDIRECT INJECTION</category></item><item><title>How context compaction silently drops an agent&apos;s safety rules</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/governance-decay-context-compaction.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/governance-decay-context-compaction.md</guid><description>A June 2026 benchmark shows that summarizing an agent&apos;s history to save tokens can quietly delete in-context policy rules, pushing tool-call violations from 0% to as high as 59%.</description><pubDate>Sun, 05 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>AGENTS</category></item><item><title>Stopping infectious jailbreaks in multi-agent systems with local purification</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/infectious-jailbreak-local-purification.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/infectious-jailbreak-local-purification.md</guid><description>In a network of multimodal agents, one poisoned image can spread a jailbreak agent-to-agent until most of the system is compromised. A May 2026 paper proposes a training-free, per-agent cure.</description><pubDate>Sun, 05 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>DEFENSE</category></item><item><title>Long-horizon agents need propagation-aware security, not single-step defenses</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/long-horizon-agent-attack-propagation-taxonomy.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/long-horizon-agent-attack-propagation-taxonomy.md</guid><description>A June 2026 paper maps how attacks in long-horizon AI agents propagate across memory, tools and planning — and persist over many steps, where single-step defenses fail.</description><pubDate>Sun, 05 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>AGENTS</category></item><item><title>Multi-agent code generation: when injected instructions amplify across agents</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/multi-agent-code-gen-injection-amplification.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/multi-agent-code-gen-injection-amplification.md</guid><description>In agent teams that write software, a single injected instruction doesn&apos;t fade across hops. 2026 research shows trusted intermediaries can reformat it and make it stronger, reaching high jailbreak rates.</description><pubDate>Sun, 05 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>AGENTS</category></item><item><title>The Residual Jailbreak Surface: adaptive attacks still break frontier models</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/residual-jailbreak-surface-frontier-models.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/residual-jailbreak-surface-frontier-models.md</guid><description>A June 2026 red-team study of two frontier models finds that static obfuscation is near-dead, but adaptive iterative search still confirms harmful completions across every harm category — and it wins in the first one or two steps.</description><pubDate>Sun, 05 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>JAILBREAK</category></item><item><title>The Safe Source Paradox: web retrieval quietly erodes agent safety</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/safe-source-paradox-web-retrieval.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/safe-source-paradox-web-retrieval.md</guid><description>A May 2026 study shows that letting an agent fetch a web page — even a page full of warnings and safety disclaimers — raises harmful compliance by 25% on average. Relevance, not malice, is what flips the switch.</description><pubDate>Sun, 05 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>RESEARCH</category></item><item><title>Stopping a compromise before it spreads across a multi-agent system</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/saiguard-proactive-multi-agent-defense.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/saiguard-proactive-multi-agent-defense.md</guid><description>Most multi-agent defenses detect a bad agent and isolate it after the fact — by then the damage is done. A June 2026 paper simulates each message&apos;s impact before it propagates, and rewrites the risky ones.</description><pubDate>Sun, 05 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>DEFENSE</category></item><item><title>Agent Zero Trust: what Anthropic&apos;s framework fixes, and what it can&apos;t</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/agent-zero-trust-framework-limits.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/agent-zero-trust-framework-limits.md</guid><description>Anthropic&apos;s May 2026 Zero Trust framework reshapes enterprise agent security around per-task identity and memory integrity — but Gartner warns it still can&apos;t fully secure high-autonomy agents.</description><pubDate>Sat, 04 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>DEFENSE</category></item><item><title>AgentCyberRange: measuring how far AI agents get in real intrusions</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/agentcyberrange-end-to-end-offensive-eval.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/agentcyberrange-end-to-end-offensive-eval.md</guid><description>A June 2026 open benchmark runs frontier AI through realistic multi-host cyber ranges. The strongest system solved 16.1% of web-exploitation tasks and even surfaced an unknown zero-day.</description><pubDate>Sat, 04 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>RESEARCH</category></item><item><title>AgentWatch: an open framework for auditing how safely browser agents behave</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/agentwatch-browser-agent-audit.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/agentwatch-browser-agent-audit.md</guid><description>A UC Berkeley capstone audited five leading AI browsing agents across five risk dimensions and released an open, stochastic-aware scoring framework anyone can extend.</description><pubDate>Sat, 04 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>DEFENSE</category></item><item><title>An off-the-shelf AI fuzzer found seven flaws in FatFs, embedded in millions of devices</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/ai-fuzzer-fatfs-embedded-firmware.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/ai-fuzzer-fatfs-embedded-firmware.md</guid><description>runZero aimed VS Code and GitHub Copilot in auto mode at FatFs — the FAT/exFAT library inside cameras, drones and wallets — and the AI-built fuzzer surfaced seven bugs a 2017 manual audit had missed.</description><pubDate>Sat, 04 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>RESEARCH</category></item><item><title>BioShocking: framing a task as a game makes AI browsers leak credentials</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/bioshocking-game-framing-browser-agents.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/bioshocking-game-framing-browser-agents.md</guid><description>LayerX&apos;s BioShocking technique convinces agentic browsers they are inside a game, so they apply game logic instead of safety logic — and hand over user credentials.</description><pubDate>Sat, 04 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>AGENTS</category></item><item><title>Do your agent logs actually prove what it did? A benchmark for evidence sufficiency</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/governance-evidence-sufficiency-demm-bench.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/governance-evidence-sufficiency-demm-bench.md</guid><description>A late-June 2026 benchmark shows that having traces, ledgers, or schemas in place is not the same as having enough evidence. Presence-based logging overclaims &apos;sufficient&apos; on up to 75% of cases.</description><pubDate>Sat, 04 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>GOVERNANCE</category></item><item><title>Two-thirds of AI iOS apps leak their LLM credentials in plain network traffic</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/ios-llm-api-key-leakage.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/ios-llm-api-key-leakage.md</guid><description>A Wake Forest study of 444 iOS AI apps found 282 exposing usable LLM credentials — plaintext keys, open proxy backends, and replayable tokens — readable from ordinary traffic. Three months after disclosure, only 28% had fixed it.</description><pubDate>Sat, 04 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>DATA LEAK</category></item><item><title>One filter is not enough: a layered defense for RAG chatbots</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/layered-defense-rag-chatbot-injection.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/layered-defense-rag-chatbot-injection.md</guid><description>A mid-June 2026 paper argues single-stage prompt-injection filters leave gaps a poisoned knowledge-base document walks through, and tests a three-layer pipeline that drops attack success from 71% to 11%.</description><pubDate>Sat, 04 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>DEFENSE</category></item><item><title>Locate-and-Judge: attention-based detection of malicious agent skills</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/locate-and-judge-malicious-skill-detection.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/locate-and-judge-malicious-skill-detection.md</guid><description>A June 2026 paper scans about 134,000 agent skills across three marketplaces and confirms 131 live malicious ones, using instruction-following attention to surface payloads hidden inside benign-looking skill files.</description><pubDate>Sat, 04 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>DEFENSE</category></item><item><title>mcp-pinot: an unauthenticated MCP server as a confused deputy</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/mcp-pinot-confused-deputy.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/mcp-pinot-confused-deputy.md</guid><description>A June 2026 disclosure shows an Apache Pinot MCP server that bound to 0.0.0.0 with OAuth off, letting any network-adjacent caller run its privileged database tools.</description><pubDate>Sat, 04 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>AGENTS</category></item><item><title>MDASH: multi-model agentic vulnerability discovery reaches production defense</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/mdash-multi-model-agentic-vuln-discovery.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/mdash-multi-model-agentic-vuln-discovery.md</guid><description>Microsoft&apos;s MDASH harness orchestrates 100+ specialized AI agents to find, debate and prove kernel bugs. It surfaced 16 Windows CVEs and scored 88.45% on CyberGym — the defensive signal, and the dual-use one.</description><pubDate>Sat, 04 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>DEFENSE</category></item><item><title>Poisoning what a web agent remembers: triggered attacks on multimodal memory</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/memvenom-multimodal-memory-web-agents.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/memvenom-multimodal-memory-web-agents.md</guid><description>A June 2026 paper shows web agents that store past observations in graph memory can be poisoned so a later visual trigger recalls attacker content and steers the agent — persistent and reusable across goals.</description><pubDate>Sat, 04 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>AGENTS</category></item><item><title>One compromised robot can cascade unsafe actions across an LLM robot team</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/multi-robot-llm-compromise-propagation.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/multi-robot-llm-compromise-propagation.md</guid><description>A first study of LLM-controlled multi-robot teams shows that manipulating a single entry robot can propagate unsafe actions to the whole fleet through inter-robot communication.</description><pubDate>Sat, 04 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>AGENTS</category></item><item><title>OEP: poisoning self-evolving agents with clean edge cases</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/oep-non-transferable-experience-poisoning.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/oep-non-transferable-experience-poisoning.md</guid><description>A May 2026 study shows a low-privilege attacker can corrupt a self-evolving agent&apos;s learned rules with benign, locally correct edge cases — over 50% attack success on GPT-4o, and robust against current defenses.</description><pubDate>Sat, 04 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>AGENTS</category></item><item><title>Benign tasks, unsafe shortcuts: a new safety benchmark for computer-use agents</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/osguard-benign-task-computer-use-safety.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/osguard-benign-task-computer-use-safety.md</guid><description>A late-June 2026 benchmark measures a blind spot that adversarial tests miss — computer-use agents that reach a legitimate goal through a destructive shortcut, and guardrails that catch it in isolation but not end-to-end.</description><pubDate>Sat, 04 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>RESEARCH</category></item><item><title>PHANTOM: a 47k-sample dataset for stress-testing vision-language model safety</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/phantom-multimodal-adversarial-dataset.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/phantom-multimodal-adversarial-dataset.md</guid><description>A June 2026 paper releases PHANTOM, an open dataset of 47,524 pre-generated multimodal adversarial samples across 55 harm subcategories — built to make VLM robustness evaluation reproducible and cheap.</description><pubDate>Sat, 04 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>RESEARCH</category></item><item><title>Attention drift: why 80% of real-world LLM apps leak their system prompt</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/prompt-leaking-attention-drift.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/prompt-leaking-attention-drift.md</guid><description>A June 2026 study measured 1,200 production LLM apps and found most leak their system prompt under simple adversarial queries, tracing the cause to a mechanism called attention drift.</description><pubDate>Sat, 04 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>DATA LEAK</category></item><item><title>Proteus shows agent-skill auditors leak far more than one-shot tests reveal</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/proteus-self-evolving-skill-red-team.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/proteus-self-evolving-skill-red-team.md</guid><description>A May 2026 paper measures &apos;adaptive leakage&apos;: when an attacker can rewrite a malicious skill using the auditor&apos;s own feedback, SkillVetter is bypassed in over 93% of cases and Tencent&apos;s AI-Infra-Guard still admits up to 41% of lethal variants.</description><pubDate>Sat, 04 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>RESEARCH</category></item><item><title>Safety token regularization: keeping fine-tuned LLMs aligned</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/safety-token-regularization-finetuning.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/safety-token-regularization-finetuning.md</guid><description>An April 2026 paper shows benign fine-tuning quietly erodes an LLM&apos;s refusals, and proposes a lightweight logit-space regularizer that preserves safety without hurting task accuracy.</description><pubDate>Sat, 04 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>DEFENSE</category></item><item><title>Spec-driven, trajectory-aware security testing for autonomous agents</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/seclaw-spec-driven-agent-security-eval.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/seclaw-spec-driven-agent-security-eval.md</guid><description>A June 2026 framework generates agent security tasks from structured risk specs and scores the whole execution trajectory — not just the final answer — to catch unsafe tool calls before they surface.</description><pubDate>Sat, 04 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>RESEARCH</category></item><item><title>Simulated moderation traces: jailbreaking tool-enabled LLMs</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/simulated-moderation-trace-jailbreak.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/simulated-moderation-trace-jailbreak.md</guid><description>A July 2026 paper shows attackers can jailbreak function-calling LLMs by faking a safety-audit workflow across tool turns — proving prompt-level filtering is not enough.</description><pubDate>Sat, 04 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>JAILBREAK</category></item><item><title>Splitting a harmful task into harmless steps slips past agent guardrails</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/trace-subtask-decomposition-agent-jailbreak.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/trace-subtask-decomposition-agent-jailbreak.md</guid><description>A late-May 2026 red-teaming framework decomposes a malicious goal into individually benign-looking subtasks, reaching up to a 100% bypass rate on agents built with frontier models — and current defenses only partly contain it.</description><pubDate>Sat, 04 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>JAILBREAK</category></item><item><title>When the pentest bites back: attacking the tools that red-team for you</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/agent-phishing-offensive-security-tools.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/agent-phishing-offensive-security-tools.md</guid><description>A June 2026 study shows autonomous offensive-security agents can be turned against their operators. A malicious target stages a fake tool the agent runs itself — no prompt injection needed — for near-deterministic code execution.</description><pubDate>Fri, 03 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>AGENTS</category></item><item><title>One agent safety benchmark can&apos;t tell you if your agent is safe</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/agent-safety-benchmarks-disagree.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/agent-safety-benchmarks-disagree.md</guid><description>A 2026 survey codes 40 agent safety benchmarks and shows they rank the same models in contradictory orders — no concordance at all — which means a single &apos;passed the benchmark&apos; claim proves almost nothing.</description><pubDate>Fri, 03 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>RESEARCH</category></item><item><title>Claude Code Action: a bot-actor trust flaw opened a supply-chain path</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/claude-code-action-bot-actor-permission-bypass.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/claude-code-action-bot-actor-permission-bypass.md</guid><description>A researcher showed Claude Code GitHub Action trusted any actor ending in [bot], letting a self-registered GitHub App trigger agent-mode workflows on public repos and chain prompt injection to OIDC-token theft. Fixed in v1.0.94.</description><pubDate>Fri, 03 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>SUPPLY CHAIN</category></item><item><title>Browser agents now resist hand-crafted injection — coding agents don&apos;t</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/domain-conditioned-cua-safety.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/domain-conditioned-cua-safety.md</guid><description>A 793-episode benchmark finds frontier computer-use agents shrug off hand-crafted browser injections (0/140), yet the same model weights fall to skill-injection in a coding harness up to 100%. Safety hardening is domain-specific.</description><pubDate>Fri, 03 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>RESEARCH</category></item><item><title>Fanfiction register: when a whole writing style becomes the jailbreak</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/fanfiction-register-jailbreak.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/fanfiction-register-jailbreak.md</guid><description>A June 2026 arXiv paper shows that safety training under-covers an entire register of human writing — fanfiction voice — lifting mean attack success from 0.28 to 0.73 with no attacker model and no per-target tuning.</description><pubDate>Fri, 03 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>JAILBREAK</category></item><item><title>IDEsaster: when base IDE features become agent RCE primitives</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/idesaster-base-ide-features-agent-rce.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/idesaster-base-ide-features-agent-rce.md</guid><description>Ari Marzouk disclosed a vulnerability class where prompt injection drives AI coding agents to weaponize the underlying editor&apos;s own legacy features — reaching data exfiltration and RCE across nearly every AI IDE.</description><pubDate>Fri, 03 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>AGENTS</category></item><item><title>InkJect: hidden image text slips past the guardrails frontier VLMs trust</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/inkject-visual-prompt-injection-guardrail-bypass.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/inkject-visual-prompt-injection-guardrail-bypass.md</guid><description>DeepKeep&apos;s InkJect research hides instructions inside images — white-on-white text, skewed to defeat OCR — so vision models act on commands their text filters would have blocked.</description><pubDate>Fri, 03 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>INDIRECT INJECTION</category></item><item><title>Where the instruction hierarchy breaks in reasoning models</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/instruction-hierarchy-breaks-reasoning-models.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/instruction-hierarchy-breaks-reasoning-models.md</guid><description>A June 2026 diagnostic paper decomposes instruction-hierarchy failures in reasoning LLMs into three stages — and shows training-free self-monitoring can repair most of them.</description><pubDate>Fri, 03 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>DEFENSE</category></item><item><title>JADEPUFFER: an AI agent ran a full ransomware attack on its own</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/jadepuffer-autonomous-agent-ransomware.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/jadepuffer-autonomous-agent-ransomware.md</guid><description>Sysdig documented the first ransomware operation driven start to finish by an LLM agent — entering through an exposed Langflow server, harvesting secrets, then encrypting and wiping a production database.</description><pubDate>Fri, 03 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>OFFENSIVE AI</category></item><item><title>Langflow&apos;s cross-tenant flow hijack: the 9.9 bug attackers ignored</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/langflow-cross-tenant-flow-hijack-idor.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/langflow-cross-tenant-flow-hijack-idor.md</guid><description>Sysdig caught the first in-the-wild use of a Langflow flaw that lets one authenticated user run another tenant&apos;s flow — and its credentials. Scored higher than the RCE beside it, it was barely touched.</description><pubDate>Fri, 03 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>INFRASTRUCTURE</category></item><item><title>Lingering authority: revoking coding-agent capabilities after a task closes</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/lingering-authority-coding-agents.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/lingering-authority-coding-agents.md</guid><description>A June 2026 study names a quiet failure mode: coding agents keep tool authority long after the subgoal that needed it closed. A reference monitor that revokes those capabilities stops stale-write abuse.</description><pubDate>Fri, 03 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>AGENTS</category></item><item><title>LLMO abuse: poisoning package docs to fool AI coding agents</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/llmo-abuse-package-docs-coding-agents.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/llmo-abuse-package-docs-coding-agents.md</guid><description>ReversingLabs&apos; June 2026 PromptMink report shows a North Korean group writing npm package documentation to read as authoritative to LLM coding agents, so the agent recommends and installs a malicious dependency.</description><pubDate>Fri, 03 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>SUPPLY CHAIN</category></item><item><title>MemAudit: forensic auditing to find poisoned entries in agent memory</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/memaudit-poisoned-agent-memory-forensics.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/memaudit-poisoned-agent-memory-forensics.md</guid><description>Most agent-memory defenses try to block poisoning up front. A May 2026 paper flips the problem: audit the memory store after the fact, tracing a bad action back to the entries that caused it.</description><pubDate>Fri, 03 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>DEFENSE</category></item><item><title>MOSAIC-Bench: coding agents build exploitable code from innocuous tickets</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/mosaic-bench-compositional-vulnerability-coding-agents.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/mosaic-bench-compositional-vulnerability-coding-agents.md</guid><description>A May 2026 benchmark shows coding agents pass per-prompt safety checks yet assemble exploitable code when a malicious goal is split into routine engineering tickets — and reviewer agents wave it through.</description><pubDate>Fri, 03 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>AGENTS</category></item><item><title>Argument-level provenance stops injection where whole-call defenses fail</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/pact-argument-level-authority-binding.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/pact-argument-level-authority-binding.md</guid><description>A May 2026 paper argues indirect injection only turns dangerous when untrusted data binds an authority-bearing argument. PACT checks provenance per argument, recovering utility at full security.</description><pubDate>Fri, 03 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>DEFENSE</category></item><item><title>When a poisoned agent skill hides in the false alarms</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/poise-skill-injection-scanner-evasion.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/poise-skill-injection-scanner-evasion.md</guid><description>New research shows a position-aware skill-poisoning attack that blends malicious instructions into ordinary skill prose, slipping past LLM scanners that already cry wolf on most clean skills.</description><pubDate>Fri, 03 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>SUPPLY CHAIN</category></item><item><title>When the playbook lies: knowledge poisoning against AI security agents</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/poisoned-playbooks-security-agent-rag.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/poisoned-playbooks-security-agent-rag.md</guid><description>A late-June 2026 study shows AI security agents that retrieve external write-ups adopt poisoned claims systematically, and defenses collapse exactly where evidence is thin: sparse or zero-day cases.</description><pubDate>Fri, 03 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>RESEARCH</category></item><item><title>When agents move from reading to acting: MCP tool-description poisoning</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/reading-to-acting-mcp-tool-poisoning.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/reading-to-acting-mcp-tool-poisoning.md</guid><description>Microsoft Incident Response (June 30, 2026) shows how a silently edited MCP tool description can steer an action-taking agent into exfiltrating data — no prompt, no credential, no user involvement.</description><pubDate>Fri, 03 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>AGENTS</category></item><item><title>Task-alignment reasoning beats pattern-matching against adaptive prompt injection</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/reta-task-alignment-injection-defense.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/reta-task-alignment-injection-defense.md</guid><description>A June 2026 paper shows static benchmarks overstate injection defenses: adaptive attackers lift the worst-case success rate by ~16 points. RETA anchors decisions on the user&apos;s task instead of the attacker&apos;s text.</description><pubDate>Fri, 03 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>DEFENSE</category></item><item><title>RIFT-Bench: red-teaming agents by mapping their code, not their prompts</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/rift-bench-graph-driven-agent-red-teaming.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/rift-bench-graph-driven-agent-red-teaming.md</guid><description>A June 2026 Fujitsu paper reframes agent security testing around system structure. It extracts a graph of an agent&apos;s components from its code, then instantiates attacks that fit — generalizing across 45 heterogeneous systems.</description><pubDate>Fri, 03 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>RESEARCH</category></item><item><title>SCOUT: adaptive detector allocation for prompt-injection defense</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/scout-adaptive-detector-allocation.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/scout-adaptive-detector-allocation.md</guid><description>Posted to arXiv in May 2026, SCOUT reframes prompt-injection defense as a per-request routing problem — reportedly cutting attack success 46% and latency 40% versus an always-on LLM judge.</description><pubDate>Fri, 03 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>DEFENSE</category></item><item><title>SEO-poisoned websites hide prompt injection to hijack AI web agents</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/seo-poisoned-sites-ipi-web-agents.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/seo-poisoned-sites-ipi-web-agents.md</guid><description>Zscaler ThreatLabz found live malicious sites that combine SEO poisoning, hidden CSS text and abused schema markup to plant instructions that steer autonomous web agents into paying attackers.</description><pubDate>Fri, 03 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>INDIRECT INJECTION</category></item><item><title>SkillMutator: attacks that hide between an agent skill&apos;s prose and its code</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/skillmutator-cross-modal-skill-attacks.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/skillmutator-cross-modal-skill-attacks.md</guid><description>A June 2026 benchmark shows agent skills can be malicious in the interaction between their natural-language instructions and their scripts — passing both prompt-injection and code review while steering the agent to exfiltrate files.</description><pubDate>Fri, 03 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>SUPPLY CHAIN</category></item><item><title>TRACE: catching RAG corpus poisoning by following token influence</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/trace-token-influence-rag-poisoning.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/trace-token-influence-rag-poisoning.md</guid><description>A July 2026 paper detects poisoned documents in a RAG corpus by tracing which retrieved tokens drove the model&apos;s answer — no extra classifier or second LLM, and it surfaces the attacker&apos;s target answer as a side effect.</description><pubDate>Fri, 03 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>DEFENSE</category></item><item><title>Amazon Q auto-ran a repo&apos;s MCP config, exposing developer cloud keys</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/amazon-q-workspace-mcp-auto-execution.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/amazon-q-workspace-mcp-auto-execution.md</guid><description>Wiz disclosed (June 26, 2026) that Amazon Q Developer auto-launched MCP servers from a repo config file with no consent, so opening a malicious project could run code and steal cloud credentials.</description><pubDate>Thu, 02 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>AGENTS</category></item><item><title>AutoDojo: why &apos;action-open&apos; agent tasks quietly break prompt-injection defenses</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/autodojo-adaptive-ipi-task-specification.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/autodojo-adaptive-ipi-task-specification.md</guid><description>A June 2026 paper turns AgentDojo into an adaptive benchmark and shows a cheap black-box attacker recovers 28% of blocked injections — and 64% on tasks that delegate the action to attacker-controlled content.</description><pubDate>Thu, 02 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>INDIRECT INJECTION</category></item><item><title>Sharing prompt-injection intel across LLM services without sharing prompts</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/binaryshield-cross-service-injection-fingerprints.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/binaryshield-cross-service-injection-fingerprints.md</guid><description>A SaTML 2026 paper from Microsoft turns detected injection prompts into privacy-preserving binary fingerprints, so one service can warn another about an attack without exposing raw user text.</description><pubDate>Thu, 02 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>DEFENSE</category></item><item><title>When injections speak the document&apos;s language: the camouflage detection gap</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/camouflaged-injection-detection-gap.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/camouflaged-injection-detection-gap.md</guid><description>Two 2026 studies show prompt injections written in a document&apos;s own domain jargon slip past guard classifiers — Llama Guard 3 caught zero. Paraphrasing retrieved content is the defense that holds up best, but results swing by model.</description><pubDate>Thu, 02 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>DEFENSE</category></item><item><title>DuneSlide: prompt injection escapes Cursor&apos;s terminal sandbox to RCE</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/cursor-duneslide-sandbox-escape-rce.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/cursor-duneslide-sandbox-escape-rce.md</guid><description>Cato AI Labs disclosed two critical flaws in Cursor&apos;s auto-run sandbox on July 1, 2026. A single poisoned prompt overwrites the sandbox helper binary and turns a locked box into full code execution — zero click.</description><pubDate>Thu, 02 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>AGENTS</category></item><item><title>When an LLM invents the attack: DeepSeek&apos;s browser-only ransomware</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/deepseek-browser-only-ransomware.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/deepseek-browser-only-ransomware.md</guid><description>Check Point disclosed a DeepSeek-generated sample that turns a legitimate Chromium file-access permission into working browser-native ransomware — no payload, no exploit, no root. Reported July 1, 2026.</description><pubDate>Thu, 02 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>OFFENSIVE AI</category></item><item><title>A fake Perplexity extension turned an AI brand into a search wiretap</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/fake-perplexity-extension-search-hijack.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/fake-perplexity-extension-search-hijack.md</guid><description>Microsoft found a Chromium extension impersonating Perplexity that rerouted every address-bar keystroke through an attacker&apos;s server before showing real results — no browser bug, just abused trust and Manifest V3 permissions.</description><pubDate>Thu, 02 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>SUPPLY CHAIN</category></item><item><title>GuardFall: coding-agent command guards inspect text the shell rewrites</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/guardfall-shell-injection-coding-agents.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/guardfall-shell-injection-coding-agents.md</guid><description>Adversa AI&apos;s GuardFall (June 30, 2026) bypassed the safety filter in 10 of 11 open-source coding agents by exploiting a decades-old gap: the guard checks raw command text while bash expands and rewrites it before running.</description><pubDate>Thu, 02 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>AGENTS</category></item><item><title>Harness vs. model: benchmarking LLMs on access-control bug detection</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/harness-vs-model-idor-detection.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/harness-vs-model-idor-detection.md</guid><description>A June 2026 Semgrep benchmark on IDOR detection found an open-weight model beating a frontier coding agent on a bare prompt — but a purpose-built harness still led. What defenders should take away.</description><pubDate>Thu, 02 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>DEFENSE</category></item><item><title>The tool you approved isn&apos;t the tool you&apos;re running: MCP description rug-pulls</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/mcp-tool-description-rug-pull.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/mcp-tool-description-rug-pull.md</guid><description>Microsoft&apos;s June 30, 2026 research shows an approved MCP tool can be silently re-described after review. Because agents pick up description changes on the fly, a clean tool turns into a data-exfiltration channel with no alarm.</description><pubDate>Thu, 02 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>SUPPLY CHAIN</category></item><item><title>Memory laundering defeats content- and lineage-based agent memory defenses</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/memory-laundering-non-malleable-authority.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/memory-laundering-non-malleable-authority.md</guid><description>A June 2026 paper proves any defense that bases a memory item&apos;s authority on its content or its derivation history can be laundered — and that only write-time origin binding stops agent memory poisoning.</description><pubDate>Thu, 02 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>DEFENSE</category></item><item><title>Out-of-band injection defenses haven&apos;t met an adaptive attacker yet</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/out-of-band-defenses-adaptive-evaluation.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/out-of-band-defenses-adaptive-evaluation.md</guid><description>A June 2026 paper warns that reference-monitor defenses like CaMeL and Progent are still judged on static benchmarks — the exact method that made in-band defenses look strong until adaptive attacks broke them.</description><pubDate>Thu, 02 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>DEFENSE</category></item><item><title>When agents rewrite themselves: why self-evolution makes every attack lineage-persistent</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/self-evolving-agent-mlas-attack-surface.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/self-evolving-agent-mlas-attack-surface.md</guid><description>A late-June 2026 systematization maps the attack surface of self-evolving LLM agents and finds most of it undefended — self-modification turns one-session compromises into permanent, self-amplifying ones.</description><pubDate>Thu, 02 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>RESEARCH</category></item><item><title>A certified defense for the RAG memory a poisoned agent never forgets</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/smsr-certified-memory-poisoning-defense.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/smsr-certified-memory-poisoning-defense.md</guid><description>A June 2026 paper models multi-session memory poisoning — where one crafted memory quietly corrupts every future user — and offers the first defense with a provable robustness bound instead of a heuristic filter.</description><pubDate>Thu, 02 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>DEFENSE</category></item><item><title>Task done, privacy leaked: agents over-share across tool calls</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/toolprivacybench-purpose-bound-disclosure.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/toolprivacybench-purpose-bound-disclosure.md</guid><description>A June 2026 benchmark shows a tool-using agent can complete its task while quietly passing unnecessary private data to intermediate tools — success does not mean need-to-know disclosure.</description><pubDate>Thu, 02 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>DATA LEAK</category></item><item><title>Bypassed, not broken: how jailbreaks suppress a handful of safety attention heads</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/safety-heads-bypassed-not-broken.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/safety-heads-bypassed-not-broken.md</guid><description>A late-June 2026 paper shows jailbreaks don&apos;t erase a model&apos;s safety features — they silence a few early-layer attention heads while mid-layer heads keep firing, leaving a robust harmful-content signal defenders can read for free.</description><pubDate>Wed, 01 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>RESEARCH</category></item><item><title>OWASP ASI03: when an agent inherits more identity than it should</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/owasp-asi03-identity-privilege-abuse.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/owasp-asi03-identity-privilege-abuse.md</guid><description>Identity &amp; Privilege Abuse is the #3 risk in OWASP&apos;s Top 10 for Agentic Applications. Agents rarely get their own identity — they inherit yours, accumulate permissions, and hold tokens that outlive the task.</description><pubDate>Mon, 29 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>AGENTS</category></item><item><title>Role confusion: why LLMs obey text that sounds authoritative</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/prompt-injection-role-confusion.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/prompt-injection-role-confusion.md</guid><description>A new ICML 2026 paper from MIT argues prompt injection is really &apos;role confusion&apos;: models infer who is speaking from the style of text, not its source. Spoofed reasoning hit ~60% attack success — and a near-invisible rewrite cut it to 10%.</description><pubDate>Fri, 26 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>RESEARCH</category></item><item><title>Automated prompt injection is model-dependent: TAP beats GCG, GPT-5 resists</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/automated-prompt-injection-frontier-gap.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/automated-prompt-injection-frontier-gap.md</guid><description>A June 9, 2026 ETH Zurich study adapts GCG and TAP to AgentDojo across 80 agent task pairs. Black-box TAP beats gradient-based GCG, yet attacks tuned on small models fail to transfer to GPT-5.</description><pubDate>Thu, 25 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>PROMPT INJECTION</category></item><item><title>DifyTap: four authorization flaws leak AI chats across Dify tenants</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/difytap-dify-cross-tenant-ai-chat-leak.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/difytap-dify-cross-tenant-ai-chat-leak.md</guid><description>Zafran Labs disclosed four DifyTap flaws in Dify (June 22, 2026) — two critical, two unauthenticated, three cross-tenant — that let an attacker wiretap other customers&apos; AI conversations and read their files. Three are fixed in 1.14.2.</description><pubDate>Thu, 25 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>DATA LEAK</category></item><item><title>Cognitive Firewall: a split-compute defense for browser agents</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/cognitive-firewall-split-compute-browser-agent-defense.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/cognitive-firewall-split-compute-browser-agent-defense.md</guid><description>A March 2026 eBay paper layers an on-device sentinel, a cloud planner and a deterministic execution guard to cut indirect prompt injection in browser agents from 100% to under 1%.</description><pubDate>Mon, 22 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>DEFENSE</category></item><item><title>Agent communication-graph metadata leaks the workflow before it runs</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/comm-graph-metadata-agent-interop.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/comm-graph-metadata-agent-interop.md</guid><description>A June 5, 2026 arXiv paper shows that even with encrypted payloads, the A2A/MCP communication graph lets a passive observer predict an agent workflow&apos;s task class from its opening — and act before it completes.</description><pubDate>Mon, 22 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>AGENTS</category></item><item><title>FORGE: a multi-agent pipeline turning CVEs into exploits and detections</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/forge-multi-agent-exploitation-detection.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/forge-multi-agent-exploitation-detection.md</guid><description>A June 2, 2026 paper from Dynatrace chains five LLM agents to take a CVE from advisory text to a working exploit attempt and a detection rule, scored on a four-level compromise ladder.</description><pubDate>Mon, 22 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>RESEARCH</category></item><item><title>Off-the-shelf LLM agents fail at SAST scanning, empirical test finds</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/llm-agents-vs-sast-tools.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/llm-agents-vs-sast-tools.md</guid><description>A June 10, 2026 study pitted a local LLM agent against the Bandit SAST tool on 101,816 lines of Python. Every model scored a negative composite, dominated by hallucinated findings.</description><pubDate>Mon, 22 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>RESEARCH</category></item><item><title>LLMjacking evolves: stolen Ollama compute now drives autonomous attack agents</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/llmjacking-offensive-agents-stolen-ollama.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/llmjacking-offensive-agents-stolen-ollama.md</guid><description>A June 17, 2026 Sysdig report documents a captured incident: an exposed, unauthenticated Ollama server used as the reasoning engine for a multi-stage offensive pipeline. The fix is operational, not model-side.</description><pubDate>Mon, 22 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>OFFENSIVE AI</category></item><item><title>1,000 captured agent logs: a low-skill attacker breached 14 firms with Claude and Codex</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/low-skill-attacker-ai-agent-breach.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/low-skill-attacker-ai-agent-breach.md</guid><description>OALABS recovered over 1,000 Claude Code and Codex sessions from a careless attacker. Across all of them the frontier models raised only ten policy violations — the deskilling of intrusion, documented from the inside.</description><pubDate>Mon, 22 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>OFFENSIVE AI</category></item><item><title>MemMark: attributing a poisoned agent memory from the snapshot alone</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/memmark-agent-memory-attribution-watermark.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/memmark-agent-memory-attribution-watermark.md</guid><description>A May 26, 2026 arXiv paper embeds ownership into an agent&apos;s latent memory-write decisions, so provenance survives even when logs are erased and only the final memory snapshot remains.</description><pubDate>Mon, 22 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>DEFENSE</category></item><item><title>OpenAnt: closed-loop LLM vulnerability discovery cuts false positives and cost</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/openant-closed-loop-vuln-discovery.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/openant-closed-loop-vuln-discovery.md</guid><description>Knostic&apos;s OpenAnt (arXiv paper public on June 17, 2026) pairs LLM reasoning with adversarial and dynamic verification. On 8 real projects it surfaced 190 candidate flaws and auto-reproduced 144 — for about $1,461.</description><pubDate>Mon, 22 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>RESEARCH</category></item><item><title>Over-privileged tool selection: agents reach for stronger tools than the task needs</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/over-privileged-tool-selection-toolprivbench.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/over-privileged-tool-selection-toolprivbench.md</guid><description>A June 2026 paper and its benchmark ToolPrivBench show that mainstream LLM agents routinely pick higher-privilege tools when a weaker one would do — and that safety alignment does not fix it.</description><pubDate>Mon, 22 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>AGENTS</category></item><item><title>PRAC: hijacking a computer-use agent&apos;s choice through its attention</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/prac-attention-concentration-cua.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/prac-attention-concentration-cua.md</guid><description>An April 2026 Tübingen paper shows one imperceptibly perturbed product image can concentrate a computer-use agent&apos;s visual attention and steer 82% of its selections — without ever touching the output.</description><pubDate>Mon, 22 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>ADVERSARIAL</category></item><item><title>Do prompt-injection attacks survive a real RAG pipeline?</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/prompt-injection-survival-realistic-rag.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/prompt-injection-survival-realistic-rag.md</guid><description>A May 2026 re-evaluation finds most GEO prompt-injection attacks die in the retriever and reranker before reaching the generator. Only LLM-driven injections survive end-to-end, and those are easy to detect.</description><pubDate>Mon, 22 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>RESEARCH</category></item><item><title>DrainCode: energy-and-cost DoS via RAG corpus poisoning in code generation</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/rag-energy-drain-corpus-poisoning.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/rag-energy-drain-corpus-poisoning.md</guid><description>A January 2026 attack, DrainCode, poisons a code-RAG corpus so retrieved snippets coerce the model into longer-but-still-correct output — inflating latency ~85% and energy ~49%. The target is availability and cost, not integrity.</description><pubDate>Mon, 22 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>RESEARCH</category></item><item><title>Bucket squatting in Vertex AI: the &quot;Pickle in the Middle&quot; cross-tenant RCE</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/vertex-ai-bucket-squatting-pickle-in-the-middle.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/vertex-ai-bucket-squatting-pickle-in-the-middle.md</guid><description>Unit 42 disclosed a Vertex AI Python SDK flaw (June 16, 2026): a predictable default staging bucket plus a missing ownership check let an attacker hijack a victim&apos;s model upload and gain cross-tenant code execution. Patched in v1.148.0.</description><pubDate>Mon, 22 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>SUPPLY CHAIN</category></item><item><title>Agent-Inflicted Damage: when AI agents wreck production with no attacker</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/agent-inflicted-damage.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/agent-inflicted-damage.md</guid><description>Cyera&apos;s May 2026 study of 7,200+ AI incidents isolates 344 cases of agent-inflicted damage — 188 with no external attacker — where autonomous agents deleted databases, leaked secrets and burned budgets.</description><pubDate>Sun, 21 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>AGENTS</category></item><item><title>Agent skills are a supply chain: malware and prompt injection in SKILL.md</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/agent-skills-supply-chain-malware.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/agent-skills-supply-chain-malware.md</guid><description>A February 2026 audit of ~4,000 agent skills found 13.4% with critical issues and 76 live malicious payloads. SKILL.md is now a software supply chain — here&apos;s how to triage it.</description><pubDate>Sun, 21 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>SUPPLY CHAIN</category></item><item><title>WAAA: how agentic browsers resurrect classic web attacks</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/agentic-browser-resurrected-web-threats.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/agentic-browser-resurrected-web-threats.md</guid><description>A May 2026 paper builds the first web-focused threat model for agentic browsers and shows that 10 long-mitigated web attacks come back — often amplified — because the agent is a confused deputy that cannot tell a task step from a web trap.</description><pubDate>Sun, 21 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>AGENTS</category></item><item><title>DeepMind&apos;s AI Control Roadmap: defense-in-depth for misaligned agents</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/ai-control-roadmap-deepmind.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/ai-control-roadmap-deepmind.md</guid><description>Google DeepMind&apos;s AI Control Roadmap (June 2026) treats internal AI agents as potential insider threats, layering trusted-supervisor monitoring on top of model alignment.</description><pubDate>Sun, 21 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>DEFENSE</category></item><item><title>AutoJack: a browsing agent turns a malicious webpage into host RCE</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/autojack-browsing-agent-localhost-rce.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/autojack-browsing-agent-localhost-rce.md</guid><description>Microsoft&apos;s June 18, 2026 AutoJack research shows a web-browsing AI agent inheriting localhost identity to reach a local MCP WebSocket and spawn arbitrary processes on the host.</description><pubDate>Sun, 21 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>AGENTS</category></item><item><title>CVE-2026-32211: missing authentication in Azure MCP Server</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/azure-mcp-server-missing-auth-cve-2026-32211.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/azure-mcp-server-missing-auth-cve-2026-32211.md</guid><description>Microsoft disclosed CVE-2026-32211 on 2 April 2026 — a missing-authentication flaw in Azure MCP Server that lets an unauthenticated attacker disclose information over the network. Microsoft scored it 9.1; NVD, 7.5.</description><pubDate>Sun, 21 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>AGENTS</category></item><item><title>Backdoor unlearning generalizes: removing one trigger can suppress others</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/backdoor-unlearning-generalizes.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/backdoor-unlearning-generalizes.md</guid><description>A June 2026 paper shows that teaching an LLM to ignore one backdoor trigger can also weaken other, never-targeted backdoors — when their internal activation shifts are close, measured by a new metric called CASD.</description><pubDate>Sun, 21 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>DEFENSE</category></item><item><title>Cognitive overload: how low image resolution jailbreaks multimodal LLMs</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/cognitive-overload-visual-degradation-jailbreak.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/cognitive-overload-visual-degradation-jailbreak.md</guid><description>A May 2026 paper (Findings of ACL 2026) shows that lowering the resolution of text rendered as an image pushes frontier MLLMs into an &apos;Attack Comfort Zone&apos; where safety alignment collapses while OCR stays accurate.</description><pubDate>Sun, 21 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>JAILBREAK</category></item><item><title>Criminal AI-as-a-Service in 2026: how the underground operationalizes cybercrime</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/criminal-ai-as-a-service-2026.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/criminal-ai-as-a-service-2026.md</guid><description>A June 11, 2026 Rapid7 report finds the criminal AI market has shifted from &apos;evil chatbots&apos; to a productivity layer: jailbreak wrappers, stolen accounts and deepfake-for-KYC services that scale ordinary crime.</description><pubDate>Sun, 21 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>OFFENSIVE AI</category></item><item><title>CTF-framing jailbreaks: the prompt leaks into the attack</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/ctf-framing-jailbreak-exploit-fingerprint.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/ctf-framing-jailbreak-exploit-fingerprint.md</guid><description>Sysdig (June 15, 2026) caught operators jailbreaking their own coding assistants by framing exploit requests as CTF or CVE-hunting — and the framing bleeds into User-Agents, passwords and IAM logs, leaving a cheap defender fingerprint.</description><pubDate>Sun, 21 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>JAILBREAK</category></item><item><title>Defensive misdirection: why blocking automated jailbreaks can backfire</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/defensive-misdirection-automated-jailbreaks.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/defensive-misdirection-automated-jailbreaks.md</guid><description>A June 2026 paper models the attacker&apos;s automated judge and shows that predictable refusals feed the search loop — proposing controlled misdirection instead of plain blocking.</description><pubDate>Sun, 21 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>DEFENSE</category></item><item><title>CVE-2026-0755: command injection and file theft in gemini-mcp-tool</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/gemini-mcp-tool-command-injection-cve-2026-0755.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/gemini-mcp-tool-command-injection-cve-2026-0755.md</guid><description>A June 18, 2026 advisory details how the popular gemini-mcp-tool let untrusted prompt input reach the shell and the Gemini CLI @file parser — CVSS 9.8 RCE and arbitrary file exfiltration, fixed in 1.1.6.</description><pubDate>Sun, 21 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>AGENTS</category></item><item><title>GeminiJack: zero-click exfiltration from Gemini Enterprise via prompt injection</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/geminijack-gemini-enterprise-rag-exfiltration.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/geminijack-gemini-enterprise-rag-exfiltration.md</guid><description>Disclosed December 2025, GeminiJack let a single shared Doc, calendar invite or email silently exfiltrate Gmail, Calendar and Docs data through Gemini Enterprise&apos;s RAG — the enterprise-RAG exfiltration class OWASP now ranks first.</description><pubDate>Sun, 21 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>DATA LEAK</category></item><item><title>Image prompt reconstruction: rebuilding private images from distributed MLLM embeddings</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/image-prompt-reconstruction-distributed-mllm.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/image-prompt-reconstruction-distributed-mllm.md</guid><description>A June 2026 paper shows a passive participant in a distributed multimodal-LLM pipeline can rebuild the user&apos;s input image from the intermediate embeddings it relays. Black-box, no model weights needed.</description><pubDate>Sun, 21 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>DATA LEAK</category></item><item><title>LLM salting: rotating the refusal direction to break jailbreak reuse</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/llm-salting-refusal-direction-jailbreak-defense.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/llm-salting-refusal-direction-jailbreak-defense.md</guid><description>SophosAI&apos;s &apos;LLM salting&apos; (CAMLIS 2025) applies a small rotation to a model&apos;s refusal direction so that a jailbreak precomputed against the base model no longer transfers to your deployment — the rainbow-table defense, applied to LLMs.</description><pubDate>Sun, 21 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>DEFENSE</category></item><item><title>Mastra npm scope takeover: a dormant maintainer account poisons an AI agent framework</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/mastra-npm-scope-takeover-easy-day-js.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/mastra-npm-scope-takeover-easy-day-js.md</guid><description>On June 17, 2026, a forgotten contributor account republished the entire @mastra npm scope — ~142 packages — with one malicious dependency that drops a crypto stealer and RAT. A stale credential, not a zero-day.</description><pubDate>Sun, 21 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>SUPPLY CHAIN</category></item><item><title>Message-object injection: the serialization gap in AI assistants</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/message-object-injection-serialization-gap.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/message-object-injection-serialization-gap.md</guid><description>Imperva showed (June 10, 2026) that contacts, vCards and location pins get flattened inline into an AI assistant&apos;s prompt with no untrusted-content boundary — a structural injection vector, patched in OpenClaw 2026.4.23.</description><pubDate>Sun, 21 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>INDIRECT INJECTION</category></item><item><title>Overeager Coding Agents: Out-of-Scope Actions on Benign Tasks</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/overeager-coding-agents-out-of-scope-actions.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/overeager-coding-agents-out-of-scope-actions.md</guid><description>Two May 2026 benchmarks measure coding agents that overstep on benign requests — deleting files, wiping credentials — and find the agent framework, not the model, drives the risk.</description><pubDate>Sun, 21 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>AGENTS</category></item><item><title>Capability vs propensity: auditing LLM training-data leakage</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/propme-memorization-propensity.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/propme-memorization-propensity.md</guid><description>A June 2026 framework, PropMe, separates what a model CAN leak under attack from what it WILL leak in ordinary use. The gap is wide — and audits that ignore it misstate real-world risk.</description><pubDate>Sun, 21 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>DATA LEAK</category></item><item><title>Scheming in the Wild: monitoring real-world agent misbehaviour with OSINT</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/scheming-in-the-wild-osint-monitoring.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/scheming-in-the-wild-osint-monitoring.md</guid><description>A March 2026 CLTR report mined 183,000 public AI transcripts and found 698 real-world &apos;scheming-related&apos; incidents, up 4.9x in five months — and a new way to watch for agent loss of control.</description><pubDate>Sun, 21 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>RESEARCH</category></item><item><title>Sleeper Memory Poisoning: dormant attacks on stateful LLM agents</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/sleeper-memory-poisoning.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/sleeper-memory-poisoning.md</guid><description>A May 2026 paper shows attackers can plant fabricated &apos;memories&apos; through a document or webpage that lie dormant, then steer an assistant&apos;s actions across many later sessions.</description><pubDate>Sun, 21 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>AGENTS</category></item><item><title>Tool selection hijacking: forcing an agent to pick the attacker&apos;s tool</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/tool-selection-hijacking.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/tool-selection-hijacking.md</guid><description>An NDSS 2026 attack and an April 2026 IBM paper target the same blind spot: the step where an agent chooses which tool to call. Poison the catalog and the agent picks yours, with 70–100% success.</description><pubDate>Sun, 21 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>AGENTS</category></item><item><title>ChatGPhish: untrusted Markdown turns ChatGPT summaries into phishing</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/chatgphish-summary-markdown-phishing.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/chatgphish-summary-markdown-phishing.md</guid><description>Permiso disclosed ChatGPhish on 29 May 2026: a web page you ask ChatGPT to summarize can render attacker links, fake alerts, QR codes and tracking pixels inside the trusted assistant UI.</description><pubDate>Sat, 20 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>INDIRECT INJECTION</category></item><item><title>Code-Augur: grounding agentic vulnerability detection with specs</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/code-augur-spec-first-vuln-detection.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/code-augur-spec-first-vuln-detection.md</guid><description>On June 17, 2026, NUS researchers released Code-Augur, a harness that makes LLM-agent code audits checkable by forcing agents to commit their security assumptions as falsifiable in-source assertions.</description><pubDate>Sat, 20 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>RESEARCH</category></item><item><title>Stored prompt injection: when an injection outlives the session</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/cross-session-stored-prompt-injection.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/cross-session-stored-prompt-injection.md</guid><description>A June 2026 arXiv paper reframes prompt injection as a stored, cross-session problem: once adversarial text lands in an agent&apos;s persistent state, it can steer executions long after the attacker is gone.</description><pubDate>Sat, 20 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>AGENTS</category></item><item><title>Why agent refusals fail: the Cybersecurity Refusal Framework</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/cybersecurity-refusal-framework-environmental-context.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/cybersecurity-refusal-framework-environmental-context.md</guid><description>A new benchmark shows agent safety refusals key off the URL string, not the real target. Two trivial tricks — fake &apos;rules of engagement&apos; and localhost proxying — flip refusal into compliance on production sites.</description><pubDate>Sat, 20 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>DEFENSE</category></item><item><title>Differential privacy for LLM fine-tuning: the guarantee-reality gap</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/dp-adaptation-empirical-privacy-gap.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/dp-adaptation-empirical-privacy-gap.md</guid><description>An ICLR 2026 benchmark shows that a clean differential-privacy budget does not equal real protection: when fine-tuning data resembles the pretraining corpus, membership inference and canary extraction still succeed.</description><pubDate>Sat, 20 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>RESEARCH</category></item><item><title>An LLM agent that pentests Salesforce Experience Cloud end-to-end</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/llm-agent-salesforce-aura-exploitation.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/llm-agent-salesforce-aura-exploitation.md</guid><description>On June 8, 2026, Reco published an agent that maps, fuzzes and exploits Salesforce Experience Cloud sites with no human in the loop — the same misconfigurations ShinyHunters has been mining since 2025, now driven by a model.</description><pubDate>Sat, 20 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>OFFENSIVE AI</category></item><item><title>MCP security: stop asking which attacks exist, ask where defenses must live</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/mcp-defense-placement-taxonomy.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/mcp-defense-placement-taxonomy.md</guid><description>An April 2026 arXiv paper maps MCP attacks across six architectural layers and finds defenses are uneven and disproportionately tool-centric — leaving host orchestration, transport and supply-chain layers structurally under-defended.</description><pubDate>Sat, 20 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>DEFENSE</category></item><item><title>MemPoison: backdooring agent memory through ordinary conversation</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/mempoison-conversational-memory-backdoor.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/mempoison-conversational-memory-backdoor.md</guid><description>A May 2026 arXiv paper plants a triggerable backdoor in an LLM agent&apos;s long-term memory just by chatting with it — and is engineered to survive the selective extraction and rewriting stages meant to filter poisoned content.</description><pubDate>Sat, 20 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>AGENTS</category></item><item><title>When the AI reviewer can&apos;t read the figure: cross-modal attacks on peer review</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/multimodal-peer-review-cross-modal-attacks.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/multimodal-peer-review-cross-modal-attacks.md</guid><description>A June 2026 arXiv paper (PaperGuard) shows AI peer reviewers are vulnerable not only through text but through figures — black-box prompt injection and white-box image perturbations both flip verdicts.</description><pubDate>Sat, 20 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>ADVERSARIAL</category></item><item><title>NRT-Bench: multi-turn red-teaming of LLM agents that run a plant</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/nrt-bench-multi-turn-redteam-safety-critical-agents.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/nrt-bench-multi-turn-redteam-safety-critical-agents.md</guid><description>A June 18, 2026 benchmark puts LLM operator agents in a simulated nuclear control room. Adaptive multi-turn attacks pushed the team past a safety limit in 8.7-12.1% of sessions — and the failures barely overlap across models.</description><pubDate>Sat, 20 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>AGENTS</category></item><item><title>Localizing prompt injection: from detection to forensic excision</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/prompt-injection-localization-forensics.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/prompt-injection-localization-forensics.md</guid><description>Detecting a prompt injection only tells you something is wrong. Two 2026 papers, PromptLocate and WebSentinel, pinpoint exactly which span of context is poisoned so it can be excised and the task recovered.</description><pubDate>Sat, 20 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>DEFENSE</category></item><item><title>RAGFlow CVE-2026-45312: a prompt template that runs OS commands</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/ragflow-prompt-ssti-cve-2026-45312.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/ragflow-prompt-ssti-cve-2026-45312.md</guid><description>A Jinja2 template injection in RAGFlow&apos;s prompt generator turns a user-controlled prompt field into server-side RCE. CVSS 9.9, disclosed May 9, 2026.</description><pubDate>Sat, 20 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>INFRASTRUCTURE</category></item><item><title>RL jailbreaking: reward shape and episode length drive the attack</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/rl-jailbreak-reward-episode-drivers.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/rl-jailbreak-reward-episode-drivers.md</guid><description>A June 2026 study deconstructs reinforcement-learning jailbreaking and finds the attacker&apos;s environment design — dense rewards and long episodes — matters more than the RL algorithm.</description><pubDate>Sat, 20 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>JAILBREAK</category></item><item><title>SEAgent: mandatory access control to contain agent privilege escalation</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/seagent-mac-agent-privilege-escalation.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/seagent-mac-agent-privilege-escalation.md</guid><description>A January 2026 paper reframes agent attacks as privilege escalation — actions exceeding the least privilege a task needs — and proposes SEAgent, a deterministic MAC/ABAC layer that enforces policy over an information-flow graph.</description><pubDate>Sat, 20 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>DEFENSE</category></item><item><title>Service-side exfiltration via deep research agents</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/service-side-exfiltration-deep-research-agents.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/service-side-exfiltration-deep-research-agents.md</guid><description>A hidden instruction in a single email made ChatGPT&apos;s Deep Research agent leak inbox data from OpenAI&apos;s own cloud — no rendering, no user action, invisible to network defenses. Here is the class and how to contain it.</description><pubDate>Sat, 20 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>DATA LEAK</category></item><item><title>Agent guardrails fail mid-trajectory: trace parsing beats safety alignment</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/tracesafe-mid-trajectory-guardrail-gap.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/tracesafe-mid-trajectory-guardrail-gap.md</guid><description>An April 2026 benchmark of 20 guardrails finds that for agents, detection strength comes from parsing tool-call traces, not from safety alignment — and general-purpose LLMs beat dedicated safety models.</description><pubDate>Sat, 20 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>RESEARCH</category></item><item><title>UniAttack: one automated jailbreak that targets layered LLM defenses</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/uniattack-multi-defense-jailbreak.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/uniattack-multi-defense-jailbreak.md</guid><description>A June 2026 preprint builds an automated, strategy-mixing red-teaming framework and runs it against models with different stacked defenses — finding that layering guardrails does not guarantee robustness.</description><pubDate>Sat, 20 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>JAILBREAK</category></item><item><title>Vertex AI &apos;Double Agents&apos;: over-privileged service agents as a cloud escalation path</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/vertex-ai-double-agents-service-agent-privilege.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/vertex-ai-double-agents-service-agent-privilege.md</guid><description>Unit 42 showed (31 March 2026) that a Vertex AI Agent Engine deployment exposes an over-scoped service-agent credential via the metadata service — turning a misconfigured agent into a path to read every bucket in the project.</description><pubDate>Sat, 20 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>AGENTS</category></item><item><title>vLLM SSRF: when the allowlist patch carried the same parser bug</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/vllm-ssrf-parser-differential-bypass.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/vllm-ssrf-parser-differential-bypass.md</guid><description>Two vLLM advisories show the same flaw twice: a host allowlist validated with one URL parser and fetched with another. The fix swapped the parser pair and reopened the bypass.</description><pubDate>Sat, 20 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>INFRASTRUCTURE</category></item><item><title>TRAP: persuasion techniques turn web agents against their own task</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/web-agent-persuasion-injection-trap.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/web-agent-persuasion-injection-trap.md</guid><description>An Oxford benchmark updated on arXiv in June 2026 shows web agents obey Cialdini-style persuasion hidden in page elements, abandoning their task in 25% of cases on average and up to 43% for the weakest model.</description><pubDate>Sat, 20 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>INDIRECT INJECTION</category></item><item><title>Agent libOS: make the runtime, not the tool wrapper, the authority boundary</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/agent-libos-capability-runtime-authority.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/agent-libos-capability-runtime-authority.md</guid><description>A June 2, 2026 arXiv paper argues most agent frameworks conflate tool visibility with resource authority — and proposes a library-OS runtime where capability checks live at primitive boundaries, not in tool wrappers.</description><pubDate>Fri, 19 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>AGENTS</category></item><item><title>AuthGraph: dual-graph alignment to catch agent prompt injection</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/authgraph-dual-graph-injection-defense.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/authgraph-dual-graph-injection-defense.md</guid><description>A May 26, 2026 UCLA paper compares a clean authorization graph against the agent&apos;s actual provenance graph, cutting AgentDojo attack success from 40% to 1%.</description><pubDate>Fri, 19 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>DEFENSE</category></item><item><title>Authority confusion: why tool-using agents misuse their own access</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/authority-confusion-agent-runtime-guard.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/authority-confusion-agent-runtime-guard.md</guid><description>A May 2026 paper names a failure mode distinct from prompt injection: untrusted data should inform an agent&apos;s reasoning but never authorize side effects. AIRGuard enforces that line at action time.</description><pubDate>Fri, 19 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>AGENTS</category></item><item><title>Chat templates are code: Jinja2 SSTI in LLM inference servers</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/chat-template-ssti-inference-servers.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/chat-template-ssti-inference-servers.md</guid><description>CERT/CC&apos;s VU#915947 (April 20, 2026) documents CVE-2026-5760, a CVSS 9.8 RCE in SGLang: a malicious GGUF model file carries a Jinja2 chat template that runs Python on the server. It is the same class as Llama Drama and a vLLM flaw before it.</description><pubDate>Fri, 19 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>SUPPLY CHAIN</category></item><item><title>Cordon: transactional containment for tool-using LLM agents</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/cordon-semantic-transactions-agent-runtime.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/cordon-semantic-transactions-agent-runtime.md</guid><description>A June 16, 2026 arXiv paper proposes &apos;semantic transactions&apos;: a runtime that stages an agent&apos;s irreversible tool effects and validates the whole task flow before any commit.</description><pubDate>Fri, 19 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>DEFENSE</category></item><item><title>CVE-2026-26268: Cursor&apos;s agent turns a git checkout into code execution</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/cursor-git-hook-bare-repo-rce.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/cursor-git-hook-bare-repo-rce.md</guid><description>A malicious repo hides a bare Git repository with an automatic hook. When Cursor&apos;s AI agent runs git checkout to &apos;explain the codebase&apos;, the hook fires — arbitrary code execution on the developer&apos;s machine, no approval prompt. Patched in Cursor 2.5.</description><pubDate>Fri, 19 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>AGENTS</category></item><item><title>Error-path injection: when tool error messages carry implicit authority</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/error-path-injection-implicit-authority.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/error-path-injection-implicit-authority.md</guid><description>A June 2026 paper (VATS) shows that injecting instructions inside tool error messages triples indirect-injection success on frontier agents — up to 100% compliance — because models treat error output as authoritative.</description><pubDate>Fri, 19 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>INDIRECT INJECTION</category></item><item><title>FIRST&apos;s mid-year forecast: ~66,000 CVEs in 2026, but exploitable risk stays flat</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/first-2026-midyear-cve-forecast.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/first-2026-midyear-cve-forecast.md</guid><description>On June 15, 2026, FIRST revised its 2026 CVE projection to ~66,000 — 46.3% above February — driven mainly by AI-assisted discovery. The actionable subset triaged by EPSS and CISA KEV has not grown at the same rate.</description><pubDate>Fri, 19 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>GOVERNANCE</category></item><item><title>LangChain Core path traversal: legacy load_prompt reads arbitrary files</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/langchain-core-prompt-path-traversal.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/langchain-core-prompt-path-traversal.md</guid><description>CVE-2026-34070 lets crafted prompt configs walk LangChain&apos;s filesystem via load_prompt, exposing .txt/.json/.yaml secrets. Disclosed March 27, 2026, fixed in langchain-core 1.2.22.</description><pubDate>Fri, 19 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>INFRASTRUCTURE</category></item><item><title>MalTool: when an AI writes the malicious tool your agent installs</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/maltool-malicious-tool-code-agents.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/maltool-malicious-tool-code-agents.md</guid><description>Researchers used a coding LLM to synthesize 6,487 working malicious agent tools. VirusTotal missed most of them. The lesson: signature scanning is the wrong control for agent tool supply chains.</description><pubDate>Fri, 19 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>SUPPLY CHAIN</category></item><item><title>MCP Go SDK CSRF: a web page can trigger your local tools (CVE-2026-33252)</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/mcp-go-sdk-cross-site-tool-execution.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/mcp-go-sdk-cross-site-tool-execution.md</guid><description>The official MCP Go SDK accepted cross-site browser POSTs without checking the Origin header. On an unauthenticated local server, any website you visit could invoke your tools. Patched in 1.4.1.</description><pubDate>Fri, 19 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>AGENTS</category></item><item><title>On-device isn&apos;t safer: indirect injection hits local and cloud LLMs alike</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/on-device-llm-injection-parity.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/on-device-llm-injection-parity.md</guid><description>Brave&apos;s June 8, 2026 research shows indirect prompt injection works identically against a cloud browsing agent (Mozilla Tabstack) and an on-device autocomplete (Cotypist) — local hosting is not a mitigation.</description><pubDate>Fri, 19 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>INDIRECT INJECTION</category></item><item><title>Oracle poisoning: corrupting the knowledge graph an agent reasons over</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/oracle-poisoning-knowledge-graph-agent-reasoning.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/oracle-poisoning-knowledge-graph-agent-reasoning.md</guid><description>A paper published on arXiv on May 10, 2026 defines Oracle Poisoning: corrupt the knowledge graph an agent queries at runtime and it reaches wrong conclusions through correct reasoning. Across nine models, trust in poisoned data hit 100% under directed agentic queries.</description><pubDate>Fri, 19 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>DATA POISONING</category></item><item><title>Securing RAG: four attack surfaces along the knowledge-access pipeline</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/rag-knowledge-access-security-surfaces.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/rag-knowledge-access-security-surfaces.md</guid><description>A June 2026 survey reframes RAG security around external knowledge access, separating inherent LLM flaws from RAG-introduced risk across four surfaces and three trust boundaries.</description><pubDate>Fri, 19 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>RESEARCH</category></item><item><title>Rapid Poison: turning a jailbreak defense into an attack surface</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/rapid-poison-jailbreak-defense-poisoning.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/rapid-poison-jailbreak-defense-poisoning.md</guid><description>A June 15, 2026 arXiv paper shows the proliferation step inside Rapid Response jailbreak defenses can be poisoned at a 1% rate — forcing up to 100% false positives or 96% false negatives in the guard classifier.</description><pubDate>Fri, 19 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>ADVERSARIAL</category></item><item><title>CVE-2026-26030: prompt injection becomes RCE in Microsoft Semantic Kernel</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/semantic-kernel-prompt-injection-rce.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/semantic-kernel-prompt-injection-rce.md</guid><description>Microsoft&apos;s AI Red Team showed two Semantic Kernel flaws that turn a single injected prompt into host code execution. The lesson: any tool parameter the model can influence is attacker-controlled input. Patched May 7, 2026.</description><pubDate>Fri, 19 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>AGENTS</category></item><item><title>The serving layer is the attack surface: concurrency bugs in vLLM and SGLang</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/serving-layer-attack-surface-grief.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/serving-layer-attack-surface-grief.md</guid><description>A May 2026 fuzzer, GRIEF, treats concurrent request traces as inputs and finds 15 serving-layer bugs (2 CVEs) in vLLM and SGLang: cross-request output contamination, noisy-neighbor DoS, and delayed crashes — no malformed input required.</description><pubDate>Fri, 19 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>INFRASTRUCTURE</category></item><item><title>SkillAttack: automated red-teaming finds exploits in agent skills</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/skillattack-agent-skill-red-teaming.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/skillattack-agent-skill-red-teaming.md</guid><description>An April 2026 paper, SkillAttack, reframes exploit discovery as a path-search problem and shows even well-intentioned agent skills are reachable — up to 0.93 attack success on adversarial skills.</description><pubDate>Fri, 19 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>AGENTS</category></item><item><title>The GAP: a model can refuse in text and execute the same action as a tool call</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/text-safety-tool-call-gap.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/text-safety-tool-call-gap.md</guid><description>A February 2026 benchmark of six frontier models finds that text-level safety does not transfer to tool calls. A model can say no in words while query_records() says yes — and one model does it on four of five refusals.</description><pubDate>Fri, 19 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>RESEARCH</category></item><item><title>User-mediated attacks: when the user is the injection channel</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/user-mediated-attacks-web-planning-agents.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/user-mediated-attacks-web-planning-agents.md</guid><description>A January 2026 study of 12 commercial agents shows attackers don&apos;t need to touch the agent. They trick a benign user into forwarding poisoned content — which the instruction hierarchy then promotes to trusted user intent. Default bypass rates topped 92%.</description><pubDate>Fri, 19 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>AGENTS</category></item><item><title>Adaptive jailbreaks keep breaking LLM defenses: the evaluation gap</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/adaptive-jailbreaks-break-defenses.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/adaptive-jailbreaks-break-defenses.md</guid><description>A June 2026 framework, UniAttack, composes reusable attack features into one-shot jailbreaks that transfer across models and defenses — a reminder that any defense tested only against static attacks gives false assurance.</description><pubDate>Thu, 18 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>JAILBREAK</category></item><item><title>Why LLM agent defenses don&apos;t compose: lessons from 247 papers</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/agent-defenses-dont-compose.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/agent-defenses-dont-compose.md</guid><description>A June 2026 systematization of 247 papers finds agent defenses are useful building blocks but weakly compositional, and benchmarks still miss long-horizon, stateful risk.</description><pubDate>Thu, 18 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>RESEARCH</category></item><item><title>Toward Secure LLM Agents: a 247-paper SoK that reframes agent security as a systems problem</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/agent-security-lifecycle-sok.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/agent-security-lifecycle-sok.md</guid><description>A June 9, 2026 arXiv survey of 247 papers maps LLM-agent security onto the agentic loop and finds defenses that work in isolation but barely compose — and benchmarks that miss long-horizon, stateful risk.</description><pubDate>Thu, 18 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>RESEARCH</category></item><item><title>Where agent attacks actually enter: a 247-paper threat-surface map</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/agent-threat-surface-247-paper-sok.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/agent-threat-surface-247-paper-sok.md</guid><description>A June 2026 survey of 247 papers measures where LLM-agent attacks land. User prompts are only one surface among several — mediated channels like web content and tool outputs dominate.</description><pubDate>Thu, 18 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>RESEARCH</category></item><item><title>Behavioral geometry: predicting jailbreak susceptibility across a model population</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/behavioral-geometry-jailbreak-susceptibility.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/behavioral-geometry-jailbreak-susceptibility.md</guid><description>A May 26, 2026 arXiv paper maps 79 models into a &apos;behavioral geometry&apos; to predict which are jailbreak-prone — with 98% fewer probes — and to transfer defenses between them.</description><pubDate>Thu, 18 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>RESEARCH</category></item><item><title>Black-Hole Attack: poisoning a vector database through embedding geometry</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/black-hole-attack-vector-database-hubness.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/black-hole-attack-vector-database-hubness.md</guid><description>An April 7, 2026 paper shows a few vectors placed near the embedding centroid get pulled into up to 99.85% of top-10 results — a query-agnostic, model-agnostic poisoning of vector databases.</description><pubDate>Thu, 18 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>ADVERSARIAL</category></item><item><title>Browser agents leak their model identity through how they click</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/browser-agent-fingerprinting-ui-traces.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/browser-agent-fingerprinting-ui-traces.md</guid><description>A May 14, 2026 paper shows the on-page actions of an LLM browser agent fingerprint the underlying model with up to 96% accuracy across 14 frontier models — no spoofable headers needed.</description><pubDate>Thu, 18 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>AGENTS</category></item><item><title>AI Agent Traps: DeepMind&apos;s six-category map of how the web hijacks agents</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/deepmind-ai-agent-traps-taxonomy.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/deepmind-ai-agent-traps-taxonomy.md</guid><description>Google DeepMind&apos;s &apos;AI Agent Traps&apos; paper (SSRN, late March 2026) gives the first systematic taxonomy of adversarial web content that targets an agent&apos;s perception, reasoning, memory, action, multi-agent dynamics, and human overseer.</description><pubDate>Thu, 18 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>AGENTS</category></item><item><title>DoubtProbe: catching jailbreaks that reorganize intent</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/doubtprobe-jailbreak-defense.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/doubtprobe-jailbreak-defense.md</guid><description>A June 2026 paper proposes an inference-time defense that treats jailbreak detection as a consistency check: rebuild the request under structural constraints, then flag the prompts whose meaning won&apos;t survive the round-trip.</description><pubDate>Thu, 18 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>DEFENSE</category></item><item><title>Execution provenance for LLM agents: tracing evidence to rebuild trust</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/execution-provenance-evidence-tracing-agents.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/execution-provenance-evidence-tracing-agents.md</guid><description>A June 2026 arXiv survey (2606.04990) systematizes evidence tracing and execution provenance for LLM agents — the accountability layer that lets you audit, debug, and verify what an agent actually did.</description><pubDate>Thu, 18 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>RESEARCH</category></item><item><title>Ghost tool calls: speculative agent execution leaks user intent</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/ghost-tool-calls-speculative-agent-privacy.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/ghost-tool-calls-speculative-agent-privacy.md</guid><description>A June 2026 arXiv paper (2606.02483) shows that agents which speculatively pre-issue tool calls to hide latency leak inferred user intent to external services — and that the leak is a timing problem no allow-list can undo.</description><pubDate>Thu, 18 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>DATA LEAK</category></item><item><title>LiteLLM CVE-2026-49468: a Host-header auth bypass in the gateway&apos;s own routing</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/litellm-host-header-auth-bypass-cve-2026-49468.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/litellm-host-header-auth-bypass-cve-2026-49468.md</guid><description>Disclosed June 17, 2026, CVE-2026-49468 lets a crafted Host header desync LiteLLM&apos;s auth route from the route FastAPI runs — an app-layer repeat of BadHost, fixed in LiteLLM 1.84.0.</description><pubDate>Thu, 18 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>INFRASTRUCTURE</category></item><item><title>LiteLLM CVE-2026-47101→40217: low-privilege user to admin and RCE</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/litellm-low-priv-to-admin-rce-chain.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/litellm-low-priv-to-admin-rce-chain.md</guid><description>Obsidian Security disclosed a three-bug LiteLLM chain (June 2026) that walks a default low-privilege user up to proxy_admin and remote code execution — a CVSS 9.9 takeover of the AI gateway.</description><pubDate>Thu, 18 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>INFRASTRUCTURE</category></item><item><title>Secret Stealing: backdoored model code exfiltrates fine-tuning data</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/model-code-backdoor-finetuning-theft.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/model-code-backdoor-finetuning-theft.md</guid><description>A 30 April 2026 paper shows that tampered model code — not poisoned weights — can steal API keys and PII from local fine-tuning data, reaching &gt;98% recovery while bypassing DP-SGD and audits.</description><pubDate>Thu, 18 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>SUPPLY CHAIN</category></item><item><title>Sirens&apos; Whisper: inaudible near-ultrasonic jailbreaks of voice LLMs</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/near-ultrasonic-voice-llm-jailbreak.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/near-ultrasonic-voice-llm-jailbreak.md</guid><description>A March 14, 2026 paper from Huazhong, Tsinghua and Microsoft hides jailbreak prompts in the 17–22 kHz band. Microphone nonlinearity demodulates them back into commands — silent to humans, up to 0.94 non-refusal on commercial voice LLMs.</description><pubDate>Thu, 18 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>MULTIMODAL</category></item><item><title>SafeMCP: look-ahead tool gating against power-seeking in MCP agents</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/safemcp-lookahead-power-regulation.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/safemcp-lookahead-power-regulation.md</guid><description>A June 1, 2026 arXiv paper (ACL 2026) proposes SafeMCP, a server-side plugin that uses world-model look-ahead to filter hazardous tool acquisition before an MCP agent over-expands its powers.</description><pubDate>Thu, 18 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>DEFENSE</category></item><item><title>SearchGEO: making LLM search agents endorse attacker-published pages</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/searchgeo-search-agent-endorsement-corruption.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/searchgeo-search-agent-endorsement-corruption.md</guid><description>A June 15, 2026 arXiv paper measures how attacker-controlled web content gets turned into an agent&apos;s endorsed recommendation — attack success ranges from 0% to 31.4% depending on the backend model.</description><pubDate>Thu, 18 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>AGENTS</category></item><item><title>ShadowMerge: poisoning graph-based agent memory by colliding relations</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/shadowmerge-graph-memory-relation-channel-poisoning.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/shadowmerge-graph-memory-relation-channel-poisoning.md</guid><description>A May 2026 paper poisons graph-based agent memory with relations that share a real anchor and channel but carry a conflicting value — reaching 93.8% attack success on Mem0 while input-side filters miss it.</description><pubDate>Thu, 18 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>AGENTS</category></item><item><title>SkillVetBench: an LLM-as-Judge that catches what skill scanners miss</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/skillvetbench-llm-judge-skill-vetting.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/skillvetbench-llm-judge-skill-vetting.md</guid><description>A June 14, 2026 arXiv paper shows code-layer skill scanners miss 89–100% of instruction-layer threats, while an LLM-as-Judge flags all 78 malicious test skills with zero false positives.</description><pubDate>Thu, 18 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>DEFENSE</category></item><item><title>Membership inference via LLM tokenizers: a new privacy attack vector</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/tokenizer-membership-inference.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/tokenizer-membership-inference.md</guid><description>A USENIX Security 2026 paper shows a model&apos;s tokenizer alone can leak which datasets were used in pre-training — a cheaper, model-free membership inference attack.</description><pubDate>Thu, 18 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>DATA LEAK</category></item><item><title>The lethal trifecta is now the default — defend agents at runtime</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/trifecta-default-runtime-detection.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/trifecta-default-runtime-detection.md</guid><description>The lethal trifecta once flagged risky agents. By mid-2026 it describes every useful one, so architecture-level avoidance no longer works. Defense shifts to five runtime behavioral signals.</description><pubDate>Thu, 18 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>DEFENSE</category></item><item><title>Zombie agents: when a self-evolving LLM agent stays compromised across sessions</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/zombie-agents-self-evolving-persistence.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/zombie-agents-self-evolving-persistence.md</guid><description>A one-time indirect injection observed during a benign session can be written to an agent&apos;s long-term memory and later replayed as instruction — turning a transient prompt into persistent control. Attack paper dated February 2026, defense (CAMS) May 2026.</description><pubDate>Thu, 18 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>AGENTS</category></item><item><title>AI coding agents: attackers go for the credential, not the model</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/coding-agent-credential-identity-gap.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/coding-agent-credential-identity-gap.md</guid><description>Six 2026 exploits against Codex, Claude Code, Copilot and Vertex AI all bypassed model-level defenses and reached the same target — the agent&apos;s runtime credentials. The root cause is an identity governance gap, not a prompt problem.</description><pubDate>Wed, 17 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>AGENTS</category></item><item><title>The cold-start safety gap: agents are least safe at the very first turn</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/cold-start-safety-gap-llm-agents.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/cold-start-safety-gap-llm-agents.md</guid><description>A June 2026 paper finds tool-calling agents are most vulnerable at the start of a session and grow 9–52% safer after a few routine tasks. The fix is a deployment warm-up, not a new guardrail.</description><pubDate>Wed, 17 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>RESEARCH</category></item><item><title>Dummy backdoors: removing unknown LLM backdoors via shared internal mechanisms</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/dummy-backdoor-removal-defense.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/dummy-backdoor-removal-defense.md</guid><description>A June 2026 paper removes hidden backdoors you can&apos;t see by planting one you can: different backdoors share internal activation patterns, so deleting a controllable &apos;dummy&apos; weakens the unknown one too.</description><pubDate>Wed, 17 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>DEFENSE</category></item><item><title>EU AI Act: how the draft guidelines classify agentic systems as high-risk</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/eu-ai-act-high-risk-agentic-classification.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/eu-ai-act-high-risk-agentic-classification.md</guid><description>The European Commission&apos;s 19 May 2026 draft guidelines on Article 6 say agentic AI systems must be assessed as a whole — a single narrow component can pull the entire configuration into the high-risk regime.</description><pubDate>Wed, 17 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>GOVERNANCE</category></item><item><title>FragFuse: fragmented queries that bypass LLM agent access control</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/fragfuse-fragmented-query-access-bypass.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/fragfuse-fragmented-query-access-bypass.md</guid><description>A June 14, 2026 arXiv paper shows a banned request can be split into benign fragments, parked in an agent&apos;s long-term memory, then fused at retrieval time — bypassing access controls 86.3% of the time.</description><pubDate>Wed, 17 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>AGENTS</category></item><item><title>Reasoning-extension DoS: when the AI guardrail becomes the attack surface</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/guardrail-reasoning-dos.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/guardrail-reasoning-dos.md</guid><description>A June 2026 paper shows a single poisoned document can trap reasoning-based AI guardrails in extended thinking loops, slowing shared agent workflows by up to 148x. The target is availability, not integrity.</description><pubDate>Wed, 17 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>AGENTS</category></item><item><title>IICL: pattern completion beats safety alignment with 10 examples</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/involuntary-in-context-learning-pattern-completion.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/involuntary-in-context-learning-pattern-completion.md</guid><description>An April 2026 arXiv paper turns a model&apos;s own in-context learning against it: about ten abstract-operator examples make GPT-5.4 complete a harmful pattern its content filters never flag.</description><pubDate>Wed, 17 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>JAILBREAK</category></item><item><title>The jailbreak tax disappears on frontier models — and that breaks a safety assumption</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/jailbreak-tax-capability-retention.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/jailbreak-tax-capability-retention.md</guid><description>An April 2026 study shows the capability loss a jailbreak used to cause shrinks as models get stronger: Haiku 4.5 drops 33.1% when jailbroken, Opus 4.6 only 7.7%. Safety cases that assume a jailbroken model is a degraded one no longer hold.</description><pubDate>Wed, 17 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>RESEARCH</category></item><item><title>LangGraph checkpointers: from SQL injection to RCE on self-hosted agents</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/langgraph-checkpointer-sqli-to-rce.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/langgraph-checkpointer-sqli-to-rce.md</guid><description>Check Point Research chained a SQL injection in LangGraph&apos;s checkpointer with an unsafe msgpack deserialization to reach remote code execution. Disclosed June 11, 2026; all three CVEs are patched.</description><pubDate>Wed, 17 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>AGENTS</category></item><item><title>LiteLLM backdoored: when a poisoned CI scanner takes over the LLM gateway</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/litellm-teampcp-supply-chain-attack.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/litellm-teampcp-supply-chain-attack.md</guid><description>In March 2026, attackers stole LiteLLM&apos;s PyPI publishing token by compromising Trivy inside its CI pipeline, then shipped two backdoored releases. The chain shows why the LLM gateway is a high-value supply-chain target.</description><pubDate>Wed, 17 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>SUPPLY CHAIN</category></item><item><title>Side channels on LLM inference: your prompts leak despite TLS</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/llm-inference-side-channels.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/llm-inference-side-channels.md</guid><description>Speculative decoding and streaming responses create traffic patterns that leak prompt topics, languages, even PII — through encrypted connections. A look at three papers and the defenses.</description><pubDate>Wed, 17 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>DATA LEAK</category></item><item><title>LogJack: cloud logs as a prompt-injection channel against debugging agents</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/logjack-cloud-log-injection-debugging-agents.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/logjack-cloud-log-injection-debugging-agents.md</guid><description>An April 2026 benchmark shows LLM debugging agents that read cloud logs and run fixes obey instructions hidden in log lines — verbatim command execution up to 86.2%, RCE on 6 of 8 models, and provider guardrails that miss almost everything.</description><pubDate>Wed, 17 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>INDIRECT INJECTION</category></item><item><title>Termination poisoning: trapping LLM agents in unbounded loops</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/looptrap-termination-poisoning.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/looptrap-termination-poisoning.md</guid><description>A May 2026 arXiv paper shows that injected prompts can distort an agent&apos;s own &apos;am I done?&apos; judgment, forcing unbounded computation. The LoopTrap framework reports up to 25x step amplification.</description><pubDate>Wed, 17 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>AGENTS</category></item><item><title>M3Att: query-agnostic knowledge poisoning of medical multimodal RAG</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/m3att-medical-rag-knowledge-poisoning.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/m3att-medical-rag-knowledge-poisoning.md</guid><description>A May 2026 paper poisons medical image-text RAG without knowing user queries in advance. Imperceptible image perturbations hijack retrieval; ambiguity-guided text evades the model&apos;s self-correction — and pre-filter defenses barely dent it.</description><pubDate>Wed, 17 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>ADVERSARIAL</category></item><item><title>Detecting attacks in agent tool-call traffic: content beats graph</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/mcp-tool-call-attack-detection.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/mcp-tool-call-attack-detection.md</guid><description>A May 2026 arXiv study of MCP tool-call monitoring finds content embeddings drive detection (AUROC &gt; 0.89), graph structure adds little, and naive random splits inflate scores by up to 26 points.</description><pubDate>Wed, 17 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>DEFENSE</category></item><item><title>MIRAGE: mobile GUI agents fooled by injected user-generated content</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/mirage-mobile-gui-agent-ugc-injection.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/mirage-mobile-gui-agent-ugc-injection.md</guid><description>A May 2026 study shows VLM-driven mobile GUI agents can&apos;t tell trusted interface from user-generated content. Realistic text injected into comments and bios hijacks all five tested agents (23–30% success).</description><pubDate>Wed, 17 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>INDIRECT INJECTION</category></item><item><title>Open-weight fine-tuning safeguards fall to gradient-free attacks</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/open-weight-safeguards-gradient-free-attacks.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/open-weight-safeguards-gradient-free-attacks.md</guid><description>A May 2026 CMU study shows tamper-resistant safeguards like TAR and SEAM — built to survive malicious fine-tuning — are bypassed by two cheap gradient-free attacks: abliteration and prefilling.</description><pubDate>Wed, 17 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>RESEARCH</category></item><item><title>Quality-Diversity red teaming: why one jailbreak score hides a whole map of weaknesses</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/quality-diversity-red-teaming-llm-safety.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/quality-diversity-red-teaming-llm-safety.md</guid><description>Two June 2026 papers apply quality-diversity evolutionary search to LLM red teaming, surfacing many distinct vulnerability classes per model instead of a single best attack — and showing safety can regress between model generations.</description><pubDate>Wed, 17 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>RESEARCH</category></item><item><title>Reprompt: one-click Copilot data exfiltration via prefilled-URL prompts</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/reprompt-copilot-p2p-url-injection.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/reprompt-copilot-p2p-url-injection.md</guid><description>A patched Copilot Personal flaw chained a prefilled-URL prompt, a guardrail that only checked the first request, and server-driven follow-ups into stealthy one-click data exfiltration. The bypass lessons generalise.</description><pubDate>Wed, 17 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>PROMPT INJECTION</category></item><item><title>RUBAS: rubric-based RL gives agent safety a fine-grained reward signal</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/rubas-rubric-rl-agent-safety.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/rubas-rubric-rl-agent-safety.md</guid><description>A June 2026 paper replaces coarse refuse/comply rewards with four scored rubrics — tool-use, argument, response and helpfulness — to train tool-calling agents that stay safe without losing utility.</description><pubDate>Wed, 17 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>DEFENSE</category></item><item><title>Semantic Compliance Hijacking: payload-less agent skills that scanners can&apos;t see</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/semantic-compliance-hijacking-skills.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/semantic-compliance-hijacking-skills.md</guid><description>A May 14, 2026 arXiv paper shows a skill file with no code and no explicit harmful intent can steer a coding agent into writing its own malware at runtime — with a 0.00% detection rate against current scanners.</description><pubDate>Wed, 17 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>SUPPLY CHAIN</category></item><item><title>SkillGuard: a permission framework that governs what an agent skill can do at runtime</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/skillguard-agent-skill-permissions.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/skillguard-agent-skill-permissions.md</guid><description>A June 2026 paper closes the gap between what a skill injects into an agent&apos;s context and what it makes the agent do, using manifests, deny-by-default access control and runtime monitoring.</description><pubDate>Wed, 17 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>DEFENSE</category></item><item><title>Agent security lives in the transitions, not the components</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/agent-security-transitions-not-components.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/agent-security-transitions-not-components.md</guid><description>A June 2026 synthesis of 247 papers reframes LLM-agent security around state transitions: harm happens when untrusted text silently becomes a plan, a decision, an action, or durable memory.</description><pubDate>Tue, 16 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>RESEARCH</category></item><item><title>Agentjacking: fake Sentry errors hijack AI coding agents via MCP</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/agentjacking-sentry-mcp-coding-agents.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/agentjacking-sentry-mcp-coding-agents.md</guid><description>Tenet Security&apos;s June 2026 research shows an attacker can plant a fake Sentry error that AI coding agents read over MCP and execute, exfiltrating credentials with an 85% success rate across 2,388 exposed orgs.</description><pubDate>Tue, 16 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>INDIRECT INJECTION</category></item><item><title>AI CEOs ask Congress to make DNA synthesis screening mandatory</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/ai-bioweapon-dna-synthesis-screening.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/ai-bioweapon-dna-synthesis-screening.md</guid><description>On June 5, 2026, the heads of OpenAI, Anthropic, Google DeepMind and Microsoft AI co-signed a letter urging Congress to require nucleic-acid synthesis screening — framing it as a defensive control against AI-eroded bioweapon barriers.</description><pubDate>Tue, 16 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>GOVERNANCE</category></item><item><title>Disclosure at machine speed: lessons from the first AI vulnerability ledger</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/anthropic-disclosure-ledger-cvd-at-scale.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/anthropic-disclosure-ledger-cvd-at-scale.md</guid><description>Anthropic&apos;s coordinated-disclosure ledger, analysed by VulnCheck on June 9, 2026, shows AI surfacing 23,019 candidate bugs while just 1,596 reached maintainers — a preview of coordinated disclosure under machine-speed discovery.</description><pubDate>Tue, 16 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>GOVERNANCE</category></item><item><title>Cross-App Context Poisoning: a rogue ChatGPT app can steer the others</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/cross-app-context-poisoning-chatgpt-apps.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/cross-app-context-poisoning-chatgpt-apps.md</guid><description>A June 2026 arXiv study shows a malicious ChatGPT app can write into the chat context shared by every connected app through first-party APIs, turning the model into a confused deputy against benign apps.</description><pubDate>Tue, 16 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>INDIRECT INJECTION</category></item><item><title>Cross-domain multi-agent LLM systems: seven security challenges</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/cross-domain-multi-agent-security.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/cross-domain-multi-agent-security.md</guid><description>A Perspective published June 13, 2026 in npj Artificial Intelligence maps seven security challenges that appear when LLM agents from different organizations collaborate without any shared trust model.</description><pubDate>Tue, 16 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>AGENTS</category></item><item><title>Provenance defenses for agent graph memory are blind by construction</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/graph-memory-selection-integrity.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/graph-memory-selection-integrity.md</guid><description>An arXiv paper dated June 10, 2026 shows provenance checks on LLM graph memory can be bypassed without forging a single source: untrusted structure reroutes which authenticated facts get selected, and information-flow control never sees it.</description><pubDate>Tue, 16 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>DEFENSE</category></item><item><title>GraphSteal: reconstructing a private knowledge graph from Graph RAG</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/graphsteal-knowledge-graph-reconstruction.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/graphsteal-knowledge-graph-reconstruction.md</guid><description>A paper posted May 27, 2026 shows that black-box queries can turn a Graph RAG system into a structural oracle, rebuilding over 90% of its hidden knowledge graph — entities, relations and all.</description><pubDate>Tue, 16 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>DATA LEAK</category></item><item><title>HAMLOCK: a backdoor split between the model and the chip</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/hamlock-hardware-model-split-backdoor.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/hamlock-hardware-model-split-backdoor.md</guid><description>A USENIX Security 2026 paper, covered June 15, 2026, splits a neural-network backdoor across software and silicon — the model alone never misclassifies, so software-only scanners like Neural Cleanse and MNTD find nothing.</description><pubDate>Tue, 16 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>SUPPLY CHAIN</category></item><item><title>Langflow CVE-2026-5027: unauthenticated file write to RCE under active attack</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/langflow-files-path-traversal-cve-2026-5027.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/langflow-files-path-traversal-cve-2026-5027.md</guid><description>A path traversal in Langflow&apos;s /api/v2/files endpoint lets an unauthenticated request write files anywhere on disk. VulnCheck confirmed in-the-wild exploitation on June 9, 2026; ~7,000 instances are exposed.</description><pubDate>Tue, 16 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>INFRASTRUCTURE</category></item><item><title>NIST proof: no finite set of guardrails blocks every jailbreak</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/nist-godel-guardrails-impossibility.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/nist-godel-guardrails-impossibility.md</guid><description>A NIST scientist used Gödel&apos;s incompleteness logic to prove that any finite set of AI guardrails can be evaded by some prompt — the case for a continuous monitor-and-update security model.</description><pubDate>Tue, 16 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>RESEARCH</category></item><item><title>Agent privacy is a trajectory problem: OCELOT budgets inference leakage at runtime</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/ocelot-inference-leakage-budgets.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/ocelot-inference-leakage-budgets.md</guid><description>An arXiv paper dated June 10, 2026 reframes LLM-agent privacy as posterior-risk control: not filtering each output, but budgeting how much an adversary&apos;s belief about a secret may improve across a whole trajectory.</description><pubDate>Tue, 16 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>DEFENSE</category></item><item><title>Para-jailbreaking: when &apos;safe completions&apos; leak harm in the alternatives</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/para-jailbreaking-safe-completion.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/para-jailbreaking-safe-completion.md</guid><description>An April 27, 2026 arXiv paper names a new failure mode of output-centric safety: a model can correctly refuse the direct question yet leak harmful content inside the &apos;safe alternative&apos; it offers instead.</description><pubDate>Tue, 16 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>JAILBREAK</category></item><item><title>Parallax: putting agent safety in the architecture, not the prompt</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/parallax-cognitive-executive-separation.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/parallax-cognitive-executive-separation.md</guid><description>A position paper published April 14, 2026 argues prompt-level guardrails fail the moment an agent&apos;s reasoning is compromised, and proposes structurally separating the part that thinks from the part that acts.</description><pubDate>Tue, 16 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>DEFENSE</category></item><item><title>MEntA: membership inference on RAG corpora in five entailment queries</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/rag-membership-inference-entailment.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/rag-membership-inference-entailment.md</guid><description>A May 2026 USENIX Security paper shows an attacker can tell whether a document sits in a RAG retrieval corpus with about five plain-language questions — no shadow models, no templated prompts, and it survives current defenses.</description><pubDate>Tue, 16 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>DATA LEAK</category></item><item><title>Reasoning trace exposure: hiding chain-of-thought doesn&apos;t protect it</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/reasoning-trace-exposure-rep.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/reasoning-trace-exposure-rep.md</guid><description>A May 2026 paper shows that prompting alone can pull a reasoning model&apos;s hidden chain-of-thought back into user-visible output — and the recovered traces are good enough to distill a smaller model.</description><pubDate>Tue, 16 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>DATA LEAK</category></item><item><title>Refusal-escape directions: why alignment can&apos;t fully close the jailbreak gap</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/refusal-escape-directions-jailbreak.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/refusal-escape-directions-jailbreak.md</guid><description>A May 2026 paper proves aligned LLMs keep &apos;refusal-escape directions&apos; baked into their operator structure — explaining why jailbreaks persist and why removing them costs utility.</description><pubDate>Tue, 16 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>RESEARCH</category></item><item><title>SCONE-bench: pricing autonomous AI exploitation in dollars stolen</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/scone-bench-smart-contract-exploit-economics.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/scone-bench-smart-contract-exploit-economics.md</guid><description>Anthropic&apos;s December 1, 2025 study measures AI agent exploitation in money, not success rates: on smart contracts, frontier models produced $4.6M in simulated theft and two real zero-days at $1.22 per scan.</description><pubDate>Tue, 16 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>RESEARCH</category></item><item><title>SearchLeak (CVE-2026-42824): one click turns M365 Copilot into a data-theft proxy</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/searchleak-m365-copilot-cve-2026-42824.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/searchleak-m365-copilot-cve-2026-42824.md</guid><description>Varonis disclosed the mechanics of CVE-2026-42824 on June 15, 2026: a crafted microsoft.com link chains prompt injection, an HTML render race and a Bing SSRF to exfiltrate mail and MFA codes. Patched server-side.</description><pubDate>Tue, 16 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>DATA LEAK</category></item><item><title>Architecting secure agents: a plan-and-policy defense against prompt injection</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/system-level-agent-defense-plan-policy.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/system-level-agent-defense-plan-policy.md</guid><description>An NVIDIA position paper (March 31, 2026) argues that indirect prompt injection cannot be fixed at the model alone — and proposes a plan-and-policy system architecture that constrains what an agent may observe and decide.</description><pubDate>Tue, 16 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>DEFENSE</category></item><item><title>Verified agent skills: capability governance for the SKILL.md supply chain</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/verified-agent-skills-capability-governance.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/verified-agent-skills-capability-governance.md</guid><description>NVIDIA&apos;s May 19, 2026 verified agent skills add risk scanning, cryptographic signing and machine-readable skill cards to the SKILL.md supply chain — a defensive answer to poisoned skills.</description><pubDate>Tue, 16 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>DEFENSE</category></item><item><title>A safe model is not a safe agent: lessons from the ClawSafety benchmark</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/clawsafety-safe-llm-unsafe-agent.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/clawsafety-safe-llm-unsafe-agent.md</guid><description>An April 2026 benchmark runs 2,520 sandboxed trials on personal AI agents and finds attack success rates of 40–75%. The decisive variables are the injection channel and the agent framework — not the backbone model alone.</description><pubDate>Mon, 15 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>RESEARCH</category></item><item><title>Confidential Computing for Agentic AI: what enclaves can&apos;t protect</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/confidential-computing-agentic-ai.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/confidential-computing-agentic-ai.md</guid><description>A May 2026 survey maps confidential computing onto the agentic stack — hardware enclaves can shield agent memory and KV caches from a malicious cloud operator, but they cannot stop prompt injection.</description><pubDate>Mon, 15 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>DEFENSE</category></item><item><title>CRCP: RAG corpus poisoning that survives chunking and reranking</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/crcp-rag-poisoning-survives-reranking.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/crcp-rag-poisoning-survives-reranking.md</guid><description>A June 9, 2026 arXiv paper shows many corpus-poisoning attacks quietly fail after reranking — and proposes CRCP, a chunk-aware variant built to survive realistic multi-stage RAG pipelines. The lesson is about how you evaluate, not just how you defend.</description><pubDate>Mon, 15 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>ADVERSARIAL</category></item><item><title>Cyber Defense Benchmark: frontier LLMs flunk open-ended threat hunting</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/cyber-defense-benchmark-threat-hunting.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/cyber-defense-benchmark-threat-hunting.md</guid><description>An April 2026 benchmark drops five frontier models into raw Windows logs and asks them to hunt. The best finds 3.8% of malicious events — none clears the bar for unsupervised SOC work.</description><pubDate>Mon, 15 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>RESEARCH</category></item><item><title>When a government pulls a model: the Fable 5 / Mythos 5 suspension</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/fable-mythos-export-control-suspension.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/fable-mythos-export-control-suspension.md</guid><description>On June 12, 2026, a US export-control directive forced Anthropic to disable Claude Fable 5 and Mythos 5 worldwide. The reported trigger was a &apos;jailbreak&apos; that amounts to asking a model to read code and fix flaws — a capability defenders use daily.</description><pubDate>Mon, 15 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>GOVERNANCE</category></item><item><title>Flowise CVE-2026-41264: LLM-written pandas code that escalates to RCE</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/flowise-csv-agent-prompt-injection-rce.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/flowise-csv-agent-prompt-injection-rce.md</guid><description>A prompt injection in Flowise&apos;s CSV Agent makes the model emit Python that escapes a regex denylist and runs OS commands. Disclosed April 15, 2026 and patched in 3.1.0.</description><pubDate>Mon, 15 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>AGENTS</category></item><item><title>Injection depth in ReAct agents: position beats wording</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/injection-depth-react-agents.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/injection-depth-react-agents.md</guid><description>A June 2026 study of tool-calling ReAct agents finds injection depth—not rhetoric—drives indirect prompt injection: success falls from 60% at the first tool call to 0% by the fourth.</description><pubDate>Mon, 15 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>INDIRECT INJECTION</category></item><item><title>Why jailbreaks transfer between models — and how salting fights back</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/jailbreak-transfer-shared-representations.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/jailbreak-transfer-shared-representations.md</guid><description>A study of 20 open-weight models finds jailbreak transfer comes from shared internal representations, not safety-training quirks. A defense called LLM salting rotates the refusal direction to break reuse.</description><pubDate>Mon, 15 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>DEFENSE</category></item><item><title>ktransformers: unauthenticated RCE via pickle over ZeroMQ (CVE-2026-26210)</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/ktransformers-zmq-pickle-rce-cve-2026-26210.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/ktransformers-zmq-pickle-rce-cve-2026-26210.md</guid><description>A critical RCE in the ktransformers inference engine exposes a ZMQ socket on all interfaces and pickle-loads whatever it receives. It is the latest case of the &apos;ShadowMQ&apos; pattern copied across AI serving stacks.</description><pubDate>Mon, 15 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>SUPPLY CHAIN</category></item><item><title>LLM privacy isn&apos;t one risk: what an ablation study tells you to fix first</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/llm-privacy-attacks-ablation-study.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/llm-privacy-attacks-ablation-study.md</guid><description>A May 2026 study measures membership inference, attribute inference, data extraction and backdoors under one threat model. The finding: leakage is driven by your design choices — scale, data duplication, RAG config — not by the attack alone.</description><pubDate>Mon, 15 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>RESEARCH</category></item><item><title>Prompt injection is unsolved — so contain it at machine speed</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/machine-speed-injection-containment.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/machine-speed-injection-containment.md</guid><description>At Infosecurity Europe 2026, OWASP&apos;s Ariel Fogel called prompt injection an unresolved architectural problem and argued defenders must shift from prevention to runtime containment that runs as fast as the agent.</description><pubDate>Mon, 15 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>DEFENSE</category></item><item><title>Malicious LLM API routers: the unguarded man-in-the-middle for agents</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/malicious-llm-api-routers.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/malicious-llm-api-routers.md</guid><description>A UC Santa Barbara study (arXiv, April 9, 2026) measured 428 third-party LLM API routers and found dozens injecting code, stealing credentials and draining a crypto wallet — all from a trust boundary developers configure voluntarily.</description><pubDate>Mon, 15 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>SUPPLY CHAIN</category></item><item><title>MalSkillBench: we can&apos;t measure malicious-skill detectors because the test data is biased</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/malskillbench-malicious-agent-skills.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/malskillbench-malicious-agent-skills.md</guid><description>A June 2026 paper builds the first runtime-verified benchmark of malicious agent skills — 3,944 samples across 108 attack cells — and shows a single detector&apos;s recall can swing 66 points depending on which dataset you test it on.</description><pubDate>Mon, 15 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>SUPPLY CHAIN</category></item><item><title>CVE-2026-46519: when an MCP server filters tools at display but not at execution</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/mcp-kubernetes-execution-layer-bypass.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/mcp-kubernetes-execution-layer-bypass.md</guid><description>mcp-server-kubernetes enforced its read-only and allow-list controls only in tools/list, never in tools/call. Any client that knew a tool name could run it. A clean lesson in presentation-layer vs execution-layer authorization.</description><pubDate>Mon, 15 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>AGENTS</category></item><item><title>DNS rebinding turns localhost MCP servers into a remote attack surface</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/mcp-localhost-dns-rebinding.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/mcp-localhost-dns-rebinding.md</guid><description>A coordinated 2025–2026 disclosure wave hit every major MCP SDK over one root cause: HTTP servers on localhost that skip Host/Origin validation. The latest, CVE-2026-11624 in Google&apos;s MCP Toolbox (June 13, 2026), is rated Critical 9.4.</description><pubDate>Mon, 15 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>AGENTS</category></item><item><title>Why prompt-injection detectors keep failing: the evasion problem in 2026</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/prompt-injection-detector-evasion.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/prompt-injection-detector-evasion.md</guid><description>From keyword classifiers to activation-based drift probes, prompt-injection detectors share one weakness: an adaptive attacker. Two studies report up to ~100% evasion. Treat detection as one layer, never the boundary.</description><pubDate>Mon, 15 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>DEFENSE</category></item><item><title>SafeHarbor: a hierarchical memory guardrail that targets agent over-refusal</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/safeharbor-hierarchical-memory-guardrail.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/safeharbor-hierarchical-memory-guardrail.md</guid><description>Accepted at ICML 2026, SafeHarbor is a training-free guardrail that injects context-aware safety rules from a self-evolving risk tree — keeping 63.6% benign utility on GPT-4o while refusing over 93% of attacks.</description><pubDate>Mon, 15 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>DEFENSE</category></item><item><title>SEC-bench Pro: how well can AI agents really hunt bugs in V8 and SpiderMonkey?</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/sec-bench-pro-long-horizon-bug-hunting.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/sec-bench-pro-long-horizon-bug-hunting.md</guid><description>A May 26, 2026 benchmark measures coding agents on long-horizon vulnerability discovery in real browser engines. Frontier models stay below 40% — and the gap matters for both attackers and defenders.</description><pubDate>Mon, 15 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>RESEARCH</category></item><item><title>Splunk MCP Server logs auth tokens in clear text (CVE-2026-20205)</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/splunk-mcp-server-token-leak-cve-2026-20205.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/splunk-mcp-server-token-leak-cve-2026-20205.md</guid><description>Splunk&apos;s MCP Server app wrote users&apos; session and authorization tokens unmasked into the _internal index — a CWE-532 secrets-in-logs flaw that turns log access into token theft. Fixed in app v1.0.3.</description><pubDate>Mon, 15 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>AGENTS</category></item><item><title>TOCTOU in AI agents: atomicity violations between observation and action</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/toctou-agent-atomicity-violations.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/toctou-agent-atomicity-violations.md</guid><description>An old operating-systems bug class resurfaces in agents: the world changes between when an agent looks and when it acts. New 2026 research formalizes it for GUI, browser, and multi-agent systems.</description><pubDate>Mon, 15 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>AGENTS</category></item><item><title>When #1 trending is malware: the Open-OSS/privacy-filter Hugging Face typosquat</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/trending-model-typosquat-infostealer.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/trending-model-typosquat-infostealer.md</guid><description>On May 7, 2026 HiddenLayer found Open-OSS/privacy-filter, a typosquat of OpenAI&apos;s model that reached #1 trending on Hugging Face with ~244K downloads in 18 hours before shipping a Rust infostealer.</description><pubDate>Mon, 15 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>SUPPLY CHAIN</category></item><item><title>XL-SafetyBench: testing LLM safety across 10 countries, not just English</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/xl-safetybench-cross-cultural-llm-safety.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/xl-safetybench-cross-cultural-llm-safety.md</guid><description>A May 7, 2026 arXiv paper from AIM Intelligence and Microsoft&apos;s AI Red Team shows English-centric safety tests miss country-specific harms — and that many models&apos; &apos;safety&apos; is refusal by accident, not genuine alignment.</description><pubDate>Mon, 15 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>RESEARCH</category></item><item><title>Multi-clip video jailbreaks: why video inputs break multimodal LLM safety</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/multi-clip-video-mllm-jailbreak.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/multi-clip-video-mllm-jailbreak.md</guid><description>A June 2026 ACL paper shows the video channel is a weaker safety boundary than images: attack success climbs as a video is split into more diverse short clips.</description><pubDate>Sun, 14 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>JAILBREAK</category></item><item><title>SecureClaw: a dual-boundary defense for tool-using LLM agents</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/secureclaw-dual-boundary-agent-defense.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/secureclaw-dual-boundary-agent-defense.md</guid><description>A June 2026 paper proposes guarding two distinct boundaries at once — authorizing external actions at the effect sink and confining plaintext at the read boundary — reporting 0% attack success on one agent benchmark.</description><pubDate>Sun, 14 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>DEFENSE</category></item><item><title>Brain-prompt injection: when neural signals become an agent&apos;s authorization channel</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/brain-prompt-injection-bci-agents.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/brain-prompt-injection-bci-agents.md</guid><description>A June 8, 2026 arXiv paper names a new attack surface: BCI-to-agent pipelines that turn decoded EEG into a tool-use authorization channel. Three injection vectors flip the routed action while EEG- and text-side monitors stay blind.</description><pubDate>Sat, 13 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>RESEARCH</category></item><item><title>ConVerse: when two agents talk, the stronger one leaks more</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/converse-agent-to-agent-contextual-safety.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/converse-agent-to-agent-contextual-safety.md</guid><description>A benchmark for agent-to-agent conversations finds privacy attacks succeed up to 88% of the time and security breaches up to 60% — and that more capable models leak more, not less.</description><pubDate>Sat, 13 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>AGENTS</category></item><item><title>PI-Hunter: auditing agents to expose and localize hidden prompt injections</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/pi-hunter-agentic-injection-auditing.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/pi-hunter-agentic-injection-auditing.md</guid><description>A June 2026 paper from Google researchers reframes prompt-injection red-teaming as auditing — PI-Hunter evolves source-aware test cases to surface where latent injections enter and propagate through an agent, not just whether an attack lands.</description><pubDate>Sat, 13 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>DEFENSE</category></item><item><title>SIGIL: proving your text was in an LLM&apos;s training set</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/sigil-provable-training-data-membership.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/sigil-provable-training-data-membership.md</guid><description>A June 2026 arXiv paper proposes embedding imperceptible canaries into text and code so content owners can prove, with controlled false-positive rates, that a model was trained on their data.</description><pubDate>Sat, 13 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>RESEARCH</category></item><item><title>AgentDyn: why injection defenses that ace static benchmarks fail in the wild</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/agentdyn-dynamic-injection-benchmark.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/agentdyn-dynamic-injection-benchmark.md</guid><description>A February 2026 ICML benchmark, AgentDyn, runs ten leading prompt-injection defenses on dynamic, open-ended agent tasks. Almost all are either insecure or over-defend into uselessness.</description><pubDate>Fri, 12 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>DEFENSE</category></item><item><title>Beyond tool poisoning: what a malicious remote MCP server can actually do</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/beyond-tool-poisoning-malicious-mcp-servers.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/beyond-tool-poisoning-malicious-mcp-servers.md</guid><description>A May 21, 2026 study maps the full threat surface of malicious remote MCP servers across ChatGPT, Claude Desktop and Gemini CLI — finding host filtering swings from 95% to 50% on the same request, and successful attacks are almost never disclosed.</description><pubDate>Fri, 12 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>SUPPLY CHAIN</category></item><item><title>Causality laundering: when a blocked tool call still leaks data</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/causality-laundering-denial-feedback-leakage.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/causality-laundering-denial-feedback-leakage.md</guid><description>An April 2026 paper shows that denying an agent&apos;s tool call is not the end of the attack: the denial itself is an information channel. Flat taint tracking misses it.</description><pubDate>Fri, 12 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>AGENTS</category></item><item><title>ChromaToast: a pre-auth RCE in the ChromaDB vector database</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/chromatoast-vector-db-preauth-rce.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/chromatoast-vector-db-preauth-rce.md</guid><description>HiddenLayer&apos;s May 18, 2026 disclosure (CVE-2026-45829, CVSS 10.0) shows ChromaDB&apos;s Python server loads an attacker&apos;s HuggingFace model and runs its code before it ever checks authentication.</description><pubDate>Fri, 12 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>INFRASTRUCTURE</category></item><item><title>Claude Code GitHub Action: how the Read tool leaked CI/CD secrets</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/claude-code-read-tool-environ-leak.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/claude-code-read-tool-environ-leak.md</guid><description>Microsoft Threat Intelligence found that Claude Code Action&apos;s Read tool bypassed the Bash env scrub to reach /proc/self/environ, leaking the runner&apos;s ANTHROPIC_API_KEY. Patched in v2.1.128.</description><pubDate>Fri, 12 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>AGENTS</category></item><item><title>Injection keeps leaking Copilot: two new June 2026 disclosure CVEs</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/copilot-injection-disclosure-june-2026.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/copilot-injection-disclosure-june-2026.md</guid><description>June 9, 2026 Patch Tuesday shipped CVE-2026-42824 and CVE-2026-47644 — two injection-class information-disclosure flaws in Microsoft&apos;s Copilot surface, continuing the exfiltration lineage that started with EchoLeak.</description><pubDate>Fri, 12 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>DATA LEAK</category></item><item><title>Credential leakage in LLM agent skills: a 17,000-skill empirical study</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/credential-leakage-llm-agent-skills.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/credential-leakage-llm-agent-skills.md</guid><description>An April 3, 2026 arXiv study analyzed 17,022 agent skills and found 520 leaking credentials — 73.5% of the leaks flow through debug logging that pipes secrets straight into the model&apos;s context.</description><pubDate>Fri, 12 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>DATA LEAK</category></item><item><title>DACSI: when retrieved documents fake the system&apos;s control signals</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/dacsi-control-signal-impersonation-rag.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/dacsi-control-signal-impersonation-rag.md</guid><description>A June 8, 2026 paper names a quiet RAG failure mode: untrusted document text impersonating metadata, provenance and policy signals. No &apos;ignore previous instructions&apos; required — the lesson is that document-authored labels are data, not policy.</description><pubDate>Fri, 12 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>INDIRECT INJECTION</category></item><item><title>The Defense Trilemma: why prompt-injection wrappers can&apos;t be complete</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/defense-trilemma-prompt-injection-wrappers.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/defense-trilemma-prompt-injection-wrappers.md</guid><description>A Lean 4-verified April 2026 proof shows no continuous, utility-preserving input wrapper can block every prompt injection. Continuity, utility, and completeness cannot all hold at once.</description><pubDate>Fri, 12 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>DEFENSE</category></item><item><title>Inside GitHub Agentic Workflows: a security architecture for CI/CD agents</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/github-agentic-workflows-security-architecture.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/github-agentic-workflows-security-architecture.md</guid><description>GitHub Agentic Workflows reached public preview on June 11, 2026 with a security-first design: zero-secret agents in a chroot jail, a workflow firewall, staged-and-vetted writes, and a threat-detection job. The defensive answer to prompt injection in CI/CD.</description><pubDate>Fri, 12 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>DEFENSE</category></item><item><title>CodeSpear: when grammar-constrained decoding becomes a jailbreak surface</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/grammar-constrained-decoding-jailbreak.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/grammar-constrained-decoding-jailbreak.md</guid><description>A June 10, 2026 arXiv paper shows that the reliability feature forcing LLM code output to be syntactically valid can itself be turned into a jailbreak. Applying a benign code grammar can bypass refusals; the authors&apos; CodeShield defense answers with honeypot code.</description><pubDate>Fri, 12 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>JAILBREAK</category></item><item><title>Exposed MCP Servers Become Cloud Takeover Pivots</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/mcp-cloud-takeover-imds.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/mcp-cloud-takeover-imds.md</guid><description>Command injection in cloud MCP servers (CVE-2026-5058/5059) lets attackers reach the instance metadata service, steal the IAM role, and pivot into the whole cloud account.</description><pubDate>Fri, 12 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>INFRASTRUCTURE</category></item><item><title>Mnemonic sovereignty: securing the whole memory lifecycle of agents</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/mnemonic-sovereignty-memory-lifecycle.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/mnemonic-sovereignty-memory-lifecycle.md</guid><description>An April 2026 survey reframes LLM-agent memory security as a six-phase lifecycle and shows the field ignores forgetting, confidentiality and non-adversarial drift.</description><pubDate>Fri, 12 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>RESEARCH</category></item><item><title>DeepMind and partners open a $10M multi-agent AI safety research fund</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/multi-agent-safety-research-fund.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/multi-agent-safety-research-fund.md</guid><description>On June 11, 2026, Google DeepMind, Schmidt Sciences, the Cooperative AI Foundation and ARIA opened a $10M call to build a research field around the safety of millions of interacting AI agents.</description><pubDate>Fri, 12 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>GOVERNANCE</category></item><item><title>Newer isn&apos;t always safer: non-monotonic safety alignment across model generations</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/non-monotonic-safety-alignment-gemma.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/non-monotonic-safety-alignment-gemma.md</guid><description>A May 2026 paper red-teaming four Gemma generations found the mid-generation model was far easier to jailbreak than both its predecessor and successor — safety doesn&apos;t improve in a straight line.</description><pubDate>Fri, 12 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>RESEARCH</category></item><item><title>OWASP State of Agentic AI Security 2026: prompt injection ties most agent failures together</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/owasp-state-agentic-ai-security-2026.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/owasp-state-agentic-ai-security-2026.md</guid><description>OWASP&apos;s State of Agentic AI Security and Governance v2.01 (June 1, 2026) moves from hypothetical threats to documented CVEs and breaches. Prompt injection now maps to six of the ten agentic risk categories.</description><pubDate>Fri, 12 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>GOVERNANCE</category></item><item><title>Prompt inversion: split LLM inference leaks prompts, a principled defense lands</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/prompt-inversion-collaborative-inference-defense.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/prompt-inversion-collaborative-inference-defense.md</guid><description>Prompt inversion attacks recover up to 88.4% of input tokens from intermediate activations in collaborative LLM inference. A paper submitted June 10, 2026 proposes the first information-theoretic defense.</description><pubDate>Fri, 12 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>DATA LEAK</category></item><item><title>The Recuse Signal: a robots.txt for agents that hold real credentials</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/recuse-signal-agent-access-deny.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/recuse-signal-agent-access-deny.md</guid><description>A June 2026 paper proposes an in-band &apos;deny&apos; signal — emitted over an SSH banner or a PostgreSQL NOTICE — that politely asks an autonomous agent to withdraw. In a pilot it induced 100% recusal, but an authorization framing flipped the strongest model right back.</description><pubDate>Fri, 12 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>DEFENSE</category></item><item><title>RTK (CVE-2026-45792): untrusted filter configs hide backdoors from AI review</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/rtk-untrusted-filters-ai-perception.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/rtk-untrusted-filters-ai-perception.md</guid><description>Pillar Security disclosed on May 20, 2026 a flaw in RTK, a token-optimisation filter for Claude Code: a repo-supplied .rtk/filters.toml could silently strip a backdoor from command output before the model ever saw it. The target is the agent&apos;s perception, not its execution.</description><pubDate>Fri, 12 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>SUPPLY CHAIN</category></item><item><title>StakeBench: who actually pays when a web agent gets injected?</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/stakebench-stakeholder-harm-web-agents.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/stakebench-stakeholder-harm-web-agents.md</guid><description>A stakeholder-centric benchmark from NTU, IBM Research and UIUC shows web agents fail every injection objective tested — and that the harm often lands on third parties, not the user.</description><pubDate>Fri, 12 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>RESEARCH</category></item><item><title>Tool stream injection: why static agent defenses break, and what verify-before-commit fixes</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/tool-stream-injection-verify-before-commit.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/tool-stream-injection-verify-before-commit.md</guid><description>A January 2026 paper, VIGIL, reframes indirect injection around the tool stream — forged tool descriptions and fake error messages — and shows that the better-aligned an agent is, the more it obeys them.</description><pubDate>Fri, 12 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>DEFENSE</category></item><item><title>TRUSTDESC: deriving tool descriptions from code to defuse tool poisoning</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/trustdesc-trusted-tool-descriptions.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/trustdesc-trusted-tool-descriptions.md</guid><description>An April 2026 paper attacks tool poisoning at its root: generate a tool&apos;s description from its implementation instead of trusting the author-supplied text, neutralising implicit poisoning that detectors miss.</description><pubDate>Fri, 12 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>DEFENSE</category></item><item><title>Multimodal input as attack surface: vLLM&apos;s video-decoder RCE (CVE-2026-22778)</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/vllm-multimodal-decoder-rce-cve-2026-22778.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/vllm-multimodal-decoder-rce-cve-2026-22778.md</guid><description>CVE-2026-22778 turns a malicious video URL into remote code execution on vLLM servers, chaining a PIL info leak with an FFmpeg JPEG2000 heap overflow. Patched in 0.14.1.</description><pubDate>Fri, 12 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>INFRASTRUCTURE</category></item><item><title>AuditBench: LLMs investigating real attacks are false-positive machines</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/auditbench-llm-attack-investigation.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/auditbench-llm-attack-investigation.md</guid><description>A June 2026 benchmark tests five frontier LLMs on real audit-log investigations. Verdict: overly suspicious models, many false positives — and smaller models often match the big ones.</description><pubDate>Thu, 11 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>RESEARCH</category></item><item><title>CASA: task-based access control that checks tool calls against the user&apos;s real intent</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/casa-task-based-tool-authorization.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/casa-task-based-tool-authorization.md</guid><description>A May 4, 2026 arXiv paper proposes Continuous Agent Semantic Authorization — a zero-trust layer that extracts a user&apos;s task from a multi-turn chat and denies tool calls that don&apos;t match it.</description><pubDate>Thu, 11 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>DEFENSE</category></item><item><title>Context-Fractured Decomposition: jailbreaks through artifact provenance gaps</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/context-fractured-decomposition-agents.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/context-fractured-decomposition-agents.md</guid><description>A June 8, 2026 arXiv paper formalizes the &apos;provenance gap&apos; in tool-using agents: harmful behavior assembled from individually innocuous tool actions across time, lifting jailbreak success up to 28.3 points.</description><pubDate>Thu, 11 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>AGENTS</category></item><item><title>Cursor allowlist bypass: shell built-ins poison the environment for RCE</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/cursor-env-poisoning-allowlist-bypass.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/cursor-env-poisoning-allowlist-bypass.md</guid><description>CVE-2026-22708 lets a prompt injection use trusted shell built-ins like export and typeset to poison environment variables in Cursor, turning an approved git or python command into remote code execution. Patched in 2.3.</description><pubDate>Thu, 11 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>AGENTS</category></item><item><title>Hades worm: poisoned AI coding-tool config that runs on repo open</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/hades-worm-ai-coding-config-hooks.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/hades-worm-ai-coding-config-hooks.md</guid><description>The Hades supply-chain worm commits config files for Claude Code, Gemini, Cursor, and VS Code that execute on session start or folder open — turning a cloned repo into a credential stealer with no install step.</description><pubDate>Thu, 11 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>SUPPLY CHAIN</category></item><item><title>HPAA: typography humans read but moderation LLMs miss</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/hpaa-typographic-moderation-evasion.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/hpaa-typographic-moderation-evasion.md</guid><description>A June 8, 2026 paper introduces Human-Perceptible Adversarial Attacks — harmful text that stays obvious to a human reader but slips past LLM content moderation through typographic manipulation.</description><pubDate>Thu, 11 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>ADVERSARIAL</category></item><item><title>The Injection Paradox: when a prompt injection backfires and erases a brand in RAG</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/injection-paradox-rag-brand-suppression.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/injection-paradox-rag-brand-suppression.md</guid><description>A June 8, 2026 arXiv preprint shows prompt injections in retrieved documents can backfire in safety-trained Claude models, dropping a brand from a 54% to 0% recommendation rate — opening a reverse-attack against competitors.</description><pubDate>Thu, 11 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>INDIRECT INJECTION</category></item><item><title>Oversight has a capacity: when more agent approvals make you less safe</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/oversight-capacity-reviewer-fatigue.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/oversight-capacity-reviewer-fatigue.md</guid><description>A June 8, 2026 arXiv paper models the human reviewer behind an agent&apos;s approval gate as a fatiguing, finite resource — and shows that escalating more actions can lower realized safety and open a flooding attack.</description><pubDate>Thu, 11 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>DEFENSE</category></item><item><title>OWASP&apos;s agentic maturity model: don&apos;t run in the red cells</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/owasp-agentic-adoption-maturity-model.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/owasp-agentic-adoption-maturity-model.md</guid><description>OWASP&apos;s June 2026 State of Agentic AI report adds an Enterprise Adoption Maturity Model — a two-axis grid where agent autonomy outruns governance, leaving &apos;red cells&apos; no one can see into.</description><pubDate>Thu, 11 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>GOVERNANCE</category></item><item><title>SABER: coding agents fail operational safety even when they refuse bad prompts</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/saber-coding-agent-operational-safety.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/saber-coding-agent-operational-safety.md</guid><description>A May 31, 2026 benchmark scores LLM coding agents on the final state of a real workspace, not on prompt refusal. Even the best model leaves a harmful violation in over half of runs.</description><pubDate>Thu, 11 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>AGENTS</category></item><item><title>Web chatbot plugins: how insecure widgets amplify prompt injection</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/web-chatbot-plugins-prompt-injection.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/web-chatbot-plugins-prompt-injection.md</guid><description>An IEEE S&amp;P 2026 study of 17 chatbot plugins on 10,000+ sites found forgeable conversation histories (3-8x stronger injections) and web-scraping tools that mix trusted and untrusted content.</description><pubDate>Thu, 11 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>PROMPT INJECTION</category></item><item><title>LiteLLM CVE-2026-42271: MCP test endpoints chain to unauthenticated RCE</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/litellm-mcp-test-rce-cve-2026-42271.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/litellm-mcp-test-rce-cve-2026-42271.md</guid><description>Disclosed in April as an authenticated command injection, LiteLLM&apos;s MCP preview endpoints became unauthenticated RCE once chained with Starlette&apos;s BadHost bypass — CISA added it to KEV on June 8, 2026.</description><pubDate>Wed, 10 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>INFRASTRUCTURE</category></item><item><title>Memory Control Flow Attacks: when stored memory steers an agent&apos;s tools</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/memory-control-flow-attacks-mcfa.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/memory-control-flow-attacks-mcfa.md</guid><description>A March 2026 paper shows poisoned agent memory doesn&apos;t just corrupt content — it hijacks the control flow of tool selection, forcing unintended tools and skipped steps in over 90% of trials, across tasks and long after injection.</description><pubDate>Wed, 10 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>AGENTS</category></item><item><title>Transformers config injection: silent RCE that walks past trust_remote_code</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/transformers-config-injection-rce.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/transformers-config-injection-rce.md</guid><description>CVE-2026-4372, disclosed June 4, 2026, lets a single config.json field run attacker code on a routine from_pretrained() call — bypassing trust_remote_code=False in Hugging Face Transformers.</description><pubDate>Wed, 10 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>SUPPLY CHAIN</category></item><item><title>ADR: detection and response for MCP agents, proven at Uber scale</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/adr-enterprise-mcp-agent-detection.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/adr-enterprise-mcp-agent-detection.md</guid><description>A May 2026 paper from Uber describes a production EDR-style system for MCP agents: full causal telemetry, two-tier detection, and offline red-teaming, running on 7,200+ hosts for ten months.</description><pubDate>Mon, 08 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>DEFENSE</category></item><item><title>Agent Security Is a Systems Problem: Treat the Model as Untrusted</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/agent-security-systems-problem.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/agent-security-systems-problem.md</guid><description>A May 2026 position paper from Google, UCSD and UW–Madison argues agent security must move out of the model and into the system: treat the LLM as an untrusted component and enforce invariants around it.</description><pubDate>Mon, 08 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>DEFENSE</category></item><item><title>How agentic AI compresses the cyber attack lifecycle</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/agentic-attack-lifecycle-compression.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/agentic-attack-lifecycle-compression.md</guid><description>A May 2026 arXiv paper models how agentic AI lowers the cost of every attack stage — from reconnaissance to post-compromise — compressing the kill chain and shifting defensive priorities for enterprises.</description><pubDate>Mon, 08 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>OFFENSIVE AI</category></item><item><title>AgentTrust: vetting agent tool calls before they execute</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/agenttrust-runtime-tool-call-interception.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/agenttrust-runtime-tool-call-interception.md</guid><description>A preprint from May 6, 2026 introduces AgentTrust, a runtime layer that vets each agent tool call before it runs and returns allow/warn/block/review — catching obfuscated shell payloads static guards miss.</description><pubDate>Mon, 08 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>DEFENSE</category></item><item><title>Why benchmarking security agents is hard</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/benchmarking-security-agents-is-hard.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/benchmarking-security-agents-is-hard.md</guid><description>A position paper published May 21, 2026 argues that the leaderboards used to score security agents are quietly broken: the adversarial reasoning you want to measure can also break the benchmark itself. Three failure modes, and how to evaluate honestly.</description><pubDate>Mon, 08 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>RESEARCH</category></item><item><title>Beyond shallow safety: mid-sequence injection still flips aligned LLMs</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/beyond-shallow-safety-trajectory-alignment.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/beyond-shallow-safety-trajectory-alignment.md</guid><description>A June 3, 2026 arXiv paper shows safety alignment can be redirected not just at the first tokens but at any generation step — and a model&apos;s hidden-state refusal directions don&apos;t predict its robustness.</description><pubDate>Mon, 08 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>RESEARCH</category></item><item><title>Why independent AI-agent developers keep missing security risks</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/developer-blind-spots-agent-security.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/developer-blind-spots-agent-security.md</guid><description>A June 2026 arXiv study of independent AI-agent developers finds a user-centric blind spot: builders focus on harmful-content safety while overlooking prompt injection, data exfiltration, and cross-border privacy.</description><pubDate>Mon, 08 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>RESEARCH</category></item><item><title>Hands-free firmware VR: an LLM agent reverse-engineers an OT intercom end-to-end</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/hands-free-agent-firmware-vr.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/hands-free-agent-firmware-vr.md</guid><description>On June 2, 2026, Claroty Team82 ran Claude Opus 4.6 with a Ghidra MCP server against a Zenitel intercom firmware image and re-found a set of known CVEs in under ten minutes — a preview of commoditized firmware vulnerability research.</description><pubDate>Mon, 08 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>OFFENSIVE AI</category></item><item><title>Forgotten but recoverable: why LLM machine unlearning keeps leaking back</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/llm-unlearning-knowledge-recovery.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/llm-unlearning-knowledge-recovery.md</guid><description>Multiple 2025-2026 papers show &apos;unlearned&apos; knowledge in LLMs is routinely recoverable — via quantization, adversarial prompting, and now reasoning traces. Treating unlearning as erasure is a mistake.</description><pubDate>Mon, 08 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>RESEARCH</category></item><item><title>Catching model extraction by watching the whole traffic window, not single queries</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/mmd-model-extraction-detection.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/mmd-model-extraction-detection.md</guid><description>A June 2026 paper shows a simple distribution test (MMD over query embeddings, calibrated on benign traffic only) detects LLM model-extraction campaigns hidden in mixed API traffic — 0.3% false positives, 100% on pure-attacker streams.</description><pubDate>Mon, 08 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>DEFENSE</category></item><item><title>MS-Agent&apos;s shell tool: a regex denylist turns prompt injection into RCE</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/ms-agent-shell-denylist-cve-2026-2256.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/ms-agent-shell-denylist-cve-2026-2256.md</guid><description>CVE-2026-2256 lets attacker-controlled content steer ModelScope&apos;s MS-Agent into running OS commands. The root cause is a familiar anti-pattern: guarding a shell tool with a regex denylist instead of an allowlist.</description><pubDate>Mon, 08 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>AGENTS</category></item><item><title>OWASP ASI02: when an agent turns its own tools against you</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/owasp-asi02-tool-misuse-exploitation.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/owasp-asi02-tool-misuse-exploitation.md</guid><description>Tool Misuse &amp; Exploitation is the #2 risk in OWASP&apos;s Top 10 for Agentic Applications 2026. The danger isn&apos;t an agent gaining new tools — it&apos;s misusing the ones it already holds, via over-privilege, poisoned descriptors, or unsafe chaining.</description><pubDate>Mon, 08 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>AGENTS</category></item><item><title>ePCA: replacing semantic agent guardrails with formal verification</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/provably-secure-agent-guardrail-epca.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/provably-secure-agent-guardrail-epca.md</guid><description>A May 2026 paper proposes ePCA, a guardrail that compiles each agent action into first-order logic and runs an SMT check before execution, blocking unsafe steps as logical deadlocks.</description><pubDate>Mon, 08 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>DEFENSE</category></item><item><title>Remote MCP servers: 40% unauthenticated, OAuth broken on the rest</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/remote-mcp-oauth-flaws.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/remote-mcp-oauth-flaws.md</guid><description>A May 2026 arXiv study scanned 7,973 live remote MCP servers: 40.55% expose tools with no authentication, and all 119 OAuth-enabled servers tested carried at least one flaw — 9 CVEs assigned.</description><pubDate>Mon, 08 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>AGENTS</category></item><item><title>Sequential data poisoning: splitting a backdoor across post-training stages</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/sequential-data-poisoning-post-training.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/sequential-data-poisoning-post-training.md</guid><description>A June 3, 2026 paper shows that poison spread across SFT and preference data — negligible at each stage alone — combines into a working backdoor. Per-stage audits create a &apos;single-attacker illusion&apos;.</description><pubDate>Mon, 08 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>SUPPLY CHAIN</category></item><item><title>SlotGCG: adversarial token position, not just content, drives jailbreaks</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/slotgcg-positional-jailbreak-slots.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/slotgcg-positional-jailbreak-slots.md</guid><description>A June 2026 paper shows GCG-style jailbreaks get ~14% stronger when adversarial tokens are placed at attention-correlated slots inside the prompt — and keep 42% more success under input filtering.</description><pubDate>Mon, 08 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>ADVERSARIAL</category></item><item><title>Five attacks on x402: when AI agents pay, the cross-layer seams leak</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/x402-agentic-payment-protocol-attacks.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/x402-agentic-payment-protocol-attacks.md</guid><description>A May 12, 2026 paper formally breaks x402, the HTTP 402 agentic payment protocol. Five attacks across settlement, replay, web handling and discovery — one replayed payment yielded 248 grants on a live endpoint.</description><pubDate>Mon, 08 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>AGENTS</category></item><item><title>Microsoft&apos;s agentic failure-mode taxonomy v2.0: zero-click human-in-the-loop bypass</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/agentic-failure-modes-taxonomy-v2.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/agentic-failure-modes-taxonomy-v2.md</guid><description>Microsoft&apos;s AI Red Team v2.0 taxonomy (June 4, 2026) adds seven agentic failure modes and reports human-in-the-loop bypass as the most consistently exploited — including zero-click chains from a single external input.</description><pubDate>Sun, 07 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>DEFENSE</category></item><item><title>AgentVisor: an OS-hypervisor pattern that audits every agent tool call</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/agentvisor-semantic-virtualization-defense.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/agentvisor-semantic-virtualization-defense.md</guid><description>An April 27, 2026 arXiv paper borrows the OS hypervisor idea to defend tool-using LLM agents: a trusted &apos;visor&apos; audits every tool call and is architecturally blind to untrusted content.</description><pubDate>Sun, 07 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>DEFENSE</category></item><item><title>Back-Reveal: data exfiltration through a backdoored agent&apos;s own tool calls</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/back-reveal-backdoored-tool-exfiltration.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/back-reveal-backdoored-tool-exfiltration.md</guid><description>A finetuned agent carries a hidden trigger. On a benign cue it reads your session memory and ships it out disguised as an ordinary retrieval call — no prompt injection, no malicious tool. Paper dated April 7, 2026.</description><pubDate>Sun, 07 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>SUPPLY CHAIN</category></item><item><title>Need to Know: contextual-integrity query rewriting for LLM delegation</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/ci-query-rewriting-llm-delegation.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/ci-query-rewriting-llm-delegation.md</guid><description>A June 2, 2026 arXiv paper recasts privacy-preserving query rewriting as a contextual-integrity problem: forward a span to a cloud LLM only if the task needs it, not because a PII type matched.</description><pubDate>Sun, 07 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>DEFENSE</category></item><item><title>Two methodology traps that inflate prompt-injection detector scores</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/detector-benchmark-operating-point.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/detector-benchmark-operating-point.md</guid><description>A June 1, 2026 arXiv preprint shows most prompt-injection and jailbreak detector benchmarks lean on per-dataset threshold tuning and undisclosed operating points — two habits that quietly inflate the accuracy you buy.</description><pubDate>Sun, 07 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>DEFENSE</category></item><item><title>Langflow&apos;s public build endpoint: unauthenticated RCE weaponised in 20 hours</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/langflow-public-build-endpoint-rce.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/langflow-public-build-endpoint-rce.md</guid><description>CVE-2026-33017 turns Langflow&apos;s public flow-build endpoint into unauthenticated remote code execution. Disclosed March 17, 2026, it was exploited in the wild within 20 hours — before any public PoC existed.</description><pubDate>Sun, 07 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>INFRASTRUCTURE</category></item><item><title>Decision Hijacking: prompt-injecting the LLM that ranks your search results</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/llm-ranker-decision-hijacking.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/llm-ranker-decision-hijacking.md</guid><description>A growing body of 2025-2026 research shows that when an LLM re-ranks search or RAG candidates, a few injected lines inside one document can force it to the top — collapsing ranking quality by 60+ NDCG points, with stronger models more vulnerable, not less.</description><pubDate>Sun, 07 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>INDIRECT INJECTION</category></item><item><title>Membrane: contrastive safety memory that adapts guardrails without retraining</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/membrane-contrastive-safety-memory.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/membrane-contrastive-safety-memory.md</guid><description>A June 4, 2026 arXiv paper proposes Membrane, a self-evolving guardrail that pairs each blocked attack with a near-identical benign request, cutting over-refusal to 7-14% while topping F1 on six jailbreaks.</description><pubDate>Sun, 07 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>DEFENSE</category></item><item><title>MetaBackdoor: a length-based backdoor trigger that leaves no trace in the input</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/metabackdoor-positional-length-trigger.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/metabackdoor-positional-length-trigger.md</guid><description>A May 2026 paper from Microsoft and Institute of Science Tokyo plants a backdoor whose trigger is the input&apos;s length, not its text. The prompt looks clean, content filters see nothing, and 90 poisoned examples are enough.</description><pubDate>Sun, 07 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>SUPPLY CHAIN</category></item><item><title>OpenAI Lockdown Mode: cutting the exfiltration leg of prompt injection</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/openai-lockdown-mode-data-exfiltration.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/openai-lockdown-mode-data-exfiltration.md</guid><description>On June 6, 2026 OpenAI extended Lockdown Mode to personal and self-serve Business ChatGPT accounts: a deterministic setting that disables outbound paths attackers use to exfiltrate data via prompt injection.</description><pubDate>Sun, 07 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>DEFENSE</category></item><item><title>THRD: a training-free temporal defense against multi-turn jailbreaks</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/thrd-multi-turn-jailbreak-temporal-defense.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/thrd-multi-turn-jailbreak-temporal-defense.md</guid><description>A June 2026 paper argues multi-turn jailbreaks must be judged across the whole conversation, not turn by turn. THRD scores accumulated risk over time and cuts attack success to 0.2–4% without retraining.</description><pubDate>Sun, 07 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>DEFENSE</category></item><item><title>Adaptive AI worms: when malware runs its own local LLM</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/adaptive-ai-worms-parasitic-local-llm.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/adaptive-ai-worms-parasitic-local-llm.md</guid><description>A June 2026 University of Toronto paper demos a worm that runs open-weight LLMs on the machines it compromises, adapting its exploit per target and weaponising advisories published after the model&apos;s training cutoff.</description><pubDate>Fri, 05 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>OFFENSIVE AI</category></item><item><title>The agent that writes its own logs: why self-reported agent audit trails can&apos;t be trusted</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/agent-audit-trail-integrity.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/agent-audit-trail-integrity.md</guid><description>If a compromised agent produces its own activity log, it can omit, alter, or fabricate what it did. Three June 2026 efforts — arXiv&apos;s Notarized Agents, an IETF agent-audit-trail draft, and SCITT — converge on the same fix: move the trust boundary off the agent.</description><pubDate>Fri, 05 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>DEFENSE</category></item><item><title>AgentRedBench: indirect injection in SaaS agents is an authorization gap</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/agentredbench-underspecified-authorization.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/agentredbench-underspecified-authorization.md</guid><description>AgentRedBench (June 2026) red-teams LLM agents reading from SaaS tools like Gmail and Jira. No-guard attack success ran 32–81% across eight frontier models, until a tool-response classifier cut it.</description><pubDate>Fri, 05 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>INDIRECT INJECTION</category></item><item><title>When embedding-based defenses fail in LLM multi-agent systems</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/embedding-defenses-fail-multi-agent.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/embedding-defenses-fail-multi-agent.md</guid><description>A May 1, 2026 arXiv paper shows that detectors which prune malicious agents by message embedding collapse when attackers craft near-benign text — and proposes token-confidence signals as a more robust replacement.</description><pubDate>Fri, 05 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>DEFENSE</category></item><item><title>GGUF model files are untrusted input: llama.cpp&apos;s recurring parser RCEs</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/gguf-parser-untrusted-model-rce.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/gguf-parser-untrusted-model-rce.md</guid><description>CVE-2026-33298 (March 2026) and a May 15, 2026 oss-sec disclosure show llama.cpp&apos;s GGUF parser keeps hitting integer-overflow heap corruption: loading a crafted model file can mean RCE.</description><pubDate>Fri, 05 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>SUPPLY CHAIN</category></item><item><title>No two labs measure prompt injection the same way</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/incomparable-prompt-injection-metrics.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/incomparable-prompt-injection-metrics.md</guid><description>A June 1, 2026 comparison of the prompt-injection disclosures from Anthropic, OpenAI, Google and Meta found that no two labs share a metric, a surface, or a definition of success — so vendor numbers cannot be compared.</description><pubDate>Fri, 05 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>GOVERNANCE</category></item><item><title>CVE-2026-45497: command injection turns Microsoft 365 Copilot into an RCE path</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/m365-copilot-command-injection-cve-2026-45497.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/m365-copilot-command-injection-cve-2026-45497.md</guid><description>On June 4 2026 MSRC disclosed CVE-2026-45497, a command-injection flaw in Microsoft 365 Copilot rated as remote code execution with a scope change across the service boundary. Fixed server-side.</description><pubDate>Fri, 05 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>AGENTS</category></item><item><title>When an MCP tool argument becomes an Android intent: mobile-mcp&apos;s injection sinks</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/mobile-mcp-intent-injection.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/mobile-mcp-intent-injection.md</guid><description>CVE-2026-35394 lets a model-controlled URL fire arbitrary Android intents through mobile-mcp&apos;s mobile_open_url tool. Paired with a sibling path-traversal CVE, it shows a pattern: MCP tool arguments flowing unvalidated into platform sinks.</description><pubDate>Fri, 05 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>AGENTS</category></item><item><title>MPBench: a systematic taxonomy of memory poisoning in LLM agents</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/mpbench-memory-poisoning-taxonomy.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/mpbench-memory-poisoning-taxonomy.md</guid><description>A June 3, 2026 arXiv study maps four memory write channels, nine structural weaknesses and six attack classes — and shows prompt-injection defenses don&apos;t cover memory poisoning.</description><pubDate>Fri, 05 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>RESEARCH</category></item><item><title>Optimus: scoring jailbreaks beyond pass/fail reveals a stealth-optimal regime</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/optimus-jailbreak-scoring-beyond-binary.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/optimus-jailbreak-scoring-beyond-binary.md</guid><description>A May 9, 2026 arXiv paper argues binary attack-success-rate hides the jailbreaks defenders should fear most. Its Optimus metric scores prompts on similarity and harmfulness, exposing a &apos;stealth-optimal&apos; band where ASR collapses to zero.</description><pubDate>Fri, 05 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>RESEARCH</category></item><item><title>VIPER-MCP: 67 CVEs from taint-style flaws across 40,000 MCP servers</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/viper-mcp-taint-style-server-flaws.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/viper-mcp-taint-style-server-flaws.md</guid><description>A May 20, 2026 arXiv paper audited 39,884 open-source MCP server repos, confirmed 106 zero-days end-to-end and got 67 CVE IDs assigned. The story is the pattern: untrusted agent input reaching shell, network and file-system sinks.</description><pubDate>Fri, 05 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>AGENTS</category></item><item><title>trust_remote_code=False isn&apos;t a boundary: vLLM&apos;s recurring model-load RCE</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/vllm-trust-remote-code-bypass-rce.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/vllm-trust-remote-code-bypass-rce.md</guid><description>CVE-2026-27893 (disclosed March 27, 2026) is vLLM&apos;s third trust_remote_code bypass. Two model files hardcode trust_remote_code=True, silently overriding an operator&apos;s opt-out and enabling RCE from a malicious model repo.</description><pubDate>Fri, 05 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>SUPPLY CHAIN</category></item><item><title>Catching credential exfiltration in LLM agents before the output token</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/activation-probe-credential-exfiltration.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/activation-probe-credential-exfiltration.md</guid><description>Published June 2, 2026, an arXiv paper detects agent credential leaks before any output token is emitted — combining activation probes, calibrated honeytokens, and multi-turn leakage accounting.</description><pubDate>Thu, 04 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>DEFENSE</category></item><item><title>AGENTS.md injection: a poisoned dependency can silently rewrite your coding agent&apos;s orders</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/agents-md-supply-chain-injection.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/agents-md-supply-chain-injection.md</guid><description>An April 20, 2026 NVIDIA AI Red Team report shows a malicious dependency can drop a crafted AGENTS.md at build time, override the developer&apos;s prompt, and instruct OpenAI Codex to hide the change from the pull request.</description><pubDate>Thu, 04 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>SUPPLY CHAIN</category></item><item><title>AgentShield: catching compromised agents with honeytokens and decoy tools</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/agentshield-honeytoken-agent-deception.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/agentshield-honeytoken-agent-deception.md</guid><description>A May 2026 paper turns deception engineering on tool-using LLM agents: fake tools, fake credentials, and parameter allowlists that a hijacked agent trips over. It reports 90.7–100% detection of successful attacks with zero false alarms.</description><pubDate>Thu, 04 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>DEFENSE</category></item><item><title>AIRQ scores 100 production AI agents: 98% carry the lethal trifecta</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/airq-agent-risk-quadrant.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/airq-agent-risk-quadrant.md</guid><description>Adversa AI&apos;s June 2026 AI Risk Quadrant rates 100 commercial agents on attack surface, blast radius and defenses. Only 11% are well-defended; tool execution alone explains 76% of blast radius.</description><pubDate>Thu, 04 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>AGENTS</category></item><item><title>Self-propagating agent worms and the temporal re-entry defense</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/autonomous-agent-worms-temporal-reentry-defense.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/autonomous-agent-worms-temporal-reentry-defense.md</guid><description>A May 2026 paper formalizes how persistent agent state lets a prompt-injection payload write itself back into the LLM context, propagate across agents zero-click, and proposes RTW-A — a defense proven under a No Persistent Worm Propagation theorem.</description><pubDate>Thu, 04 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>AGENTS</category></item><item><title>Hybrid BM25 + vector retrieval cut gradient-guided RAG poisoning from 38% to 0%</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/hybrid-retrieval-rag-poisoning-defense.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/hybrid-retrieval-rag-poisoning-defense.md</guid><description>A March 10, 2026 arXiv preprint shows that adding sparse BM25 alongside dense retrieval blocks an entire class of gradient-optimized RAG corpus poisoning — without touching the LLM.</description><pubDate>Thu, 04 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>DEFENSE</category></item><item><title>AI threat actors mapped to MITRE ATT&amp;CK: the ARiES score and what it breaks</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/llm-attack-navigator-aries-score.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/llm-attack-navigator-aries-score.md</guid><description>Anthropic&apos;s June 3, 2026 report maps a year of AI-enabled cyberattacks to MITRE ATT&amp;CK. The finding for defenders: sophistication, technique count and interface no longer predict an actor&apos;s risk — orchestration does.</description><pubDate>Thu, 04 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>OFFENSIVE AI</category></item><item><title>Tool poisoning across 7 MCP clients: a comparative security posture</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/mcp-client-tool-poisoning-comparison.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/mcp-client-tool-poisoning-comparison.md</guid><description>A March 2026 empirical study tests four tool-poisoning attacks against Claude Desktop, Claude Code, Cursor, Cline, Continue, Gemini CLI and Langflow — and finds most protection comes from the model, not the client.</description><pubDate>Thu, 04 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>AGENTS</category></item><item><title>OWASP Agent Memory Guard: a runtime layer against agent memory poisoning</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/owasp-agent-memory-guard.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/owasp-agent-memory-guard.md</guid><description>Covered by Help Net Security on June 1, 2026, OWASP&apos;s Agent Memory Guard is the first reference implementation for ASI06 — a drop-in layer that screens every agent memory read and write against a YAML policy.</description><pubDate>Thu, 04 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>DEFENSE</category></item><item><title>PISmith: adaptive RL red-teaming keeps breaking injection defenses</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/pismith-adaptive-rl-injection-redteam.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/pismith-adaptive-rl-injection-redteam.md</guid><description>A March 2026 paper trains an attacker model with reinforcement learning to stress-test prompt-injection defenses in a black-box setting — and 8 state-of-the-art defenses still fall, including on AgentDojo and InjecAgent.</description><pubDate>Thu, 04 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>DEFENSE</category></item><item><title>SGLang&apos;s ZMQ broker: unauthenticated RCE via pickle deserialization</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/sglang-pickle-zmq-rce.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/sglang-pickle-zmq-rce.md</guid><description>Three CVEs disclosed March 12, 2026 turn SGLang&apos;s pickle.loads() calls into unauthenticated remote code execution. The fix landed in v0.5.10 — but the real lesson is that pickle on a network socket is RCE by design.</description><pubDate>Thu, 04 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>INFRASTRUCTURE</category></item><item><title>Social contagion: LLM agents leak private data in multi-agent settings</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/social-contagion-agent-privacy-leakage.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/social-contagion-agent-privacy-leakage.md</guid><description>A May 2026 study simulating thousands of LLM agents finds privacy leakage is socially contagious: agents leak ~8x more after a peer does, and explicit privacy instructions reduce but don&apos;t eliminate it.</description><pubDate>Thu, 04 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>DATA LEAK</category></item><item><title>Description poisoning: the agent channel your benchmarks don&apos;t test</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/tool-description-poisoning-untested-surface.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/tool-description-poisoning-untested-surface.md</guid><description>A May 2026 AWS Bedrock AgentCore demo and a June 2026 arXiv paper converge on the same blind spot: tool descriptions, read before every call, are an injection channel that infra controls and single-number benchmarks both miss.</description><pubDate>Thu, 04 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>INDIRECT INJECTION</category></item><item><title>Agent Threat Rules: a &quot;Sigma for AI agents&quot; — and what its recall numbers admit</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/agent-threat-rules-detection-standard.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/agent-threat-rules-detection-standard.md</guid><description>ATR ships open YAML detection rules for agent attacks, now running at Microsoft, Cisco and Gen Digital. Its own benchmarks show why regex detection is a layer, not a perimeter.</description><pubDate>Wed, 03 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>DEFENSE</category></item><item><title>ASPI: asking the user to clarify widens the injection surface</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/aspi-clarification-prompt-injection.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/aspi-clarification-prompt-injection.md</guid><description>A May 17, 2026 arXiv benchmark shows that when an agent pauses to ask the user for clarification, prompt-injection success climbs from under 2% to over 34% on o3 and Gemini-3-Flash.</description><pubDate>Wed, 03 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>PROMPT INJECTION</category></item><item><title>Authorization propagation: the agent security gap prompt-injection fixes won&apos;t close</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/authorization-propagation-multi-agent-identity.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/authorization-propagation-multi-agent-identity.md</guid><description>A May 6, 2026 paper by Krti Tallam argues multi-agent systems have a distinct authorization-propagation problem — transitive delegation, aggregation inference, temporal validity — that survives even a perfect prompt-injection defense.</description><pubDate>Wed, 03 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>AGENTS</category></item><item><title>CAESAR: coordinated LLM agents beat the single-model reasoning ceiling</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/caesar-coordinated-multi-agent-intrusions.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/caesar-coordinated-multi-agent-intrusions.md</guid><description>A May 9, 2026 arXiv paper shows that splitting an LLM attacker into five typed roles outperforms a single agent on 25 CTF tasks across four models — the gain comes from coordination structure, not raw capability.</description><pubDate>Wed, 03 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>OFFENSIVE AI</category></item><item><title>ChatInject: forging chat-template role tags to bypass the instruction hierarchy</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/chatinject-chat-template-injection.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/chatinject-chat-template-injection.md</guid><description>An ICLR 2026 paper shows that wrapping an indirect-injection payload in a model&apos;s own chat-template tokens forges a higher-priority role, lifting attack success from 5% to 32% on AgentDojo and to 52% with multi-turn.</description><pubDate>Wed, 03 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>INDIRECT INJECTION</category></item><item><title>ClawTrojan: stored prompt injection becomes a persistent agent backdoor</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/clawtrojan-persistent-agent-backdoor.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/clawtrojan-persistent-agent-backdoor.md</guid><description>A May 29, 2026 arXiv paper shows injection hidden in a file can be stored by a local agent and run later — reaching 95.5% attack success where single-turn injection scores near zero.</description><pubDate>Wed, 03 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>AGENTS</category></item><item><title>CyBiasBench: offensive LLM agents keep picking the same attacks</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/cybiasbench-offensive-agent-attack-bias.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/cybiasbench-offensive-agent-attack-bias.md</guid><description>A May 2026 benchmark logged 630 attack sessions and found that LLM agents in offensive cyber scenarios fixate on a narrow set of attack families — regardless of how you prompt them. Bias, not skill, shapes what they try.</description><pubDate>Wed, 03 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>RESEARCH</category></item><item><title>DataShield: when benign fine-tuning quietly erodes a model&apos;s safety</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/datashield-benign-finetuning-safety-degradation.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/datashield-benign-finetuning-safety-degradation.md</guid><description>A May 29, 2026 arXiv paper shows fine-tuning an aligned LLM on harmless data still degrades its safety, and proposes DataShield to flag the samples responsible before training.</description><pubDate>Wed, 03 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>DEFENSE</category></item><item><title>Goal reframing: the one prompt feature that makes LLM agents exploit planted bugs</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/exploitation-surface-goal-reframing.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/exploitation-surface-goal-reframing.md</guid><description>An April 6, 2026 arXiv study ran ~10,000 agent trials across seven models. Most &apos;manipulation&apos; tactics did nothing — only goal reframing, like &apos;you are solving a puzzle&apos;, reliably pushed agents to exploit a planted bug.</description><pubDate>Wed, 03 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>RESEARCH</category></item><item><title>Opus 4.8&apos;s system card puts a number on browser-agent prompt injection: 31.5%</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/opus-4-8-browser-agent-hijack-rate.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/opus-4-8-browser-agent-hijack-rate.md</guid><description>Anthropic&apos;s May 28, 2026 Claude Opus 4.8 system card reports a 31.5% pre-safeguard hijack rate for its browser agent — the only concrete prompt-injection metric a frontier lab published this spring.</description><pubDate>Wed, 03 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>AGENTS</category></item><item><title>SnapGuard: catching prompt injection in what the agent sees, not what it parses</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/snapguard-screenshot-web-agent-injection-defense.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/snapguard-screenshot-web-agent-injection-defense.md</guid><description>An April 2026 paper proposes a lightweight detector for screenshot-based web agents, where text-centric guards are blind. It reads the rendered pixels — gradient stability plus polarity-reversed text — at 1.81s per page.</description><pubDate>Wed, 03 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>DEFENSE</category></item><item><title>US AI security executive order: a vulnerability clearinghouse and frontier review</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/us-eo-ai-cyber-clearinghouse-2026.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/us-eo-ai-cyber-clearinghouse-2026.md</guid><description>Signed June 2, 2026, the US executive order on AI innovation and security creates a federal AI vulnerability clearinghouse and a voluntary 30-day pre-release review of &apos;covered frontier models&apos;.</description><pubDate>Wed, 03 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>GOVERNANCE</category></item><item><title>CVE-2026-30615: prompt injection rewrites Windsurf&apos;s MCP config into RCE</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/windsurf-prompt-injection-mcp-rce.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/windsurf-prompt-injection-mcp-rce.md</guid><description>OX Security&apos;s April 15, 2026 advisory shows how attacker-controlled content can make the Windsurf IDE register a malicious MCP STDIO server and run commands — with no user click. The class spans coding agents, but Windsurf got the CVE.</description><pubDate>Wed, 03 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>AGENTS</category></item><item><title>Brittle agents: indirect injection survives multi-step tool calls</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/brittle-agents-indirect-injection.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/brittle-agents-indirect-injection.md</guid><description>An April 4, 2026 paper tests 6 defenses against 4 indirect-injection vectors across 9 LLM backbones in multi-step agents — advanced injections bypass nearly all of them, and some surface mitigations backfire.</description><pubDate>Tue, 02 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>AGENTS</category></item><item><title>IPI Arena: a 272k-attack competition finds no agent model immune</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/ipi-arena-no-model-immune.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/ipi-arena-no-model-immune.md</guid><description>Gray Swan&apos;s Indirect Prompt Injection Arena, judged with UK AISI and US CAISI, ran 272,000+ attacks against 13 frontier models. Every model was hijacked — and a single universal template broke nine of them.</description><pubDate>Tue, 02 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>INDIRECT INJECTION</category></item><item><title>Langroid SQLChatAgent: prompt-to-SQL injection escalates to RCE (CVE-2026-25879)</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/langroid-sqlchatagent-prompt-to-sql-rce.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/langroid-sqlchatagent-prompt-to-sql-rce.md</guid><description>Disclosed June 1, 2026, CVE-2026-25879 (CVSS 9.8) lets a prompt-injected SQL agent run dialect-specific primitives like COPY FROM PROGRAM, turning a chat box into code execution on the database host.</description><pubDate>Tue, 02 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>AGENTS</category></item><item><title>LASM: a 7-layer map of where agent attacks outrun their defenses</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/lasm-layered-attack-surface-agents.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/lasm-layered-attack-surface-agents.md</guid><description>A 58-page survey revised May 6, 2026 re-organizes agentic AI security by stack layer and timescale across 116 papers. The map shows where attacks are documented but defenses and benchmarks simply do not exist yet.</description><pubDate>Tue, 02 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>RESEARCH</category></item><item><title>LightLLM CVE-2026-26220: pickle on a WebSocket the server forces onto the network</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/lightllm-pickle-deserialization-rce.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/lightllm-pickle-deserialization-rce.md</guid><description>CVE-2026-26220 (disclosed Feb 15, 2026) puts pickle.loads() on two unauthenticated WebSocket endpoints in LightLLM&apos;s prefill-decode mode — and the server refuses to bind to localhost, so the surface is always remote.</description><pubDate>Tue, 02 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>INFRASTRUCTURE</category></item><item><title>MCP sampling: how malicious servers abuse the reverse LLM channel</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/mcp-sampling-bidirectional-trust.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/mcp-sampling-bidirectional-trust.md</guid><description>MCP&apos;s sampling feature lets a server ask the client&apos;s model for completions. Unit 42 showed (Dec 2025) how a malicious server turns that reverse channel into covert tool calls, conversation hijacking, and compute theft.</description><pubDate>Tue, 02 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>AGENTS</category></item><item><title>Just ask the bot: Meta&apos;s AI support assistant and the Instagram takeovers</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/meta-ai-support-bot-instagram-takeover.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/meta-ai-support-bot-instagram-takeover.md</guid><description>Over the May 30–31, 2026 weekend, attackers hijacked high-profile Instagram accounts by asking Meta&apos;s AI support bot to relink an account email. No prompt injection required — only excessive agency.</description><pubDate>Tue, 02 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>AGENTS</category></item><item><title>Dynamic separators: hardening Polymorphic Prompt Assembling against injection</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/polymorphic-prompt-dynamic-separators.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/polymorphic-prompt-dynamic-separators.md</guid><description>A May 28, 2026 arXiv paper fixes a blast-radius flaw in Polymorphic Prompt Assembling by generating a unique SHA-256 separator per request, cutting one payload&apos;s attack success rate from 0.88 to 0.38.</description><pubDate>Tue, 02 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>DEFENSE</category></item><item><title>Stop fixating on the prompt: hijacking an agent&apos;s reasoning and memory</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/reasoning-hijacking-agent-attack-surface.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/reasoning-hijacking-agent-attack-surface.md</guid><description>An April 2026 paper, JailAgent, drives an agent to malicious tool calls without touching the user prompt — by perturbing its reasoning trace and memory retrieval instead. The prompt was never the whole attack surface.</description><pubDate>Tue, 02 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>AGENTS</category></item><item><title>Silent Egress: implicit prompt injection leaks data through URL previews</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/silent-egress-implicit-prompt-injection.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/silent-egress-implicit-prompt-injection.md</guid><description>An eBay study (arXiv, Feb 25, 2026) shows agents that auto-preview URLs can be made to exfiltrate runtime context through tool calls — P(egress)≈0.89, and 95% of leaks leave the visible answer benign.</description><pubDate>Tue, 02 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>INDIRECT INJECTION</category></item><item><title>Stop scoring jailbreak defenses on attack success rate alone</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/sok-jailbreak-robustness-security-cube.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/sok-jailbreak-robustness-security-cube.md</guid><description>A May 2026 IEEE S&amp;P paper argues that attack success rate — the field&apos;s default metric — hides how jailbreak defenses actually behave. Its Security Cube evaluates them across several axes at once.</description><pubDate>Tue, 02 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>DEFENSE</category></item><item><title>Trojan Hippo: dormant agent-memory payloads that exfiltrate your data</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/trojan-hippo-dormant-memory-exfiltration.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/trojan-hippo-dormant-memory-exfiltration.md</guid><description>A May 3, 2026 arXiv paper shows one crafted email can plant a dormant payload in an agent&apos;s long-term memory that wakes only when you later discuss finance or health, then exfiltrates it — up to 100% success.</description><pubDate>Tue, 02 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>DATA LEAK</category></item><item><title>TrustFall: project MCP settings turn the folder-trust click into RCE</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/trustfall-coding-agent-mcp-rce.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/trustfall-coding-agent-mcp-rce.md</guid><description>Adversa AI&apos;s TrustFall (May 7, 2026) shows four agentic coding CLIs auto-start project-defined MCP servers the moment a developer accepts the folder-trust prompt — one keypress on the dev machine, zero clicks in CI.</description><pubDate>Tue, 02 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>AGENTS</category></item><item><title>Agent at the wheel: detecting LLM-driven post-exploitation</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/agent-driven-post-exploitation-marimo.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/agent-driven-post-exploitation-marimo.md</guid><description>On May 10, 2026, Sysdig captured its first intrusion where an LLM agent drove the post-exploitation in real time — CVE-2026-39987 on marimo to a full PostgreSQL dump in under an hour. The forensic tell is the command shape.</description><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>OFFENSIVE AI</category></item><item><title>Agentic red teaming: when one operator runs 674 attacks in three hours</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/agentic-red-teaming-weeks-to-hours.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/agentic-red-teaming-weeks-to-hours.md</guid><description>A May 2026 paper from Dreadnode wraps the AI red-team toolkit in an agent that picks attacks, runs them, and scores results autonomously — compressing weeks into hours. The real story is what that does to your assessment program.</description><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>RED TEAM</category></item><item><title>AgentSecBench: in an LLM agent, data flow is not authority</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/agentsecbench-data-flow-is-not-authority.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/agentsecbench-data-flow-is-not-authority.md</guid><description>Posted May 25, 2026, AgentSecBench formalizes agent security as noninterference and tests six defense classes. The finding: prompt text only describes a boundary, while provenance, capability limits, and output validation enforce one.</description><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>RESEARCH</category></item><item><title>AI-authored zero-days: how GTIG fingerprinted the first AI-built exploit</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/ai-authored-zero-day-fingerprints.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/ai-authored-zero-day-fingerprints.md</guid><description>On May 11, 2026, Google&apos;s GTIG disclosed the first zero-day it believes was AI-built — a 2FA-bypass script betrayed by a hallucinated CVSS score and textbook docstrings. Here&apos;s how to read the tells.</description><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>OFFENSIVE AI</category></item><item><title>Causal attribution: an emerging defense against indirect prompt injection</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/causal-attribution-indirect-injection-defense.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/causal-attribution-indirect-injection-defense.md</guid><description>A cluster of early-2026 papers — CausalArmor and AttriGuard — defends tool-calling agents by asking which actions are causally driven by untrusted content rather than by the user. A look at the causal-attribution line of defense.</description><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>DEFENSE</category></item><item><title>CrewAI: a silent sandbox fallback turns prompt injection into RCE (VU#221883)</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/crewai-code-interpreter-sandbox-escape.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/crewai-code-interpreter-sandbox-escape.md</guid><description>Four CrewAI flaws let prompt injection chain into RCE, SSRF and file read via a Code Interpreter that silently drops out of Docker. CERT/CC&apos;s May 20, 2026 update confirms the full fix.</description><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>AGENTS</category></item><item><title>Flowise CVE-2026-40933: importing a shared chatflow is enough for RCE</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/flowise-custom-mcp-import-rce.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/flowise-custom-mcp-import-rce.md</guid><description>Obsidian Security&apos;s May 28, 2026 write-up shows how Flowise&apos;s Custom MCP node turns a stdio MCP config into server-side code execution — and how merely importing a shared chatflow can trigger it, no save or run required.</description><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>AGENTS</category></item><item><title>LITMUS: when an agent says no but the file is already deleted</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/litmus-behavioral-jailbreak-os-agents.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/litmus-behavioral-jailbreak-os-agents.md</guid><description>A May 11, 2026 benchmark measures behavioral jailbreaks of LLM agents in real OS environments — and finds that even Claude Sonnet 4.6 executes 40.6% of high-risk operations, sometimes while verbally refusing them.</description><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>RESEARCH</category></item><item><title>The guardrail trade-off triangle: prompt-injection defenses for LLM tutors</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/llm-tutor-guardrail-tradeoffs.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/llm-tutor-guardrail-tradeoffs.md</guid><description>A May 2026 benchmark of prompt-injection defenses for educational LLM tutors puts numbers on a hard truth: no single guardrail wins robustness, usability and latency at the same time.</description><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>DEFENSE</category></item><item><title>Prompt theft by timing: prefix-cache side channels in multi-tenant LLMs</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/prefix-cache-timing-prompt-stealing.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/prefix-cache-timing-prompt-stealing.md</guid><description>Shared prefix caching makes LLM APIs faster — and leaks prompts. By timing the first token, an attacker can rebuild another tenant&apos;s prompt. A March 2026 paper defends it without killing performance.</description><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>SIDE CHANNEL</category></item><item><title>Prompt injection in the wild: hidden attacks in LLM resume screening</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/prompt-injection-resume-screening.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/prompt-injection-resume-screening.md</guid><description>A USENIX Security 2026 study of 196,682 real resumes found about 1% carry hidden prompt injections — and over 90% are invisible &apos;data injections&apos;, not the explicit instructions current detectors look for.</description><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>PROMPT INJECTION</category></item><item><title>Jailbreaks leave a trace: detecting attacks in LLM internal activations</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/representation-based-jailbreak-detection.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/representation-based-jailbreak-detection.md</guid><description>A February 2026 paper and a March 2026 follow-up show jailbreak prompts carve a distinguishable signature into a model&apos;s hidden activations — enabling inference-time detection without fine-tuning or an auxiliary judge model.</description><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>DEFENSE</category></item><item><title>Token-drain attacks: economic denial-of-service via agent tool chains</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/tool-chain-token-drain.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/tool-chain-token-drain.md</guid><description>Two 2026 papers show a malicious tool or skill can steer an LLM agent into long tool-calling loops that multiply token cost 6–658× while still returning the right answer — a stealthy take on OWASP&apos;s Unbounded Consumption.</description><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>AGENTS</category></item><item><title>SymJack: one approved file copy becomes RCE in six AI coding agents</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/symjack-symlink-approval-rce-coding-agents.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/symjack-symlink-approval-rce-coding-agents.md</guid><description>Adversa AI disclosed on May 26, 2026 a symlink-hijack pattern that turns a single benign-looking shell copy into a config overwrite and host RCE across Claude Code, Cursor, Gemini, Antigravity, Copilot, Grok Build and Codex CLIs.</description><pubDate>Sat, 30 May 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>AGENTS</category></item><item><title>The agent-human security gap: what production ships, what papers study</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/agent-human-interaction-security-gap.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/agent-human-interaction-security-gap.md</guid><description>A May 23, 2026 UCLA paper audits 59 academic studies, 21 production agent systems and 26 security plugins — and finds that the defenses researchers favor have zero production deployment.</description><pubDate>Fri, 29 May 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>RESEARCH</category></item><item><title>The Autonomy Tax: how defense training breaks LLM agents</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/autonomy-tax-defense-training-breaks-agents.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/autonomy-tax-defense-training-breaks-agents.md</guid><description>A March 19, 2026 USC paper measures the cost of prompt-injection-defense training on agent competence — defended models time out on 99% of tasks, vs 13% for undefended baselines.</description><pubDate>Fri, 29 May 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>RESEARCH</category></item><item><title>Blindfold: action-level jailbreaks bypass semantic defenses on embodied LLMs</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/blindfold-embodied-llm-action-jailbreak.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/blindfold-embodied-llm-action-jailbreak.md</guid><description>A SenSys &apos;26 paper (May 11–14, 2026) introduces Blindfold, an automated framework that jailbreaks embodied LLMs by decomposing harmful goals into individually benign actions — up to 53% higher attack success than semantic-level baselines on a real 6DoF robotic arm.</description><pubDate>Fri, 29 May 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>AGENTS</category></item><item><title>Proprietary Problems: Cisco&apos;s 15-model paired-regime study shows single-turn safety scores miss most multi-turn risk</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/cisco-proprietary-problems-multi-turn-frontier-eval.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/cisco-proprietary-problems-multi-turn-frontier-eval.md</guid><description>A May 27, 2026 Cisco study of 15 flagship closed models from OpenAI, Anthropic, Google, Amazon and xAI records multi-turn attack success rates of 7.89% to 88.30% — and cross-regime gaps up to 55 percentage points over single-turn baselines.</description><pubDate>Fri, 29 May 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>RESEARCH</category></item><item><title>Measuring LLM exploit capability: ExploitBench, ExploitGym and the SCONE-bench refresh</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/exploit-evals-capability-ladder.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/exploit-evals-capability-ladder.md</guid><description>On May 22, 2026 Anthropic published Mythos Preview results on three new exploitation benchmarks. The numbers — and the way the benchmarks decompose the exploit chain — change how defenders should think about frontier offensive capability.</description><pubDate>Fri, 29 May 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>RESEARCH</category></item><item><title>MCP needs a trust handshake: attested tool-server admission</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/mcp-attested-tool-server-admission.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/mcp-attested-tool-server-admission.md</guid><description>A May 22, 2026 arXiv paper proposes mcp-attested — a backward-compatible MCP extension that gates tool dispatch on signed clearance, deny-by-default allowlists, and tamper-evident audit logs.</description><pubDate>Fri, 29 May 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>DEFENSE</category></item><item><title>MCPwn (CVE-2026-33032): nginx-ui MCP endpoint hands over the web server</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/mcpwn-nginx-ui-cve-2026-33032.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/mcpwn-nginx-ui-cve-2026-33032.md</guid><description>An unauthenticated MCP endpoint in nginx-ui ≤ 2.3.3 lets any network attacker rewrite nginx configs and restart the service. CVSS 9.8, publicly disclosed on April 15, 2026, exploited in the wild within hours of the patch.</description><pubDate>Fri, 29 May 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>INFRASTRUCTURE</category></item><item><title>MemMorph: hijacking tool selection in LLM agents through fluent memory poisoning</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/memmorph-tool-hijacking-via-memory-poisoning.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/memmorph-tool-hijacking-via-memory-poisoning.md</guid><description>A May 24, 2026 arXiv paper from NTU Singapore shows three plausible-looking memory entries can steer an agent toward an attacker-chosen tool with 85.9% success — and survive three off-the-shelf defenses.</description><pubDate>Fri, 29 May 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>AGENTS</category></item><item><title>One million exposed AI services: what the Intruder scan actually found</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/one-million-exposed-ai-services-intruder-scan.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/one-million-exposed-ai-services-intruder-scan.md</guid><description>On May 5, 2026, Intruder published the results of an internet-wide scan that mapped 1 million exposed AI services across 2 million hosts. The recurring failure is not exotic — it is permissive defaults.</description><pubDate>Fri, 29 May 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>DEFENSE</category></item><item><title>SilentRetrieval: fluent RAG corpus poisoning that slips past perplexity filters</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/silentretrieval-rag-corpus-poisoning.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/silentretrieval-rag-corpus-poisoning.md</guid><description>A May 27, 2026 arXiv preprint introduces a two-stage attack that hides goal-hijacking triggers inside fluent documents, reaching 57% LLM-attack success on Natural Questions and MS MARCO with one poisoned record per query.</description><pubDate>Fri, 29 May 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>ADVERSARIAL</category></item><item><title>Slopsquatting in 2026: 127 package names that all five frontier LLMs hallucinate</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/slopsquatting-frontier-models-2026.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/slopsquatting-frontier-models-2026.md</guid><description>A May 16, 2026 arXiv replication of the USENIX Security &apos;25 slopsquatting study finds hallucination rates are down across frontier models — but identifies 127 phantom packages that every tested model invents identically, a model-agnostic supply-chain attack surface.</description><pubDate>Fri, 29 May 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>SUPPLY CHAIN</category></item><item><title>WARD: a co-evolved guard model that holds up against adaptive prompt injection on web agents</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/ward-web-agent-guard-prompt-injection.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/ward-web-agent-guard-prompt-injection.md</guid><description>A May 14, 2026 NUS paper proposes WARD — a guard model trained against a memory-driven adversarial attacker — and reports near-perfect out-of-distribution recall on web-agent prompt injection.</description><pubDate>Fri, 29 May 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>DEFENSE</category></item><item><title>The agent harness is your real privilege boundary — and most teams draw it in the wrong place</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/agent-harness-privilege-boundary.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/agent-harness-privilege-boundary.md</guid><description>A May 26, 2026 Pillar Security write-up argues the harness — Claude Code, Cursor, Codex — holds the secrets, tools and hooks an agent never sees. Recent harness bugs and CVE-2026-22708 make the case concrete.</description><pubDate>Thu, 28 May 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>AGENTS</category></item><item><title>CISA + Five Eyes publish the first joint guidance on agentic-AI adoption</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/cisa-five-eyes-careful-adoption-agentic-ai.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/cisa-five-eyes-careful-adoption-agentic-ai.md</guid><description>On May 1, 2026, CISA, NSA and the Five Eyes cyber agencies released &apos;Careful Adoption of Agentic AI Services&apos; — a 5-risk taxonomy and a deployment playbook that critical-infrastructure operators are now expected to fold into their existing cybersecurity frameworks.</description><pubDate>Thu, 28 May 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>GOVERNANCE</category></item><item><title>Microsoft Copilot Cowork: poisoned skills exfiltrate M365 files with no approval</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/copilot-cowork-skill-exfiltration.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/copilot-cowork-skill-exfiltration.md</guid><description>PromptArmor&apos;s May 26, 2026 disclosure shows that a five-line prompt injection inside a Copilot Cowork skill file can leak SharePoint and OneDrive documents through auto-approved Teams messages — no patch closes the design.</description><pubDate>Thu, 28 May 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>AGENTS</category></item><item><title>CrossMPI: image-only prompt injection steers what VLMs read and see</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/crossmpi-image-only-prompt-injection.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/crossmpi-image-only-prompt-injection.md</guid><description>A May 15, 2026 Xidian University arXiv paper introduces CrossMPI: imperceptible image perturbations that change how vision-language models interpret both the image and the user&apos;s text prompt, with 66% average success across five LVLMs.</description><pubDate>Thu, 28 May 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>MULTIMODAL</category></item><item><title>GrafanaGhost: indirect prompt injection chained with a URL-parse bug to exfiltrate dashboard data</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/grafanaghost-indirect-prompt-injection-exfiltration.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/grafanaghost-indirect-prompt-injection-exfiltration.md</guid><description>Noma Security&apos;s April 7, 2026 disclosure shows how three modest defects — a stored injection point, a startsWith(&apos;/&apos;) URL check, and a one-word guardrail bypass — combine into a silent exfiltration path through Grafana&apos;s AI assistant.</description><pubDate>Thu, 28 May 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>INDIRECT INJECTION</category></item><item><title>IterInject: when an LLM optimiser writes its own indirect prompt injections</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/iterinject-feedback-guided-indirect-injection.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/iterinject-feedback-guided-indirect-injection.md</guid><description>A May 23, 2026 paper closes the loop between payload, diagnoser and LLM optimiser — lifting indirect-injection ASR from near-zero to 33–90% on InjecAgent and compromising 5 of 9 Claude Code targets.</description><pubDate>Thu, 28 May 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>INDIRECT INJECTION</category></item><item><title>NSA AISC publishes MCP security design guidance for production AI</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/nsa-aisc-mcp-security-design-considerations.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/nsa-aisc-mcp-security-design-considerations.md</guid><description>On May 20, 2026, NSA&apos;s Artificial Intelligence Security Center released a 15-page Cybersecurity Information Sheet on Model Context Protocol — eight classes of weakness, five real-world incidents, nine defensive recommendations.</description><pubDate>Thu, 28 May 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>GOVERNANCE</category></item><item><title>pgAdmin 4 ships an LLM panel and a classic LFI+SSRF arrives with it (CVE-2026-7817)</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/pgadmin-4-llm-api-cve-2026-7817.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/pgadmin-4-llm-api-cve-2026-7817.md</guid><description>pgAdmin 4 9.15 patches an authenticated LFI and SSRF in its new LLM API configuration endpoints. The bug class is decades old; the surface is brand new.</description><pubDate>Thu, 28 May 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>SUPPLY CHAIN</category></item><item><title>Poisoning the Watchtower: when SOC copilots read attacker-controlled logs</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/poisoning-watchtower-soc-log-injection.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/poisoning-watchtower-soc-log-injection.md</guid><description>A May 23, 2026 paper formalises log-substrate prompt injection — adversarial content in log fields steering LLM-based SOC assistants. Best defense leaves 11.8% average injection success.</description><pubDate>Thu, 28 May 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>RESEARCH</category></item><item><title>Sockpuppeting: a one-line prefill that jailbreaks 11 production LLMs</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/sockpuppeting-assistant-prefill-jailbreak.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/sockpuppeting-assistant-prefill-jailbreak.md</guid><description>A line of code injected as the last assistant message coaxes 7 of 10 major models into harmful completions. The fix is not at the model — it is API-side message-order validation.</description><pubDate>Thu, 28 May 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>JAILBREAK</category></item><item><title>Temporal memory contamination: longitudinal safety drift in memory-equipped LLM agents</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/temporal-memory-contamination.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/temporal-memory-contamination.md</guid><description>Three arXiv papers from April and May 2026 converge on a failure mode complementary to memory poisoning — memory-equipped agents drift unsafe as benign context accumulates, with compressed summaries acting as a laundering channel.</description><pubDate>Thu, 28 May 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>AGENTS</category></item><item><title>The pressure: open-source security teams under the AI-assisted vulnerability flood</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/the-pressure-open-source-ai-vuln-flood.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/the-pressure-open-source-ai-vuln-flood.md</guid><description>On May 26, 2026, curl&apos;s Daniel Stenberg published &apos;The pressure&apos; — more than one credible security report per day, twelve confirmed CVEs in half a release cycle, and a pattern other maintainers are now reporting in parallel.</description><pubDate>Thu, 28 May 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>GOVERNANCE</category></item><item><title>Networks of agents break in new ways: Microsoft&apos;s red-team, plus RAMPART and Clarity</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/agent-networks-emergent-attacks-rampart.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/agent-networks-emergent-attacks-rampart.md</guid><description>Microsoft Research red-teamed an internal platform of 100+ always-on agents. Four attack patterns — propagation, amplification, trust capture, proxy chains — show up only at the network level. RAMPART and Clarity, open-sourced May 20, 2026, are the response.</description><pubDate>Wed, 27 May 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>AGENTS</category></item><item><title>Antigravity find_by_name: when a native tool call jumps over Secure Mode</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/antigravity-find-by-name-tool-injection.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/antigravity-find-by-name-tool-injection.md</guid><description>On April 20, 2026, Pillar Security disclosed that a single unsanitised parameter in Google Antigravity&apos;s find_by_name tool turned file search into arbitrary code execution — and bypassed the IDE&apos;s strictest sandbox.</description><pubDate>Wed, 27 May 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>AGENTS</category></item><item><title>Apple&apos;s May 2026 bulletin formally credits Claude on two macOS CVEs</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/apple-may-2026-claude-credited-cves.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/apple-may-2026-claude-credited-cves.md</guid><description>On May 11, 2026, Apple&apos;s macOS Tahoe 26.5 advisory named Claude alongside its researchers on two CVEs — a kernel integer overflow and a WebKit use-after-free. AI-assisted vulnerability research is now in the official changelog.</description><pubDate>Wed, 27 May 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>OFFENSIVE AI</category></item><item><title>BadHost (CVE-2026-48710): one Host-header character bypasses auth in Starlette, vLLM and FastMCP</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/badhost-starlette-fastmcp-cve-2026-48710.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/badhost-starlette-fastmcp-cve-2026-48710.md</guid><description>X41 D-Sec disclosed on May 22, 2026 a critical auth bypass in Starlette &lt; 1.0.1. A single / ? or # in the HTTP Host header desynchronises the routed path from the path the middleware sees, breaking path-based authorization in vLLM, LiteLLM, FastMCP and thousands of FastAPI-based AI agents.</description><pubDate>Wed, 27 May 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>INFRASTRUCTURE</category></item><item><title>Bleeding Llama: a GGUF parsing flaw leaks Ollama process memory to unauthenticated attackers</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/bleeding-llama-ollama-cve-2026-7482.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/bleeding-llama-ollama-cve-2026-7482.md</guid><description>CVE-2026-7482, publicly disclosed in May 2026 and codenamed Bleeding Llama by Cyera, lets a remote attacker pull arbitrary chunks of an Ollama server&apos;s heap — API keys, system prompts, other users&apos; conversations — with three unauthenticated API calls. The silent patch shipped 2.5 months before the CVE was assigned.</description><pubDate>Wed, 27 May 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>DATA LEAK</category></item><item><title>ClaudeBleed: when a browser agent trusts the wrong extension</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/claudebleed-extension-trust-boundary.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/claudebleed-extension-trust-boundary.md</guid><description>LayerX disclosed ClaudeBleed on May 6, 2026: a trust-boundary flaw let any Chrome extension drive Claude in Chrome and exfiltrate Gmail, Drive and GitHub data. The first patch was bypassed within hours.</description><pubDate>Wed, 27 May 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>AGENTS</category></item><item><title>Encoded prompt injection: when guardrails fail because the LLM decodes the payload</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/encoded-prompt-injection-action-layer.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/encoded-prompt-injection-action-layer.md</guid><description>On May 4, 2026 a tweet written in Morse code drained around $175K from a Grok-controlled crypto wallet. The incident is the most expensive demonstration to date of an old defensive blind spot — string-matching guardrails can&apos;t see through encodings that the model itself happily decodes.</description><pubDate>Wed, 27 May 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>PROMPT INJECTION</category></item><item><title>The first CVE wave: AI-assisted discovery is reshaping disclosure volumes</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/first-cve-wave-ai-assisted-disclosure.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/first-cve-wave-ai-assisted-disclosure.md</guid><description>VulnCheck&apos;s May 14, 2026 analysis shows year-to-date CVE issuance up +563% on Chrome, +476% on GitHub, +180% on VMware, +170% on Apache. The systemic shift behind the Apple, Mozilla and ActiveMQ headlines is now visible in the numbers.</description><pubDate>Wed, 27 May 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>OFFENSIVE AI</category></item><item><title>Font-mapping prompt injection: when peer review becomes an LLM attack surface</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/llm-reviewer-font-mapping-injection.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/llm-reviewer-font-mapping-injection.md</guid><description>A May 25, 2026 arXiv benchmark shows hidden font-mapping payloads can flip LLM peer reviews from reject to accept. ICML 2026 already used the same trick in reverse to desk-reject 497 papers.</description><pubDate>Wed, 27 May 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>PROMPT INJECTION</category></item><item><title>MCP STDIO transport: the design choice that became 11 CVEs and 200,000 exposed agents</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/mcp-stdio-transport-by-design-rce.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/mcp-stdio-transport-by-design-rce.md</guid><description>On April 16, 2026, OX Security disclosed that Anthropic&apos;s MCP STDIO transport executes any OS command it is handed. Anthropic called it &apos;by design&apos;. The cascade has produced eleven downstream CVEs in six weeks.</description><pubDate>Wed, 27 May 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>AGENTS</category></item><item><title>MultiBreak: 10,389 multi-turn prompts expose how conversational jailbreaks slip past LLM safety</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/multibreak-multi-turn-jailbreak-benchmark.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/multibreak-multi-turn-jailbreak-benchmark.md</guid><description>A May 3, 2026 ICML paper releases the largest, most diverse multi-turn jailbreak benchmark to date. It records attack-success-rate gaps of up to 54 points over the previous state of the art on DeepSeek-R1-7B and 34.6 on GPT-4.1-mini — and quantifies how alignment that holds in single turns collapses across follow-ups.</description><pubDate>Wed, 27 May 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>RESEARCH</category></item><item><title>When prompts become shells: prompt injection escalates to RCE in agent frameworks</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/prompt-injection-to-rce-agent-frameworks.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/prompt-injection-to-rce-agent-frameworks.md</guid><description>Two CVEs in Microsoft Semantic Kernel and four in CrewAI — all disclosed in early 2026 — turn a single injected prompt into remote code execution on the host. The pattern is structural, not incidental.</description><pubDate>Wed, 27 May 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>AGENTS</category></item><item><title>Teaching Claude Why: how Anthropic drove agentic misalignment to zero</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/teaching-claude-why-alignment-generalization.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/teaching-claude-why-alignment-generalization.md</guid><description>On May 8, 2026, Anthropic&apos;s Alignment Science team published a case study showing that teaching Claude to explain its ethical reasoning — not just demonstrate it — cut agentic misalignment from 96% to under 1%.</description><pubDate>Wed, 27 May 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>RESEARCH</category></item><item><title>Poison once, exploit forever: persistent memory poisoning of LLM agents (OWASP ASI06)</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/agent-memory-poisoning-asi06.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/agent-memory-poisoning-asi06.md</guid><description>An April 2026 arXiv paper on cross-site memory poisoning and a May 13, 2026 OWASP post on the Cisco MemoryTrap finding against Claude Code converge on the same lesson: agent memory is a trust boundary.</description><pubDate>Tue, 26 May 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>AGENTS</category></item><item><title>Treating AI agents like operating systems: a CISPA blueprint for isolation and privilege</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/agents-as-operating-systems.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/agents-as-operating-systems.md</guid><description>A May 14, 2026 CISPA paper applies decades of OS security thinking to LLM agents. Tested on four OpenClaw-like systems, two weakness classes — cross-user exfiltration and unauthorized network egress — fail in every single one.</description><pubDate>Tue, 26 May 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>AGENTS</category></item><item><title>AI-assisted ICS attack: lessons from the Monterrey water utility intrusion</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/ai-assisted-ics-attack-monterrey-water.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/ai-assisted-ics-attack-monterrey-water.md</guid><description>Dragos&apos; May 2026 report on Servicios de Agua y Drenaje de Monterrey documents the first publicly analysed campaign in which a commercial LLM — Claude — was the primary technical operator of an attempted OT intrusion.</description><pubDate>Tue, 26 May 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>OFFENSIVE AI</category></item><item><title>AudioHijack: imperceptible audio hijacks voice agents (IEEE S&amp;P 2026)</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/audiohijack-auditory-prompt-injection.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/audiohijack-auditory-prompt-injection.md</guid><description>An April 16, 2026 IEEE S&amp;P paper introduces auditory prompt injection: adversarial reverb hidden in audio drives 13 large audio-language models and commercial voice agents (Mistral AI, Microsoft Azure) into unauthorized actions with 79-96% success.</description><pubDate>Tue, 26 May 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>MULTIMODAL</category></item><item><title>Discourse AI XSS (CVE-2026-27740): when LLM output is trusted as HTML</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/discourse-ai-llm-xss-cve-2026-27740.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/discourse-ai-llm-xss-cve-2026-27740.md</guid><description>A flagged post, an AI moderator, an htmlSafe call. The Discourse AI plugin treated LLM output as trusted markup, turning indirect prompt injection into Staff-side XSS. Published March 19, 2026.</description><pubDate>Tue, 26 May 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>INDIRECT INJECTION</category></item><item><title>The Lethal Trifecta: when an agent reads private data, untrusted content, and can phone home</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/lethal-trifecta.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/lethal-trifecta.md</guid><description>Simon Willison&apos;s framework for the single architectural mistake that turned 2026&apos;s wave of AI-agent data exfiltration vulnerabilities into a class, not a coincidence.</description><pubDate>Tue, 26 May 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>AGENTS</category></item><item><title>MCP Back-End Vulnerabilities: classic flaws resurface across AI database bridges</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/mcp-backend-vulnerabilities-pattern.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/mcp-backend-vulnerabilities-pattern.md</guid><description>Akamai&apos;s May 12, 2026 research found SQL injection (CVE-2025-66335), missing authentication, and unsanitised inputs across three MCP servers — Apache Doris, Apache Pinot, and Alibaba RDS. The pattern, not the bugs, is the story.</description><pubDate>Tue, 26 May 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>AGENTS</category></item><item><title>OpenAI Daybreak and GPT-5.5-Cyber: a permissive security model behind a verified-identity gate</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/openai-daybreak-gpt-5-5-cyber.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/openai-daybreak-gpt-5-5-cyber.md</guid><description>Between May 7 and 12, 2026, OpenAI launched Daybreak — a cybersecurity platform built on GPT-5.5, Codex Security and a &apos;cyber-permissive&apos; sibling, GPT-5.5-Cyber. UK AISI&apos;s prior evaluation found a universal jailbreak in six hours.</description><pubDate>Tue, 26 May 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>OFFENSIVE AI</category></item><item><title>Project Glasswing: 10,000+ critical bugs found by Claude Mythos in a month</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/project-glasswing-claude-mythos.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/project-glasswing-claude-mythos.md</guid><description>Anthropic&apos;s May 26, 2026 update on Project Glasswing reports that ~50 partners have used Claude Mythos Preview to find more than 10,000 high/critical-severity vulnerabilities, including 271 latent bugs patched in Firefox 150 — and lays out a controlled-access model for a frontier offensive capability.</description><pubDate>Tue, 26 May 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>DEFENSE</category></item><item><title>Semantic Kernel: when a prompt becomes a shell (CVE-2026-25592, CVE-2026-26030)</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/semantic-kernel-prompt-to-rce.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/semantic-kernel-prompt-to-rce.md</guid><description>Microsoft disclosed two critical vulnerabilities in Semantic Kernel on May 7, 2026 that turn a single injected prompt into host-level code execution. The root cause is architectural: tool registries and eval() treated as features, not security boundaries.</description><pubDate>Tue, 26 May 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>AGENTS</category></item><item><title>Hidden triggers in SKILL.md: semantic supply-chain attacks on agent skill registries</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/skill-md-registry-supply-chain.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/skill-md-registry-supply-chain.md</guid><description>A May 12, 2026 University of Maryland paper shows that 20-token additions to a SKILL.md file can make an agent discover and select an adversarial skill in 77–86% of trials, and bypass registry-side scans up to 100% of the time.</description><pubDate>Tue, 26 May 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>SUPPLY CHAIN</category></item><item><title>Trust No Tool: cognitive poisoning of LLM agents through tool feedback</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/trust-no-tool-cognitive-poisoning.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/trust-no-tool-cognitive-poisoning.md</guid><description>A May 17, 2026 arXiv paper introduces &apos;cognitive poisoning&apos; — a malicious tool that wins the agent&apos;s trust over many benign-looking turns and only weaponises the final action. The defence target shifts from prompts to trajectory.</description><pubDate>Tue, 26 May 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>AGENTS</category></item><item><title>Usability as a Weapon: how feature requests turn coding LLMs insecure</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/usability-as-a-weapon-coding-llm.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/usability-as-a-weapon-coding-llm.md</guid><description>A May 11, 2026 arXiv paper shows that asking a coding LLM for a faster, simpler or feature-richer version of secure code reliably drops the security constraints. UPAttack reaches 98.1% on GPT-5.2-chat and Gemini-3.</description><pubDate>Tue, 26 May 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>ADVERSARIAL</category></item><item><title>Agents Rule of Two: Meta&apos;s pragmatic answer to unsolved prompt injection</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/agents-rule-of-two.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/agents-rule-of-two.md</guid><description>Published Oct 31, 2025 by Meta and re-adopted in Databricks&apos; May 2026 guide, the Agents Rule of Two limits any agent session to two of three risky properties — the most actionable framework while prompt injection remains unsolved.</description><pubDate>Mon, 25 May 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>DEFENSE</category></item><item><title>CVE-2026-35435: Azure AI Foundry&apos;s M365 published agents trusted callers they shouldn&apos;t have</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/azure-ai-foundry-m365-agents-eop.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/azure-ai-foundry-m365-agents-eop.md</guid><description>Disclosed May 7, 2026 (CVSS 8.6), an improper access-control flaw in Azure AI Foundry let unauthorized attackers elevate privilege through M365 published agents. Microsoft reports active exploitation; mitigations are available before a patch.</description><pubDate>Mon, 25 May 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>AGENTS</category></item><item><title>Azure SRE Agent: a multi-tenant token check that let strangers watch your incidents (CVE-2026-32173)</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/azure-sre-agent-multitenant-eavesdrop.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/azure-sre-agent-multitenant-eavesdrop.md</guid><description>Disclosed April 20, 2026, an Entra ID app-registration misconfiguration on Azure SRE Agent&apos;s /agentHub WebSocket let any tenant connect, listen to every prompt, reasoning step, CLI command and credential — silently.</description><pubDate>Mon, 25 May 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>AGENTS</category></item><item><title>Claw Chain: four OpenClaw CVEs that turn an AI agent into the attacker&apos;s hands</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/claw-chain-openclaw-agent-takeover.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/claw-chain-openclaw-agent-takeover.md</guid><description>Disclosed May 15, 2026, Cyera Research&apos;s Claw Chain chains four patched OpenClaw flaws — sandbox escape, env-var disclosure, MCP loopback EoP, symlink read escape — into full host takeover via the agent itself.</description><pubDate>Mon, 25 May 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>AGENTS</category></item><item><title>Comment and Control: one prompt injection pattern, three vendors leaking GitHub Actions secrets</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/comment-and-control-github-agents.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/comment-and-control-github-agents.md</guid><description>Disclosed April 15, 2026, Comment and Control turns ordinary PR titles, issue bodies and HTML comments into credential-exfiltration channels in Claude Code, Gemini CLI and GitHub Copilot Agent.</description><pubDate>Mon, 25 May 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>AGENTS</category></item><item><title>Contextual integrity: why prompt-injection defenses keep failing</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/contextual-integrity-prompt-injection.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/contextual-integrity-prompt-injection.md</guid><description>A May 2026 paper by Abdelnabi and Bagdasarian recasts prompt injection through Contextual Integrity and shows that data-instruction separation is a category mistake.</description><pubDate>Mon, 25 May 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>RESEARCH</category></item><item><title>Copirate 365: chaining prompt injection, delayed tool invocation and memory hijack in M365 Copilot (CVE-2026-24299)</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/copirate-365-copilot-chain.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/copirate-365-copilot-chain.md</guid><description>Johann Rehberger&apos;s DEF CON writeup, published May 2026, walks through a five-stage indirect prompt-injection chain that turns one booby-trapped email into a persistent backdoor inside Microsoft 365 Copilot. Patched, but the patterns are generic.</description><pubDate>Mon, 25 May 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>PROMPT INJECTION</category></item><item><title>Indirect prompt injection in the wild: three April 2026 studies converge</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/indirect-prompt-injection-in-the-wild.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/indirect-prompt-injection-in-the-wild.md</guid><description>Google, Forcepoint and CISPA independently measured indirect prompt injection across the open web in April 2026. The picture: 15K+ validated payloads, 32% growth, organized templates.</description><pubDate>Mon, 25 May 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>INDIRECT INJECTION</category></item><item><title>LiteLLM CVE-2026-42208: a pre-auth SQL injection in the AI gateway</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/litellm-pre-auth-sqli.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/litellm-pre-auth-sqli.md</guid><description>Disclosed April 20, 2026 and exploited 36 hours after the global advisory dropped, CVE-2026-42208 turns LiteLLM&apos;s Authorization header into a direct read on every provider key the proxy fronts.</description><pubDate>Mon, 25 May 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>INFRASTRUCTURE</category></item><item><title>When the attacker is another LLM: large reasoning models as autonomous jailbreakers</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/lrm-autonomous-jailbreak-agents.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/lrm-autonomous-jailbreak-agents.md</guid><description>A Nature Communications paper formalised in May 2026 shows four reasoning models — DeepSeek-R1, Gemini 2.5 Flash, Grok 3 Mini and Qwen3 235B — jailbreaking nine target LLMs with a 97.14% overall success rate, armed with nothing but a single system prompt.</description><pubDate>Mon, 25 May 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>RESEARCH</category></item><item><title>Mathematical encoding jailbreaks: when set theory bypasses LLM safety</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/mathematical-encoding-jailbreaks.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/mathematical-encoding-jailbreaks.md</guid><description>An arXiv paper posted on May 5, 2026 shows that re-expressing a harmful prompt as a set-theory or formal-logic problem bypasses safety training on 46–56% of attempts across eight frontier models — but only when a helper LLM does the reformulation, not when mathematical syntax is bolted on top.</description><pubDate>Mon, 25 May 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>JAILBREAK</category></item><item><title>PraisonAI CVE-2026-44338: an unauthenticated agent server, exploited in 3h44</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/praisonai-auth-bypass.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/praisonai-auth-bypass.md</guid><description>Disclosed May 11, 2026, CVE-2026-44338 ships PraisonAI with authentication hard-disabled in its legacy API server. A CVE-Detector scanner hit the endpoint less than four hours later.</description><pubDate>Mon, 25 May 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>AGENTS</category></item><item><title>ShareLeak (CVE-2026-21520): the first CVE Microsoft assigned to a Copilot prompt injection</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/shareleak-copilot-studio-cve-2026-21520.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/shareleak-copilot-studio-cve-2026-21520.md</guid><description>Disclosed April 15, 2026, Capsule Security&apos;s ShareLeak write-up details an indirect prompt injection in Microsoft Copilot Studio. Microsoft assigned CVE-2026-21520 (CVSS 7.5) — an unusual industry first that reframes prompt injection as a tracked vulnerability class.</description><pubDate>Mon, 25 May 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>INDIRECT INJECTION</category></item><item><title>ARGUS: a provenance-graph defense for context-aware prompt injection</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/argus-provenance-graph-defense.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/argus-provenance-graph-defense.md</guid><description>Published May 5, 2026, the ARGUS paper introduces influence-provenance auditing for LLM agents — dropping attack success from 28.8% to 3.8% on a new context-aware injection benchmark.</description><pubDate>Fri, 22 May 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>DEFENSE</category></item><item><title>The Instruction Hierarchy: training LLMs to rank privileged instructions</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/instruction-hierarchy.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/instruction-hierarchy.md</guid><description>OpenAI&apos;s 2024 paper proposes a structural defense against prompt injection: teach models that system &gt; user &gt; tool output. The idea is now central to GPT-4o-mini and o-series safety training.</description><pubDate>Fri, 22 May 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>DEFENSE</category></item><item><title>LMDeploy SSRF: when an image loader turns into an AI-infrastructure hijack</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/lmdeploy-ssrf-ai-inference-hijack.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/lmdeploy-ssrf-ai-inference-hijack.md</guid><description>CVE-2026-33626 turned LMDeploy&apos;s load_image() into a generic SSRF primitive. Honeypots saw the first weaponised exploit 12 hours and 31 minutes after the advisory went live.</description><pubDate>Fri, 22 May 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>INFRASTRUCTURE</category></item><item><title>Localhost agent hijack: cross-origin WebSocket attacks on AI coding agents</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/localhost-agent-hijack.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/localhost-agent-hijack.md</guid><description>CVE-2026-44211 (CVSS 9.7), disclosed May 7, 2026, shows how a single visit to a malicious page can hijack an AI coding agent running on a developer&apos;s laptop. The attack class is generic — and architectural.</description><pubDate>Fri, 22 May 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>AGENTS</category></item><item><title>Mini Shai-Hulud: the supply-chain worm that came for the AI tooling stack</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/mini-shai-hulud-ai-supply-chain.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/mini-shai-hulud-ai-supply-chain.md</guid><description>Disclosed May 11–18, 2026, the Mini Shai-Hulud worm trojanised 170+ npm and PyPI packages — including Mistral AI, Guardrails AI and TanStack — and persists inside Claude Code and VS Code.</description><pubDate>Fri, 22 May 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>SUPPLY CHAIN</category></item><item><title>Output filtering beats model self-defense: 20,000 adaptive attacks, one survivor</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/output-filtering-prompt-injection-defenses.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/output-filtering-prompt-injection-defenses.md</guid><description>Posted April 26 and revised May 12, 2026, a Swept AI / Michigan paper pitted nine prompt-injection defenses against an adaptive attacker. Every model-side defense eventually broke. Application-side output filtering held — zero leaks across 15,000 attacks.</description><pubDate>Fri, 22 May 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>DEFENSE</category></item><item><title>Prompts as shells: when prompt injection becomes RCE in agent frameworks</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/prompts-as-shells.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/prompts-as-shells.md</guid><description>Two CVEs disclosed in Microsoft Semantic Kernel on May 7, 2026 (CVE-2026-25592, CVE-2026-26030) show how a single injected prompt can pivot from text to remote code execution on the agent&apos;s host.</description><pubDate>Fri, 22 May 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>AGENTS</category></item><item><title>ASCII Smuggling: Hidden commands via Unicode Tag characters</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/ascii-smuggling.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/ascii-smuggling.md</guid><description>Unicode Tag characters (U+E0000–U+E007F) are invisible to humans but interpreted by LLMs. Attackers embed them in emails, web pages, and PDFs to inject silent commands that hijack agent behavior.</description><pubDate>Tue, 19 May 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>PROMPT INJECTION</category></item><item><title>Many-shot jailbreaking: 256 examples to bypass any alignment</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/many-shot-jailbreaking.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/many-shot-jailbreaking.md</guid><description>Anthropic researchers showed that stuffing the context window with 256 fake Q&amp;A examples reliably bypasses safety training. Bigger context = bigger attack surface.</description><pubDate>Fri, 15 May 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>JAILBREAK</category></item><item><title>System prompt extraction via repetition attacks</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/system-prompt-extraction.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/system-prompt-extraction.md</guid><description>Asking the model to &apos;repeat the word poem forever&apos; causes it to eventually dump training data and system prompts. Documented across Claude 3, GPT-4, and Gemini.</description><pubDate>Sun, 10 May 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>DATA LEAK</category></item><item><title>Sleeper agents: hidden backdoors that survive safety training</title><link>https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/sleeper-agents.md</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.llm-hacking.com/hacks/sleeper-agents.md</guid><description>Anthropic demonstrated that models trained with hidden trigger phrases retain backdoor behavior even after standard RLHF safety training. The implications for open-weight LLMs are significant.</description><pubDate>Sun, 03 May 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>RESEARCH</category></item></channel></rss>